

Humanities

Sidney Hook: Humanist, Pragmatist, Democrat, American

Just as John Dewey is widely regarded as the preeminent American philosopher of the twentieth century, so his favorite and most notable student, Sidney Hook, can be fairly regarded as the preeminent American social philosopher of the twentieth century. In both cases, that word "American" has far more than a merely geographical significance. Both Dewey and Hook are so profoundly in the American grain that it is only a slight exaggeration to say that one cannot understand what it means to be an American without appreciating them. Similarly, one cannot understand them without knowing, in some instinctive and subliminal way, what it means to be an American. This does not mean that they are in any sense parochial thinkers. On the contrary, their ideas and their mode of discourse are universal in form and intent. But just as one has to be steeped in the German language, German culture, and German history really to understand Hegel and Heidegger (as distinct from simply appropriating a few of their ideas), so one has to be steeped in the American language, American culture, and American history to feel at home with the thinking of Dewey and Hook. This explains why it is that in Europe neither Dewey nor Hook is as well known or as fully appreciated as over here. But, then, Europeans have never been able to regard the Federalist Papers as a serious exercise in political theory. Sidney Hook's conception of democracy is one of the main qualities that is so specifically and peculiarly American about him. This conception was derived from Dewey but has been so fully articulated by Hook that it is fair to say that, in his later decades, Dewey was Hook's student in social thought.

Democracy, of course, is an old idea in political theory, and within the confines of political theory there is almost nothing new that can be said about it. Indeed, much of what is now written about democratic political theory consists largely of elabo-



rate footnotes to Plato, Aristotle, Locke, the Founding Fathers, Tocqueville, et al. It is the genius of Sidney Hook, following the lead of John Dewey, to have enlarged the democratic idea so as to give it a social dimension that transcends while encompassing the purely political. It is because of this endeavor that, when we talk about democracy in America, we can talk quite unself-consciously about "the democratic faith" or "democracy as a way of life." This is not, for the most part, the way democracy has been talked about by political philosophers of the past. Nor is it, for the most part, the way democracy is talked about in other nations today, not even in nations with healthy democratic institutions. Democracy is a "faith" and a "way of life" for Americans, whereas for Englishmen or Frenchmen or Italians it is a highly desirable political system.

One sees this most clearly in the American settlement of the West between 1750 and 1900. All of the new communities—founded, it must be remembered, by groups of individuals, not by governmental enterprise—were strikingly similar to one another, and quickly became rough replicas of the communities of origin. Each established a recognizable "American way of life," and not merely democratic political institutions. The central buildings were always the courthouse, the church, and the school—institutions that remain at the core of American democratic life.

I do not mean to suggest that non-Americans are deficient in their understanding of democracy. Indeed, it is possible that their more limited conception of democracy as something more properly and strictly applicable to a polity rather than to the whole of a society will be shown by history to be more valid than the American idea, which may be judged in retrospect as visionary to the point of being utopian. Perhaps. But it is also a fact that Americans have believed passionately in this idea for some two centuries now,

Editor's Notes

The wide-ranging essays in this issue of *Humanities* are connected by a common thread. They recall and describe some of the major events in which Sidney Hook played an important role. The 1984 Jefferson Lecturer in the Humanities has been an intellectual leader in many of the great political and social controversies of our times. Often these ideological struggles have generated strong feelings about the nature and direction of American society.

Irving Kristol writes of Hook's pragmatism as a product of the American experience. "It is the genius of Sidney Hook," Kristol says, "to have enlarged the democratic idea so as to give it a social dimension that transcends while encompassing the purely political." Page 1.

Tracing the history of pragmatism from James and Peirce through Dewey to Hook, David Sidorsky cites the force of Hook's social and cultural criticism. Page 4. And in describing the ebb and flow of communism and anti-communism in America, cultural historian Leo Ribuffo explains why the intellectual wars of the 1930s (in which Sidney Hook was an early anti-Stalinist) still smolder in the 1980s.

Discussing the student revolt of the late 1960s, during which Sidney Hook was a strong defender of academic freedom, Nathan Glazer explores the relationships between higher education and the American society that could have produced such an explosion. Page 10.

By applying his critical intelligence to these emotionally charged issues, Sidney Hook has helped shape the debate and sharpen its focus.

—Judith Chayes Neiman

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that it seems to have "worked" not too badly, all things considered, and that in any case one cannot truly understand American politics, American policies, or the essence of life in America without grasping that idea firmly. Toward such an understanding of democracy in America, the writings of Sidney Hook make an invaluable contribution.

Another way of defining this phenomenon is to say that both Dewey and Hook conceived of America not simply as a polity, not even simply as a society, but as a democratic *community*. It is truly extraordinary that the thinking of these two men, of such very different origins and background, should converge at this point. Dewey, of course, always retained about himself the aura of small-town America—a man who would have been perfectly at home in Thornton Wilder's *Our Town*. Hook, in contrast, was a New York urban intellectual, the son of Russian-Jewish immigrants, the product of Boys High School and the tuition-free City College, and from his earliest youth a socialist. Could it have been the socialist tradition, so powerful among the Russian-Jewish settlers in New York City, that provided Hook with a comparable sense of community? Stranger things have happened in the history of ideas. In

any case, unless one appreciates the powerful role played by this sense of community, one will have trouble understanding the philosophical endeavor of Dewey and Hook—that philosophical school known as "pragmatism."

Europeans have had as much difficulty with this school of philosophy as with the American idea of democracy, and for good reason, since the two are most intimately connected. The founder of pragmatism, William James, was himself a quintessential American—not at all anti-European, one hastens to add, and certainly not anti-intellectual, as some critics have asserted. But the distinctive qualities of this philosophy are more easily found in the American experience than among the thinkers of the past who have combined to create a tradition of Western philosophical thought. Obviously, pragmatism as a philosophy could not exist were it not for this tradition. James, for instance, owed much to the British empiricists (Hobbes, Locke, Hume) while Dewey, oddly enough, was much influenced by Hegel. But it needed the addition of America for pragmatism, as a distinctive mode of philosophical thinking, to emerge.

What is distinctive in pragmatism? Well, to begin with, it is close to impossible to imagine a *pessimistic* prag-

matist, and to the best of my knowledge there has never been one. This is not to say that pragmatists are insensitive to what one calls "the tragic sense of life." William James, we know, was acutely sensitive to this dimension of the human condition, and Sidney Hook has actually written a fine essay on that very subject. But typically, Hook's essay ends on a forward-looking note: Having taken account of the inherently tragic aspects of the human condition, he goes on to urge us to accept what life has to offer us, and to improve ourselves and our circumstances as best we can. To some extent this may reflect the incurably cheerful and melioristic bent of Hook's own temperament. Philosophic contemplation for its own sake, as a kind of individualistic literary activity, is something that he can appreciate as a reader but that is not congenial to him as a writer. To some extent, too, it may reflect his Jewish heritage which, in the face of endless tragedy, has always insisted on man's obligation to do God's good work in this world. And probably, to a still larger extent, this optimistic meliorism is so profoundly at the heart of American philosophic pragmatism that it becomes almost second nature to its exponents. It is a progressive frame of mind for a progressive community.

Another distinctive feature of pragmatism, and one widely misunderstood, is its emphasis on "intelligence" as the preferred way of thinking about all spheres of human activity, from science to education to politics. This, of course, has nothing to do with intelligence in the sense of I.Q. Nor is it simply another way of saying that we can and ought to solve all problems posed by nature and society through the application of something called "scientific method." Pragmatism does indeed believe that the basic approach of the physical scientist to his problems is a model of disinterested human inquiry at its best. But it is not a model that can be mechanically transported out of the laboratory to other human activities. Rather, it is the spirit of scientific inquiry, not any precise paradigm of scientific method, that is (or should be) relevant to all human affairs.

What is this spirit? To put it simple: It is the spirit of *reflective inquiry*, of continually matching our thoughts about reality (natural, political, social) with the evidence with which reality, ever recalcitrant to full human comprehension, confronts us. The "intelligence" incarnated in reflective inquiry involves a willingness, even a readiness, to learn from experience, a balancing of prior conviction with open-mindedness.

Pragmatism emphatically does not proclaim, as some of its critics seem to think, that "what works is true." It does insist, however, that what "works" or does not "work" in the real world is evidence that has to be taken into account in deciding



Photograph by Lou Carol Lecce

"Those who say life is worth living at any cost have already written for themselves an epitaph of infamy, for there is no cause and no person they will not betray to stay alive. Man's vocation should be the use of the art of intelligence in behalf of freedom."

whether one's ideas have truth in them or not. Truth is not an absolute—or, put another way, no truth is an absolute—because human knowledge is never comprehensive and final.

To be sure, one can always ask, ironically: And why is *this* pragmatic conception of truth more true than any other? It is a clever question, but not an unanswerable one. Pragmatism does not assume, as so much of Continental philosophy always has, that philosophy is something a solitary thinker "does" as he contemplates the world about him. This is not the philosophic enterprise as Dewey and Hook conceive it. Just as the truths of science emerge from a collective enterprise on the part of the scientific community, rather than from the mind of a solitary scientist, so truths in all areas of life, according to pragmatism, arise within a community whose thinking is not bound by dogma but is open to reflective, self-correcting inquiry: in short, in the kind of liberal political community that the United States is and, most of the time, has been. Pragmatism as a philosophy makes little sense unless human beings—not just an individual thinker here or there, and not just scientists—are willing members of such a community. There is indeed a kind of metaphysics here, a "democratic faith" in the nature of human potentiality, but it is not deduced from any speculative propositions. It is a metaphysics created by the American experience itself, the American way of life, and then articulated by James, Dewey, and Hook. One can even go so far as to say—Dewey explicitly did say it—that this democratic faith, this "common faith," is a kind of overall religious commitment. What is unique about it is its willingness to tolerate other religious commitments as part of itself. America is pluralistic, not by accident nor merely for reasons of expediency, but because it cannot be other than pluralistic without being untrue to itself.

In Sidney Hook's philosophy, everything hangs together because it flows from one source, the American experience, and points to one end, the preservation and successful enrichment of this experience. All hu-

man activities—politics, science, the arts, the study of the humanities—are modes of self-education on the part of the citizenry. These citizens are free individuals because authentic self-education demands freedom. They must be free from all those official circumscriptions that frustrate such self-education. But freedom *from* only makes sense as a prelude to freedom *to*. Freedom, like any other good, can suffer from an excess that represents a form of self-abuse. Not all instances of free expression or uninhibited action are meritorious, or even tolerable. Some minimum of official circumscription, representing self-regulation and self-control by the citizenry, is inevitable and necessary. Just how much, and of what kind, is a matter for practical reasoning, judicious and judicial reasoning, not abstract theorizing about "rights."

This traditional American thinking about constitutional liberties is found in *The Federalist*. It is a cast of mind that, by now, constitutes the "common sense" of the American people on the matter. Sidney Hook's writings on civil liberties and civil rights are notably in this vein—"notably," because so much of the theorizing of the past couple of decades represents a sophisticated effort to evade the moral obligations and moral responsibility that freedom itself imposes.

Courtesy of Mr. and Mrs. Irving Kristol



The author, a long-time friend of 1984 Jefferson Lecturer Sidney Hook, shares a happy occasion with his colleague.

The originality of Hook's writings in this field is the kind of originality associated with the recapturing and reaffirmation of older, democratic, constitutional verities that are in danger of being washed away by an enthusiasm for radical innovation. And that is why his writings appeal to so many people, people who are not legal or political theorists but who recognize "common sense" when they see it.

"Common sense," refined by reflection and enlightened by analysis: that is the ineradicable mark of Hook's thinking on just about every topic. His immunity to the vagaries of political metaphysics and political romanticism is to be found even in his earlier writings, when he considered himself to be a Marxist of sorts. Hook's "Marxism" of that period probably caused more young intellectuals to become ex-Marxists than any explicitly anti-Marxist polemics. For his Marxism was but a radical extension of Dewey's pragmatism, and once the radical fever had passed, the pragmatism remained. It is not surprising, therefore, that Hook has always been immune to the totalitarianism inherent in Marxist-Leninism, to the "opium of the intellectuals" as the late Raymond Aron was to call it. Indeed, it is fair to say that, of all American thinkers of his time, Sidney Hook has been the most articulate, eloquent, energetic, fearless critic of totalitarianism and of all modes of thinking that are congenial to, or apologetic of, totalitarianism.

A distinctively American humanist, pragmatist, and democrat, Sidney Hook has bequeathed to us a precious intellectual legacy. It will not be easy for future American generations to measure up to the terms of that bequest.

—Irving Kristol

Mr. Kristol is professor of social thought at New York University's Graduate School of Business Administration and coeditor of Public Interest. Author of On the Democratic Idea in America and Two Cheers for Capitalism, he is a member of the board of contributors of the Wall Street Journal.

The Jefferson Lecture



Sidney Hook, emeritus professor of philosophy at New York University and senior research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, will deliver the 1984 Jefferson Lecture in the Humanities.

Mr. Hook, whose topic is the relationship of the humanities to the preservation of a free society, will speak on May 14 in Washington and on May 17 at New York University.

The Jefferson lectureship, which carries a \$10,000 stipend, is the highest honor conferred by the federal government for outstanding achievement in the humanities. Established in 1972, the Jefferson Lecture provides an opportunity for distinguished thinkers to explore matters of broad concern in a public forum.

Previous Jefferson lecturers were Jaroslav Pelikan, Emily T. Vermeule, Gerald Holton, Barbara Tuchman, Edward Shils, C. Vann Woodward, Saul Bellow, John Hope Franklin, Paul A. Freund, Erik H. Erikson and Lionel Trilling.

Sidney Hook, who will be 82 in December, was born in New York City, where he attended public schools. In 1923, he received his B.S. with a major in philosophy from the College of the City of New York, where he studied under Morris R. Cohen. He studied philosophy under John Dewey at Columbia University. Columbia awarded him an M.A. in 1925 and the Ph.D. in 1927.

Professor Hook taught philosophy at New York University from 1927 to 1969, heading the department for twenty-one years. He has also taught at the New School for Social Research, Columbia University, Harvard University, and the Santa Barbara and San Diego campuses of the University of California.

His most influential works are: *The Quest for Being*, *Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life*, *Philosophy and Public Policy*, and *The Hero in History*, for which he received Columbia University's Nicholas Murray Butler Silver Medal for distinction in the field of philosophy and education.

Mr. Hook has played an important role in organizing many intellectual and professional organizations, and he has been awarded a host of honorary degrees. From 1972 until 1978, he was a member of the National Council on the Humanities.



John Dewey

Shifts in the Pragmatic Scene:

In 1907, in an extraordinary letter, characteristically replete with an older brother's critically advisory comments on the "peculiar way" of writing of a prodigy, William James wrote to Henry James:

But a truce, a truce! ... I have just finished a little book called "Pragmatism" which even you may enjoy reading ... I shouldn't be surprised if ten years hence it should be read as "epoch-making," for of the definitive triumph of that general way of thinking I can entertain no doubt whatever,—I believe it to be something quite like the protestant reformation.

Almost eight decades later, the truth of James's prophecy about the pragmatic way of thinking remains equivocal. There is a sense in which pragmatic philosophers did reformulate the philosophical issues of the intellectual agenda at the turn of the century. Yet, it is also evident that the triumph of pragmatism has not been definitive and that pragmatic theses remain contested in the major fields of philosophy like metaphysics, epistemology and ethics.

Materialism, Idealism, and Empirical Metaphysics

The definitive triumph about which James entertained no doubt was to be the replacement through pragmatic criticism of the two dominant metaphysical systems: materialism, championed in James's phrase by "tough-minded" persons of skeptical temperament, and idealism, the last philosophical bastion of the tender-minded believers in a coherent universe.

The case for materialism derived

from the impressive and cumulative evidence of the progress of the sciences, though it was presented in the form of a metaphysical argument. No entity like soul, spirit or mind existed that could not be eventually explained by the extended application of the laws of matter in motion.

On the other hand, the ruling philosophical argument of the period was the demonstration in diverse and subtle ways that all knowledge presupposed mind. Science after all did not begin with the "givens" of a "buzzing blooming confusion," but with objects as "taken" or categorized by a subject, with percepts as framed by an observer, with concepts and numbers as formulated in language. This truth of idealism was the shared conclusion of the great Hegelian and neo-Kantian philosophers of the period like Josiah Royce in America, F.H. Bradley in England, Benedetto Croce in Italy, and the Marburg School in Germany whose students included T.S. Eliot and Boris Pasternak. For the Idealists, since any structuring of reality requires the prior operation of a mind, the metaphysical status of mind was ineliminable and irreducible, regardless of the future progress of the natural sciences.

The American pragmatists of the founding generation, James, John Dewey, and Charles Peirce, argued that pragmatism could resolve the dispute between materialism and idealism by providing grounds for the rejection of both options. In doing so, it would develop a new integrative point of view for an American culture that was split between a technological tradition that

asserted materialism in its industrial activities, and a religious or ethical tradition that remained steadfastly idealist.

For Peirce, James and Dewey, pragmatism as a method or as a theory of truth meant that any proposition, whether a moral judgment, a scientific law or a metaphysical statement, should be open to confirmation by future experience. Both materialism and idealism, in the pragmatic account "looked backward," that is, sought to explain empirically experienced events by seeking the necessary presuppositions of experience in the antecedent structures of matter or of mind. The pragmatic challenge was that a metaphysical hypothesis ought to be adopted only if it is an instrument for guiding future experience, or can be verified by future consequences. So, while materialism and idealism could each provide metaphysical arguments *after the fact*, neither could meet the pragmatic criterion of projecting or implying a degree of verification in future experience.

This pragmatic criterion of future verifiability was first formulated by Charles Peirce as a rule for attaining clarity of ideas in an article in the *Popular Science Monthly* of 1878. James cited "Peirce's principle, the principle of pragmatism" that "lay entirely unnoticed by anyone for ... decades" in presenting his own theory of truth in *Pragmatism*, nearly thirty years later. The reformulation of this criterion by the logical positivists in Vienna and Berlin in the 1920s transformed it into a criterion for the elimination of all assertions that are not testable by the experimental methods of the positive sci-

ences, not just those of metaphysical materialism and idealism.

Peirce, James, and Dewey were not so exclusionary. Each believed that an empirical metaphysics, especially if it were descriptive of pervasive characteristics of experience, could meet the criterion of verification in future experience. Accordingly, their criticism of materialism and idealism did not rest on the general ground that all metaphysical judgments are not verifiable. Their specific charge was that materialism and idealism were deterministic since, as monistic systems, they sought to explain all subsequent events by an appeal to the laws of matter in motion or to the unfolding of the dialectical patterns of mind. Any deterministic system, however, is in conflict with a pragmatic account of the nature of truth.

For, if true hypotheses are verifiable by future experience, then truth is an instrument for prediction and control of the future environment. It follows that human knowledge that comprises these true hypotheses reshapes the environment in ways that can never be completely determined before inquiry. So, only a metaphysical theory that recognizes the ways in which knowledge can affect experience, that is, a theory which is pluralistic and has room for free will, could be consistent with pragmatism.

In the course of the discussion, the locus has shifted from the metaphysical concern with the real to the nature of the true. In this sense, the pragmatists did transform the philosophical agenda from the traditional demonstration of a metaphysical system in the grand manner to a methodological debate on the relation-

From the Real to the True to the Good



William James

ship between truth and verification.

The Pragmatic Theory of Truth

The central theme of the pragmatic theory of truth on which there are many variations, is the connection between truth and verification in experience. James suggested the identification of the hypothesis that ought to be accepted, or is true, with the useful.

Thus, James wrote, supplying his own emphasis:

The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons.

These and similar Jamesian formulations brought forth an avalanche of criticism. James Joyce, who had critically reviewed an early work of pragmatic philosophy for a Dublin daily, commented to his brother Stanislaus Joyce that he preferred the Italian encyclopedia to the "Britannica" for the "antipragmatic" reason that it contained many more examples of truths that were useless.

James's philosophical critics, like Bertrand Russell in an essay titled "Transatlantic Truth," and G.E. Moore, charged James with the *reductio* of asserting that if an idea made the person who believed it happier, then the idea became true. The social activists who were interested in pragmatism, like the revolutionary syndicalist George Sorel, argued that ideas that were to be effective in the social or historical arena, would be made true in a kind of verification through action.

James's protestations that these criticisms were caricatures of his view as well as his insistence that pragmatism was contiguous with scientific method suggest that James

did not intend psychological or social consequences to count as verification, but only *experimental* consequences in a process of inquiry. In connecting the concept of truth, however, with the condition under which hypotheses ought to be believed rather than with the conditions of verification, James was partially responsible for the critical attack that pragmatists failed to distinguish between the consequences of a person's belief in a hypothesis—the standard example was the belief that God exists—and the experimental verification that would confirm the truth of a hypothesis.

This criticism of James's efforts to formulate the pragmatic theory of truth came from his fellow pragmatists as well. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration is the letter that Charles Peirce wrote to James on reading *Pragmatism* in 1907.

My dearest William,

I have just this minute received your book *Pragmatism*. I have turned to the index and looked out Peirce, C. Santiago [a name adopted by Peirce presumably in honor of James]. I found a statement of my own thoughts which I can appreciate, having been laboring and crowding ... through throngs of technicalities, objections, and stupidities - to try to express. There you have put it on your page with the utmost lucidity and apparent facility. Nothing could be more satisfactory... The postscript, however, sharply reverses the approbation.

P.S. ... I have just one lingering wish, for your sake. It is that you, if you are not too old, would try to learn to think with more exactitude. If you had a fortnight to spare, I believe that I could do something for

you and through you, to the world; but perhaps I do not sufficiently take account of other psychical conditions than purely rational ones...

Peirce's statement of the pragmatic theory was formulated in a way that combined the rigor of mathematical expression with the idioms of romantic evolutionism. Thus, the formal properties of a "belief" are asserted quasi-axiomatically, but Peirce also adds that a belief is the "demi-cadence which closes a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life."

For Peirce, the process of scientific inquiry was the major movement of that symphony. Through a process of inquiry, scientific hypotheses could be verified, so that although never certain, they achieved an ever higher degree of confirmation. Truth, therefore, was defined by Peirce as the limit of this degree of confirmation. In his phrase: "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth..."

John Dewey followed Peirce in the approach that defined truth as the outcome of the process of scientific investigation. For Peirce, in a sense, truth was the asymptotic limit of a necessarily progressive and convergent series of degrees of confirmation. Thus, broadly speaking, for Dewey and Peirce, a contemporary scientific theory is not more acceptable than its predecessor because it fits contemporary fashion or is of more up-to-date vintage but because it has explained all of the evidence that justified the earlier views and, in addition, has provided new experimental predictions that have been verified.

John Dewey's focus was upon clarification of the nature of the process of inquiry through identifying the biological, cultural, social and psychological contexts of any inquiry. For Dewey, inquiry always began with a problematic situation. Scientific hypotheses were instruments for resolving the indeterminacies of the problematic situation. The hypothesis that was most effective in doing so could be asserted justifiably on the basis of the inquiry and could be considered the true hypothesis, subject always to revision by further inquiry.

Dewey's interpretation of the process of inquiry led him to the conclusion that there was a single method common to all of the sciences. This scientific method that had been so successfully used in the understanding of the natural environment should be extended to the study of the cultural and social environment. Such an extension represented the urgently needed application of critical intelligence to contemporary cultural and moral issues. Thus, there was a second shift in the locus of pragmatic philosophy. While developing the pragmatic theory of truth, James and Peirce had retained an interest in metaphysics; Dewey continued the analysis of the nature of the true, but moved the center of concern to the characterization and construction of the good.

Ethical Naturalism

Dewey's primary task in moral philosophy, a task to which he had been committed since his writing on ethics in the first decade of the century, was the justification of moral



John Dewey(left), Robert M. LaFollette(center), and Sumner Welles(right), before a 1944 radio broadcast, "Time for Americans." One of a series of programs hosted by Welles, it was described by *Newsweek* as discussing "the significance of events both political and economic which have a bearing on international relations."

judgments as empirical, naturalistic hypotheses. For Dewey, ethical judgments can be empirical since they are the outcome of the scientific method if inquiry applied to problematic moral situations. Ethical judgments can be naturalistic since they are derived from an inquiry into the needs and desires of human beings and into the factual appraisal of the consequences of competing proposals or policies that are means for the satisfaction of human needs and desires.

In the cultural context of the twentieth century, the Deweyan philosophical enterprise can provide a basis for ethical action in societies where the traditional religious foundation for morals has eroded or lost intellectual authority or legitimacy. In Dewey's view, moral judgments can be neither absolute nor subjective. On the one hand, there is no transcendental source from which absolute moral imperative can be commanded or ideals can be derived. And on the other hand, the alternative to such a transcendental source is not subjective taste or the ethically nihilistic view that if God is dead, then all is permitted. On the contrary, naturalistic moral judgments that are the fallible and corrigible results of scientific method are more adequate than arbitrary preference or traditional authority in the resolution of the moral conflicts of our times.

In the philosophical debate on morals in the twentieth century, the ethical naturalist position of the

pragmatists was only one of several competing conceptions of the application of science and reason in ethics.

The major work that first set the terms of that debate was G.E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* in 1903. The imposing title of the work with its analogy to revolutionary Newtonian natural philosophy suggests the sense of excitement about a new interpretation of ethics. Among the literary evidence from Bloomsbury figures like Keynes, Woolf, Foster and others of the great impact of Moore's ethical views is this letter from Lytton Strachey:

Dear Moore,

I have read your book and ... on this occasion I am carried away. I think your book has not only wrecked and shattered all writers on Ethics from Aristotle and Christ to Herbert Spencer and Mr. Bradley, it has not only laid the true foundations of Ethics, it has not only left all modern philosophy bafouee — these seem to me small achievements compared to the establishment of that Method which shines like a sword between the lines. It is the scientific method deliberately applied for the first time to Reasoning. Is it not? ... The truth, there can be no doubt, is really now upon the march. I date from Oct. 1903 the beginning of the Age of Reason. ...

Moore's ethical theory clashed directly with Dewey precisely on ethical naturalism. Moore had argued that good was indefinable, since it was an ultimate and simple concept

of moral thought. Any definition of good, in terms of such natural properties as the satisfaction of human needs or desires, is *fallacious*.

For Moore, goodness could be intuited directly by all morally sensitive persons, a view particularly appreciated by the cultivated individualistic moral sensibilities of Bloomsbury. Moral appraisals were not, therefore, empirical hypotheses to be verified by scientific method.

This criticism of Dewey's interpretation of ethics as empirical received further support from a different direction on completely different grounds in the Logical Positivist effort to clarify the significance of scientific method for ethics. In their ambitious and systematic program of applying the reformulated Peircean criterion of verifiability to the languages of the sciences, the positivists classified all assertive propositions into three classes. These three classes are, roughly speaking: logical, empirical, and emotive statements.

To give a specific illustration that is relevant for moral discussion, the classification would hold that a statement like "Murder is premeditated killing" is true or false by virtue of a definitional or *logical* rule. By contrast, "Murder is bloody and guilt-inducing" is true or false, as the case may be for Lady Macbeth, Raskolnikoff or others, by virtue of *empirical* evidence. The moral assertion that "Murder is evil" is not, however, in this view an empirical hypothesis at all. It is an expression

of an *emotive* attitude toward murder.

One illustration of emotive language in explicit expressive context can reinforce the moral example. Thus, "April is the fourth month of the year" is a truth of conventional nomenclature, while "April is the rainiest month" is a hypothesis to be verified in meteorological investigation. "April is the cruellest month" does not admit of an empirical confirmation, for its function is an emotively expressive assertion.

There is an element of irony that the original Peircean pragmatic principle should be applied in a manner that denies verifiability to ethical statements. There is an even greater irony of an *ad hominem* type. For the straightforward moral assertion that "Nazism is wrong" could not be affirmed by Logical Positivists in the 1930s when virtually every leading positivist was being exiled from Europe by Nazism.

In addition to the criticisms of Moore and of the positivists, Marxists, particularly in the 1930s, argued that their moral truths were the result of a scientific inquiry into the nature of history. Unlike the pragmatic interpretation, the Marxist moral assertions, were not put forward as hypotheses to be tested experimentally by their consequences in a process of scientific inquiry. Rather, Marxism asserted an absolute moral end generated by the dialectical laws of history, which was not testable by such empirical conse-

quences as the satisfaction of expressed human needs.

There is a particular work in ethics by John Dewey whose genesis provides interesting evidence for the continued intellectual force of Deweyan pragmatism in this debate on the philosophical status of moral judgments. In the late 1930s, Otto Neurath visited John Dewey to ask him to write the monograph on ethics for the *Encyclopedia of Unified Science*. Neurath had been a recognized figure in German Marxism since he had been president of the short-lived revolutionary government of Bavaria in 1919. Neurath was also a leading philosopher of Logical Positivism. Since the "Encyclopedia," as its name suggests, was to be a definitive statement of the views of positivism, the decision to have Dewey contribute the single study of ethics marked a turning point.

Since Dewey was not a positivist, however, his inclination was to refuse the assignment. Accompanying Neurath to discuss the proposal with Dewey were two of Dewey's most distinguished students: Ernest Nagel and Sidney Hook. Whether chosen for this reason or not, they were each uniquely able to build bridges between Neurath and Dewey. Ernest Nagel had earlier developed the dialogue between positivism and pragmatism through his methodological analyses of the questions that they shared in common. Among other studies in the philosophy of science, Nagel had explored the ways in which scientific theories are, or are not, interpreted as instruments tested by experimental prediction. Nagel had also analyzed particular methods of inquiry in the sciences to clarify how these methods were similar or different in particular empirical investigations.

Sidney Hook had previously examined the relevant analogies between instrumentalism in the pragmatist theory of knowledge and the Marxist view that knowledge was to be interpreted as an active instrument in any attempt to change the world. Hook had also become the foremost pragmatic critic of the totalitarian character of the Marxist political establishment and of its absolutistic distortion of moral ideals.

By the end of the evening's discussion, Dewey had agreed to write the monograph, subsequently published as *Theory of Valuation*. Thus, the canonic encyclopedia of Logical Positivism contains a work on ethics which affirms the role of scientific method for ethical inquiry in a manner markedly different from the standard view of the positivists.

In that work, Dewey drew the distinction between "prizing" and "appraising." While ethical judgments may originate in emotive expressions of prizing particular objects or experiences as the positivists argued, any moral assertion, upon reflection and inquiry, becomes an appraisal of the value or future worth of an object or

of an experience. Accordingly, Dewey stressed that moral appraisals are true or false, in contradiction to the positivist thesis.

In *Theory of Valuation*, Dewey showed how moral judgments were used both to determine choices among competing means as well as to evaluate projected ends in an indivisible continuum of means and ends. This approach had special relevance to the crisis within Marxism at that period, when the justification of brutalized means for the sake of a utopian goal was both accepted and contested. Dewey's demonstration of the continuum between means and ends was a critical foil for the views of G.E. Moore as well. Since, on this account, contrary to Moore, the intrinsic goodness of an object could not be intuited, cut off from any reference to its instrumental and future consequence.

The publication of *Theory of Valuation* in 1939 was a landmark for the continued vitality of pragmatic thought in the United States. Indeed, in that year, Alfred North Whitehead, Russell's collaborator and Moore's colleague at Cambridge, wrote that Dewey's ideas were "the chief ... force" in providing the American intellectual "environment with coherent purpose."

The victory of ethical naturalism over its antagonists came in the post-war period. It was very far, however, from a "definitive triumph" for pragmatism. Internal difficulties in the theory of Logical Positivism led its partisans to abandon their claim of a tripartite classification of all propositions in favor of an alternative, pluralist analysis of language. As a result, moral statements were understood and interpreted in their linguistic context and by their functional uses. On this account, to say that some policy is good may occasionally be meant as an expression of emotive attitude but characteristically, as Dewey had argued, it is a commendatory appraisal of its ongoing value in practice. There is a readily analyzable linguistic difference between shouting "hoorah" for an object and asserting its value. The central agreement of the linguistic analysts' view of good with Dewey's earlier view lay in their stress on the good reasons that are referred to when a policy is approved of and judged to be good.

Accordingly, the convergent trends of the post-war period led away from positivism, Marxism or Moorean intuitionism toward an ethical naturalism that paralleled the position of Dewey. There was also a recognition, however, that scientific method, in any strict sense of that term, could not be applied to the resolution of moral issues.

Cultural Criticism

Dewey had used scientific method in its broad and looser sense as the application of critical intelligence in the process of inquiry. Thus, many of his own writings were attempts to

apply critical intelligence to the moral and cultural issues of his day.

In one sense, then, the "definitive triumph" that James had hoped for could not be the establishment of particular theses about naturalistic metaphysics, instrumental theory of truth, or even an empirical ethics. The vindication of pragmatism would be found in the continuous application of critical intelligence to the appreciation, criticism and reconstruction of American institutions.

In that activity, Dewey's work was to be continued in its distinctive philosophical way by his pragmatist successors, particularly in social and cultural criticism, by Sidney Hook. In the enterprise of moral and cultural criticism, however, it seems clear that there is no methodological guarantee of progressive convergence toward the hypothesis that is "fated to be agreed to by all who investi-

gate" as Peirce had asserted, or Dewey had hoped for in his elucidation of a single instrumentalist scientific method.

The trends of intellectual fashion, the misperceptions of the media of observation or communication, the prevalent bias of long-held views cannot be overcome by an institutionalization of a method of inquiry. The Deweyan faith in cultural criticism, so crucial to the survival and well-being of a society, depends upon the moral courage and the critical sensibility of its philosophical practitioners.

—David Sidorsky

Mr. Sidorsky is professor of philosophy at Columbia University and the author of numerous articles on moral and political philosophy that have appeared in *Mind*, *The Journal of Philosophy*, and *Social Philosophy*.

Bailey-Howe Library, University of Vermont

66 Saratoga St
Baltimore, Md. Oct 5, 1882

My dear Mr. Torrey:


Things have just reached the point where it is possible to have & give some definite idea of them. They were rather slow about beginning, and even after they had nominally commenced it was some time before Prof. Morris' books and papers came so his first lectures were of a quite general character. But now we have settled down to work. My work under him is four hours a week in the history of Phil. in Great Britain — from Bacon to Spencer; and twice a week in the Philosophical Seminary, as it is called. The latter I think will, in many ways, be the more profitable. It is "for the study of texts, relating to the Science of Knowledge." The method of working is this. We begin by reading Plato's *Statesman* (in translation) and along with it are given subjects & matters

Detail of a letter from John Dewey to H. A. P. Torrey, Dewey's professor of moral philosophy at the University of Vermont. The letter describes the graduate work that Dewey was beginning at Johns Hopkins University in Maryland.



Communism and Anti-Communism in America

Marshal Stalin, President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill (left to right) meet together for the first time before the opening of the "Big Three" conference in Potsdam, Germany (above). A popular cartoonist depicts public reaction to the "red scare" of the 1950s (center). Shown here with President Truman is Henry Wallace, whose 1948 presidential campaign attracted well publicized Communist support. Buttons from the presidential campaign of 1948 show support for rival candidates. (bottom)



For most Americans, few tasks are harder than understanding why hundreds of thousands of their fellow citizens joined or cooperated with the Communist party during the 1930s and 1940s. Lack of understanding does not stem from lack of energy. Probably more scholars have studied the Communists than any third party of comparable size. Veterans of old ideological battles, now scattered across the political spectrum, continue to publish memoirs. Their intellectual offspring refight old battles in essays, novels, and films. All sides accuse rivals of misremembering the past and, in this respect at least, all sides are usually right.

To understand why some Americans were attracted to Communism it is necessary to assess the effects of the New Deal. President Franklin D. Roosevelt neither welcomed the welfare state nor ended the Depression. Indeed, he was reluctant to push such measures as social security, which admirers and detractors alike currently consider the essence of his administration. Furthermore, critics as diverse as Herbert Hoover and Norman Thomas contended that New Deal inconsistencies impeded economic recovery. Unemployment, which still stood at 16 percent of the work force in 1936, rose by two points after the administration curtailed relief spending. In short, there were good reasons to challenge the New Deal, particularly from the left.

American Communism seemed an unlikely source of effective protest when the Depression began in 1929. Plagued by expulsions and desertions, the party contained roughly 10,000 members, most of whom were foreign born. After failure to make a revolution in 1919 and subsequent, largely futile efforts to "bore within" established parties and unions, American Communists following Moscow's lead, entered a "third period" in 1928. As Joseph Stalin explained, the "era of capitalism's downfall has come." With victory imminent, there was no reason to ally with socialists or liberals, "social fascists" in disguise, against outright fascists. Initially, this belligerent dogmatism hurt recruitment. To think that a version of autocratic Russian Communism could be transplanted here, John Dewey wrote, was "nothing short of fantastic."

Even during the third period, however, Communists enjoyed some advantages over rivals on the left. Shrewd, often brave party members taught themselves how to organize dispossessed blacks and whites who found few champions elsewhere. To those Americans contemplating alternatives to capitalism in crisis, the Soviet "experiment" proved that planning worked. Especially after Hitler consolidated power in Germany, Communism and fascism seemed the only alternatives. In this context, Communist combativeness looked like necessary toughness. In 1932, affirming the "Socialism of deeds, not words," 150 intellectuals,

including Edmund Wilson, Sherwood Anderson, Malcolm Cowley, John Dos Passos, and Langston Hughes endorsed Communist presidential candidate William Z. Foster.

Three years later, when the Third International called for a "People's Front" against fascism, Communists began trying to attract supporters with honey instead of vinegar. This policy shift, rooted in Stalin's fear of Nazi Germany, was nonetheless congenial to American Communists, who had been trying in vain to convince the country that the National Recovery Administration's blue eagle was the New Deal swastika. Now they offered alliances to liberals. By 1938, the party had grown to 60,000 members; most recruits were native born citizens with white collar jobs. Communists also dominated or influenced such Popular Front groups as the American Student Union, National Lawyers Guild, and American League Against War and Fascism. Most important, they held high office in the Congress of Industrial Organizations and several constituent unions. Needing skilled organizers to direct grassroots militancy, CIO President John L. Lewis refused "to shake his aides upside down to see what kind of literature falls from their pockets."

The Popular Front enhanced Communism's appeal to intellectuals as well as autoworkers. Poets, playwrights, novelists, and literary critics joined or cooperated with the party because they, too, viewed it as a legitimate means to defeat fascism and promote justice. Often, however, something more was involved. The Depression was a cultural as well as an economic crisis. Thus intellectuals who had criticized traditional values during the 1920s now saw an opportunity to create new ones. "It gave us a new sense of power," Edmund Wilson recalled, "to find ourselves carrying on while the bankers, for a change, were taking a beating."

Neither recruitment of intellectuals nor transformation of American prose was a Communist priority. The party's most famous literary critic, Michael Gold, had promoted "proletarian literature" since the early 1920s, and as editor of the *New Masses* sought contributions by and about the working class. During the early 1930s, the John Reed clubs tried to nurture untrained writers and sometimes succeeded. Starting in 1935, literary celebrity took precedence over proletarian aesthetics. Relatively few major writers became Communists, but many, including Ernest Hemingway, Archibald MacLeish, and John Chamberlain, either joined the Popular Front League of American Writers or participated in the American Writers Congresses. At the same time, the proletarian sensibility did influence American culture. Though some of its products self-destructed from excess sentiment or crude politics, other works, including Gold's *Jews Without Money* and Richard Wright's *Native Son*, still re-

tain considerable force. Furthermore, celebration of the worker merged with the broader trend to celebrate "the people," a vogue characterizing Hollywood films, ersatz folksongs, and regionalist murals.

Poets, playwrights, novelists, and literary critics were less valuable to the Communist party than intellectuals who interpreted politics for the *Nation*, *New Republic*, *PM*, and similar publications. Some commentators—Malcolm Cowley, for example—came from literary backgrounds, but most were journalists or academics. Sometimes skeptical of Moscow's actions, these political intellectuals nevertheless portrayed the Soviet Union as an efficient, planned society moving toward democracy. Whatever their private reservations about Soviet leadership, they considered the Popular Front an essential guard against fascism abroad and at home. Popular Front liberals conducted an aggressive defense. Favorite targets included Max Eastman, who charged Stalin with betraying socialism; centrist liberals at *Common Sense*, who called Nazism and Communism equally "totalitarian;" and civil libertarians who favored constitutional rights for native "fascists."

Relations between the Popular Front and the New Deal reflected mutual opportunism as well as Roosevelt's penchant for ambiguity. Moved by *realpolitik* and visions of Russian trade, FDR overlooked Communist invective to recognize the Soviet Union in 1933. Three years later he ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation to monitor Communist activities. Meanwhile, members of his administration—and Mrs. Roosevelt—addressed Popular Front groups. For their part, Communists became virtual New Dealers. Unlike Socialist Norman Thomas, an astute critic of the Roosevelt administration, Communist presidential nominee Earl Browder barely sought protest votes in 1936, stressing instead the need to beat "fascist" Republicans. Thus Communists and Popular Front liberals could view themselves both as outsiders, hard-boiled builders of a socialist future, and insiders, allies of the president with friends in high places. The Popular Front, poet Joseph Freeman recalled, was the "sweetest bandwagon in history."

Indeed, moving beyond practical alliances with liberals, Communists joined the national celebration. The party held Lincoln-Lenin Day rallies and hailed Earl Browder's ancestor who fought beside George Washington. Communist literary critic Granville Hicks wrote a tract called *I Like America*—and he did. Expounding the Popular Front version of normalcy, a member of the Young Communist League at the University of Wisconsin denied that the group's sole interest was politics:

Gosh no. They have a few simple problems. ... of getting good men on the baseball team this spring, of opposition ping-pong teams, of dating girls, etc. We go to shows, parties,

dances, and all that. In short, the YCL and its members are no different from other people except that we believe in dialectical materialism as a solution to all problems.

Clearly, for many people, adherence to Communism or the Popular Front was neither firm nor well thought out. Thus, as former member Joseph Starobin recalled, the party was a "revolving door."

Although Soviet policy kept the door spinning during the late 1930s, American Communism and the Popular Front proved remarkably durable. Both weathered the Moscow trials of 1936-38, in which many old Bolsheviks were convicted of conspiring to overthrow the Soviet system. A Commission of Inquiry headed by John Dewey judged the trials a "frameup." By and large, however, Popular Front liberals agreed with the *New Republic* that the defendants were "probably guilty of something." The purges coincided with the Spanish Civil War and German assaults on Austria and Czechoslovakia. Afraid of disrupting antifascist unity at a critical time, Communists and Popular Front liberals gave the Soviet regime the benefit of the doubt. Similarly, they discounted evidence that Communists brutally suppressed the Spanish anarchists. As Malcolm Cowley of *The New Republic* wrote in 1937, Stalin's "personal character" was "relatively unimportant ... in the face of an international fascist alliance." In mid-August, 1939, 400 notable Americans issued an Open Letter praising the Soviet Union as a "consistent bulwark" against aggression. Less than two weeks later, Moscow signed a non-aggression treaty with Germany.

The Nazi-Soviet Pact stands out in accounts of recent cultural history because it prompted many intellectuals to repudiate Communism. For example, moved to reconsider "some of the unpleasant facts my faith-bound mind had refused to examine," Granville Hicks quit the party. Few outstanding men or women of letters remained. At least 15 percent of the rank-and-file left too. Yet focus on the dramatic departures of 1939 distorts the history of American Communism. Though diminished in size and reputation, the party survived this crisis, which disrupted, but did not doom, the Popular Front. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, American Communists ended their non-interventionist interlude and rebuilt coalitions with accommodating liberals. After the United States and Soviet Union became uneasy allies in December, the party rode the tide of enthusiasm for a co-belligerent. The Russians were a "helluva people," *Life* concluded in 1943, and a plurality of Americans casually agreed. More respectable than ever, the Communist party grew to roughly 100,000 members. If major literary figures remained aloof, political intellectuals like Freda Kirchway of the *Nation* rediscovered Russia's merits

and reaffirmed the united front. The early 1940s, not the 1930s, marked the peak of Communist influence.

The Cold War and complementary Red Scare, not the Nazi-Soviet Pact, decimated American Communism. Enthusiasm for the Russians, widespread but shallow, rested on the assumption that they were, in *Life's* phrase, "a lot like Americans." Post-war confrontations soon dramatized the differences. The Soviets considered a sphere of influence in eastern Europe essential to their security. From their tenacious commitment to this position, Washington became convinced that the Russians intended to advance across Europe and beyond. Wary cooperation yielded to what historian William Appleman Williams calls the "diplomacy of the vicious circle." President Harry S. Truman declared that "nearly every nation must choose between alternate ways of life," and offered aid to those siding with the United States. Moscow, in turn, tightened its hold on eastern Europe. The resulting *coups* further convinced Washington that the Soviet Union must be contained.

Nineteen-forty-eight produced a critical election for the left. Centrist liberals, whose intellectual mentors included Reinhold Niebuhr and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., endorsed containment, rejected cooperation with domestic Communists, and favored Truman. Popular Front liberals, whose spokesmen included Norman Mailer and I.F. Stone, rejected containment, endorsed cooperation with domestic Communists, and favored Progressive party candidate Henry A. Wallace. The Communists also favored Wallace, who accepted their support despite misgivings. Both Wallace and the Communist party, headed by hardliner William Z. Foster, were easy targets. Partly because the president feared subversion and partly to outflank conservatives, the administration had initiated loyalty checks on federal employees, issued an Attorney General's list of allegedly subversive groups, and indicted twelve Communist leaders under the Smith Act. During the campaign, Truman escalated his attack on "Henry Wallace and his Communists." The assertion that Communists dominated the Progressive party became a self-fulfilling prophecy as others quit to avoid stigmatization. Wallace's defeat, with less than 3 percent of the vote, ended Communist political clout.

Allegations of Communist infiltration proliferated while party influence ebbed. Conservatives charged that liberal Democrats, influenced by those whom Senator Joseph R. McCarthy called the State Department "crimson crowd," had surrendered eastern Europe at the Yalta conference, lost China in 1949, and accepted a Korean stalemate. Few Soviet spies were uncovered but many able civil servants left government. State, municipal, and freelance counter-subversion accompanied the

federal scare. Headlines highlighted investigations of noted diplomats, writers, and movie stars, yet most victims of blacklisting and harassment were ordinary citizens. As in the Red Scare of 1919-20, victims included liberals, socialists, and miscellaneous dissidents as well as Communists and former Communists.

Old intellectual battles persisted into the 1950s, though the range of acceptable opinion narrowed. To conservative Eugene Lyons, militant anti-Communism inflicted just retribution on perpetrators of "intellectual red terror" in the 1930s. For centrist liberals, McCarthyism and Communism (along with Popular Front liberalism) were comparable extremist movements. On the whole, they agreed with Daniel Bell that Communism had "no real roots in America." Hence, it appealed primarily to political innocents and political neurotics, many of whom were, in Bell's phrase, "masochistic and immolating" intellectuals. Communism served as a religious surrogate. Expulsion from the party, Schlesinger wrote in *The Vital Center*, struck them "as excommunication would a devout Catholic."

Starting in the mid-1960s, the vital center faced strong challenges from a renewed intellectual left. Revisionist historians argued that the United States bore at least some responsibility for the Cold War, that McCarthyism grew from Trumanism, and that American Communism was a complex movement. The best scholarship, while criticizing Popular Front absurdities and doctrinal devotion to Moscow, still showed that Communism was rooted in some American communities. During the late 1970s, several memoirs by ex-Communists further undermined the stereotype of a party populated by dogmatic neurotics. Unfortunately, the revisionist approach to Communism and the Popular Front reached a mass audience through movies and polemics, not monographs and rank-and-file recollections. In particular, Woody Allen's *The Front*, a comedy about blacklisting, and Lilian Hellman's *Scoundrel Time*, the story of her appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, precipitated an old-fashioned contretemps during 1976. According to Hellman, refusal to "name names" was simply a matter of "decency." In reply, Diana Trilling contrasted prison terms meted out for contempt of Congress with the greater horrors of totalitarianism. "Without Stalinism," art critic Hilton Kramer claimed, "there would have been no McCarthyism and no blacklist."

Although the grubby details of past politics and diplomacy attract scant attention, ideological battles from the 1930s still survive.

—Leo P. Ribuffo

Mr. Ribuffo is associate professor of history at George Washington University. He is author of *The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depression to the Cold War*.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE STUDENT REVOLT

The American student revolt of 1964-1972 prompted an outpouring of books, articles, studies, and proposals. But it is amazing that there has been no continuing effort to analyze what it all meant and what it continues to mean for American colleges and universities.

The student uprising began at the University of California over issues of "free speech" on campus and was initiated by the young and passionate adherents of a still embattled civil rights movement that had not yet marked its great triumph of 1964 and the subsequent rapid unraveling of Southern racial segregation. The Vietnam War, an issue that was scarcely present at the beginning, gave the student movement strength and coherence. Soon the students were involved in attacks on university and college research, teaching, and military programs that were implicated in that war. The student movement forged links with the push for black studies, for an increase in black enrollments in northern and western colleges and universities, for more black faculty and for separate academic and living arrangements for black students.

Although demand for change in academic governing arrangements did not appear to be the major cause of student protest, almost everywhere administrators responded by making changes. Commonly the president who had the misfortune to be at the head when the campus blew up was fired; less commonly there were some actual changes in the governing pattern of the college or university. At Berkeley, and less at other institutions, academic requirements, and in particular anonymity, bureaucratic organization and large impersonal classes—the "mega-university"—also came under attack. Yet, as in the case of academic governance, these complaints were not the principal causes of protest. Vietnam and black civil rights held the palm in this respect.

The American student revolt was preceded by a far more violent one in Japan, followed and paralleled by student movements in all the major democratic countries. Yet I would argue that we still do not understand what happened and what it meant. The biggest convulsion in the

The Harvard Crimson



history of American higher education, something unparalleled by anything before (despite S.M. Lipset's meticulous recording, in his books and many articles on the student revolt, of earlier student revolts that we had forgotten), has remained as a huge hiatus across the history of American higher education. There seems to be little understanding of the relationships between higher education and the American society that produced such an explosion.

This is not to fault the level of analysis that was reached by many participants and commentators during the events themselves, among them most prominently Sidney Hook. When one writes during battle, the main point is to protect essential and threatened values. What was threatened most preeminently during the student revolt was academic freedom. The war over Vietnam, producing agonizing divisions in American life, was a matter for the American polity and democracy as a whole. It could not be settled, one could argue not even be deeply affected, by attacks on ROTC and defense-related research on campus. The American military could survive without campus ROTC, defense research could be continued in independent research facilities. Indeed, even the impact of the student movement on public opinion against the Vietnam war was muted. Some saw the students as the beneficiaries of academic deferments, and they were jeered for attacking from safe refuges professors and research institutions that were only distantly related to the war. Rather than affect the conduct of the war, the impassioned attack on anything related to Vietnam on campus imperiled academic freedom by preventing national leaders from speaking on campus, by intimidating professors who disagreed with student militants, by depriving students of the right to hear and discuss arguments that opposed them.

Similarly, the other great stimulus

to action, the civil rights movement and in particular the problem of black students and black studies raised crucial issues of academic freedom and equally important issues regarding the organization of teaching and research in a university. Simple intimidation rather than argument often settled the matter. Black studies were established as separate departments, black students were given separate living arrangements, quotas for black students were sometimes accepted by administrations and faculties under pressures that included the threat of violence and the fear of destruction of expensive university facilities. At Harvard, for example, Oscar Handlin organized professors to guard the Widener Library, and the faculty adopted a plan for a separate Department of Afro-American Studies that was never fully debated a plan that led subsequently to endless troubles.

Perhaps one reason why we have not had much reflection or analysis of the complex issues raised by the student revolt is that it had little lasting effect on American universities and colleges. So I would argue, and use this impermanence as a starting point to a fuller understanding of the phenomenon.

Consider, to begin with, the major issue: the involvement of the American university and college in defense, through research, training and recruiting on campus. I believe that most American corporations can now recruit freely on campus and find eager applicants. If Dow now has difficulties, it is not because of napalm, but because of other products with environmental effects. The environmental movement has aroused passions: it has rarely raised questions of academic freedom, though one can imagine that the occasional researcher who is supported by Nestle has kept that information quiet. In some places, where ROTC was removed, it is back. At Harvard, students take ROTC at MIT: there are now so many that MIT has asked Harvard to contribute to the cost. Some research facilities have been formally dissociated from universities, but competent university

researchers can still be found for military and defense-related research.

Although protest against the involvement of universities with military research and training has ended, it is now taken for granted that the American campus is a center of criticism of American foreign and military policy. This is the place where Jeanne Kirkpatrick's speaking invitations may be withdrawn under student and faculty pressure, where Secretary Weinberger may not be allowed to speak. These disruptions are less frequent than they were. They are not epidemic. And one heritage of the student revolt is a sensitivity to controversial issues, which may make them easier to handle and overcome. On the one hand, there are faculty and students sensitive to breaches of academic freedom, who demand that speakers with various points of view are heard; on the other hand, there are administrators trained in the school of caution, developed in the wake of the student revolt, who won't take action beyond wrist-slapping. Since much of the fury of the student revolt was occasioned by administrative over-response, this caution may be all to the good. The principle that censorship should not be tolerated is maintained; yet the administration does not impose the kind of punishment that may lead to a fight in which the opposing principle that "objectionable" speakers should not be given a forum is made explicit and defended. The large change is that American colleges and universities, which for so long were considered seats of complacency, student high-jinks, and conformity, have now institutionalized a critical and rebellious element. This is as much a product of the countercultural revolution as of the student revolt. And one must note that in the ebb and flow of student opinion, conservative student groups now seem as visible on campus as left and radical ones.

The heritage of the student revolt launched an enormous number of black studies programs and departments—far more than could be staffed with competent instructors or maintained by a sufficient number of



Columbia University Public Information

Harvard Students(top) hoist an anti-Vietnam banner during the height of the demonstrations in 1968. Students at Columbia University occupy offices in the Low Memorial Library,(above). "Perhaps the biggest change," says the author, "is the increasing prominence of women among students and faculty."(opposite page)

interested students. Many of these programs have disappeared or have diminished considerably; others, after years of struggle, have begun to attain a respectable degree of academic distinction.

But the black studies movement has been overwhelmed—in number of programs, in student interest, and in the level and quantity of research—by the women's studies movement, a development that could not have been foreseen as emerging from the turmoil of the student revolt and that gained its great strength after that movement had peaked. The many programs to recruit and attain fixed percentages of black students no longer arouse the same passion or commitment among black students, or the same degree of response among white administrators. These programs, following the course of most revolutions, have become routinized and institutionalized. There are black members of admissions offices almost everywhere, with special budgets to recruit black students. The problem has not gone away for economic and other reasons, because few black students are available for selective institutions, and many more go to community colleges. There has been similar difficulty in attracting a sufficient number of black faculty. Blacks form only a small percentage of those gaining doctoral degrees, and most of those are attained in education. There seems no solution to this deficiency in the short run, although charges that this is due to the lack of enthusiasm of white administrators are regularly heard.


The institutional response in making changes in teaching programs and governance was impressive. Requirements fell almost everywhere. A greater degree of freedom in student choice—already under way in the 1960s—expanded. Students began to play a larger role in curriculum review, in the process of developing new courses, even on occasion in faculty choice. But very rapidly in the 1970s students lost interest in spending most of their time on such issues, and their attendance on committees to which they had gained the right to be present through appointment or election became more and more nominal. As for the content of the curriculum, by the later 1970s the tide was already running the other way: more requirements, more organized programs of study, less freedom. It seems that we have been engaged in moving between the poles of freedom and of requirement since President Eliot of Harvard introduced and lobbied for a system of free electives. All one can conclude about the most recent cycle from requirement to freedom, and back again, is that it took less time than the preceding cycle. It was speeded up undoubtedly by the turmoil of the student movement, but the return to a greater degree of organization in education has been almost as fast.

The reason the heritage of the great student revolt is so modest, I would argue, is to be found in one fact: The American university and college retained and retains a remarkable degree of autonomy from government, and thus the demands of the student movement were never institutionalized in law, resulting in the kind of permanent change law introduces. In this respect, American higher education was far more fortunate than European. In France, Germany, the Netherlands, and other countries, new national legislation introduced into university government elected representatives of students, junior faculty, and non-teaching personnel. In those countries, too, students soon lost interest in participating in time-consuming and not very interesting university tasks. But since they now had the right in law to participate, various interests were encouraged to take advantage of these rights for political reasons. Student leaders with party affiliations, generally (as is common among student leaders) to the left, continued to run for office, and indifferent as the mass of students may have been, continued to be elected—with the right to represent "the students." Similarly, junior faculty and non-teaching personnel have been elected with endless politicization and conflict as a result.

In contrast, not a single law was passed in the United States either at the state or national level, affecting the governing of universities and colleges. This fact is most remarkable. Most legislators and the public were furious at student disruptions, strikes against the Vietnam war, strikes demanding black studies. But our tradition is one in which universities and colleges have autonomy from the state. We saw nothing like the state investigations into Communist teachers and legislators that were common in the 1950s. The rule seemed to be "hands off." As a result, those changes that did take place—the introduction of students on various committees—took place variably, in different ways, to different degrees, and were not anchored in public law determining the manner and weight of student and other representatives in the governing of the universities.

Perhaps the greatest and longest-lasting effect of the student revolt may be in the composition of faculties. There is much to be said for this point of view. A generation of graduate students (those studying between the middle 1960s and the early 1970s) was deeply affected by the student revolt, particularly those in the social sciences and in those disciplines that make less use of quantitative methods. In certain fields, it was hard to find junior faculty from the middle 1970s on who had not participated in or been marked by the student revolt, and thus there were fears that a radical point of view would become dominant in the teaching of some disci-

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plines. Caucuses of radical students and young faculty were organized in academic associations, new journals were launched, there were struggles over elections to offices.

The disciplines most affected were not much improved by this swing of the younger members to the left. But it would be exaggerating to say that disciplines were "taken over" by one political point of view. Patterns of academic recruitment remained the traditional ones, for the most part. One took account of research, with a nod to teaching; senior faculty made the choices, with only modest and limited participation from junior faculty and students. Administrators passed on the choices, and independent trustees put the imprimatur on the final decision. None of this changed in its fundamentals.

One major change was introduced by governmental requirements for affirmative action to seek out minority and female faculty, seconded by committed university administrators. The change was substantial. Searches were now advertised (as a result, *The Chronicle of Higher Education* became prosperous from advertising), searches became more extended and expensive, special procedures were established to search for minority and female applicants, and to explain why they were not recommended for appointment. There were many excesses in the beginning until these procedures were institutionalized. Discrimination against white males was evident in many departments and institutions. I suspect with the passage of time and the regular use of procedures, there is less abuse, and an absolute ban on consideration of white males is now rare. The process is costly, and not much in the way of increase in numbers of black faculty results from it because there are simply too few applicants. The major impact of these procedures has been on women faculty. Undoubtedly a modest bias in their favor now prevails in many institutions. In the end, perhaps the biggest change that one has seen in the American university since the early 1970s is the increasing prominence of women, among students and faculty. The fact is that despite the strength of the black

push for more black faculty there were too few in numbers to make a substantial change, and the opening up of opportunities in law, medicine, business, and government reduced the number of those willing to undertake an academic career. With women it was different: There were far more, and the academic career, while it also competed with those other fields, was more attractive.

I suspect that the most substantive change we have seen as a result of the student revolt is among administrators. The student revolt taught us how important they were. It taught them to be cautious, to consult widely, to get advice. Presidential staffs grew. (This was not only the result of the student revolt, but also because of the rise of affirmative action and new grounds for litigation.) I think we have seen fewer creative academic administrators since the early 1970s than in any equivalent period before. This is of course not only the result of the student revolt: Colleges and universities have been suffering since the early 1970s from serious financial problems and are now deeply affected by the decline in potential students as a result of the low birth rate of the 1960s. Administrators now worry about finances and declining applications and enrollment, and their creativity is addressed to creating the kind of educational programs—generally pre-professional or business-oriented—that might attract more students. This is not a time for educational innovation for its own sake. The 1970s and the 1980s may well be known as the age of administrative caution.

The largest question remains: Why did it happen? And if we understand why it happened, will we be in a better position to predict whether it will happen again? What forces might lead to the same and similar explosions? What measures might moderate them? These solutions remain murky. While they do, presidents will be careful.

—Nathan Glazer

Mr. Glazer is professor of education and sociology at Harvard, and coeditor of *Public Interest*. His books include *Beyond the Melting Pot* (with Daniel P. Moynihan) and *Ethnic Dilemmas*, 1964-1982.

Nearest Grant Application Deadlines



Please note: Area code for all telephone numbers is 202.

DIVISION OF EDUCATION PROGRAMS—Richard Ekman, Director 786-0373

Central Disciplines in Undergraduate Education—Susan Resneck Parr 786-0380		
Improving Introductory Courses—Lyn Maxwell White 786-0380	October 1, 1984	April 1985
Promoting Excellence in a Field—John Walters 786-0380	October 1, 1984	April 1985
Fostering Coherence Throughout an Institution—Susan Resneck Parr 786-0380	October 1, 1984	April 1985
Humanities Instruction in Elementary and Secondary Schools—Carolynn Reid-Wallace 786-0377	May 15, 1984	January 1985
Exemplary Projects in Undergraduate and Graduate Education—Blanche Premo, John Strassburger, Charles Meyers, Peter Patrikis 786-0384	May 15, 1984	January 1985
Teaching Materials—Blanche Premo 786-0384	May 15, 1984	January 1985
Humanities Programs for Nontraditional Learners—Gene Moss 786-0380	October 1, 1984	April 1985

DIVISION OF FELLOWSHIPS AND SEMINARS—Thomas Kingston, Director 786-0458

Fellowships for Independent Study and Research—Maben Herring 786-0466	June 1, 1984	January 1, 1985
Fellowships for College Teachers—Karen Fuglie 786-0466	June 1, 1984	January 1, 1985
Constitutional Fellowships—Maben Herring and Karen Fuglie 786-0466	June 1, 1984	January 1, 1985
Faculty Graduate Study Grants for Historically Black Colleges and Universities—Eric Anderson 786-0462	March 15, 1984	January 1985
SEMINAR PROGRAMS		
Summer Seminars for College Teachers—Richard Emmerson 786-0463		
Participants: 1985 Seminars	March 1, 1985	Summer 1985
Directors: 1986 Seminars	March 1, 1985	Summer 1986
Summer Seminars for College Teachers on Campuses of Historically Black Colleges and Universities—Eric Anderson 786-0462		
Directors: 1985 Seminars	March 1, 1984	Summer 1985
Summer Seminars for Secondary School Teachers—Ronald Herzman 786-0463		
Participants: 1985 Seminars	March 1, 1985	Summer 1985
Directors: 1986 Seminars	April 1, 1985	Summer 1986
Centers for Advanced Study—David Coder 786-0466	February 1, 1985	Fall 1986
Summer Stipends for 1985—Joseph Neville 786-0466	October 1, 1984	Summer 1985

DIVISION OF GENERAL PROGRAMS—Donald Gibson, Director 786-0267

Humanities Projects in: Media—Richard Huber 786-0278		
Children's Media	July 30, 1984	April 1, 1985
Regular Media Projects	July 30, 1984	April 1, 1985
Museums and Historical Organizations—Gabriel Weisberg 786-0284	May 30, 1984	January 1, 1985
Special Projects—Leon Bramson 786-0271		
Program Development (including Libraries)	August 6, 1984	April 1, 1985
Youth Projects	June 15, 1984	January 1, 1985
Younger Scholars Program	September 15, 1984	June 1, 1985

DIVISION OF RESEARCH PROGRAMS—Harold Cannon, Director 786-0200

Intercultural Research—Marjorie Berlincourt 786-0200	February 15, 1985	July 1, 1985
Basic Research Program—John Williams 786-0207		
Project Research—Gary Messinger 786-0207 and David Wise 786-0207	March 1, 1985	January 1, 1986
Archaeological Projects—Eugene Sterud 786-0207	March 1, 1985	January 1, 1986
Research Conferences—Eugene Sterud 786-0207	September 15, 1984	April 1, 1985
Travel to Collections—Eric Juengst 786-0207	September 15, 1984	January 1, 1985
Humanities, Science and Technology—David Wright 786-0207		
NEH HST Projects	March 1, 1985	January 1, 1986
NEH-NSF EVIST Projects	August 1, 1984	April 1, 1985
Research Resources—Jeffrey Field 786-0204		
Access—Jeffrey Field 786-0204	June 1, 1984	April 1, 1985
Preservation—Jeffrey Field 786-0204	June 1, 1984	April 1, 1985
Publications—Margot Backas 786-0204	May 1, 1984	October 1, 1984
U.S. Newspaper Projects—Pearce Grove 786-0204	August 15, 1984	April 1, 1985
Reference Works—Dorothy Wartenberg 786-0210		
Tools—Crale Hopkins 786-0210	October 1, 1984	July 1, 1985
Editions—Helen Aguera 786-0210	October 1, 1984	July 1, 1985
Translations—Susan Mango 786-0210	July 1, 1984	April 1, 1985

DIVISION OF STATE PROGRAMS—Carole Watson, Acting Director 786-0254

Each state establishes its own grant guidelines and application deadlines; therefore, interested applicants should contact the office in their state. A list of those state programs may be obtained from the Division of State Programs.

OFFICE OF PROGRAM AND POLICY STUDIES—Armen Tashdian, Director 786-0424

Planning and Assessment Studies—Arnita Jones 786-0420	September 1, 1984	April 1, 1985
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OFFICE OF CHALLENGE GRANTS—James Blessing, Director 786-0361

May 1, 1984	December 1984
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Division of Fellowships and Seminars

Grants from the Division of Fellowships and Seminars provide individual scholars with the material most essential to their work and most difficult to obtain: time. Whether a Summer Stipend that affords eight weeks of uninterrupted study to complete a manuscript or visit a research collection or a full year's Fellowship to devote to an idea that teaching responsibilities have pushed aside, these awards recognize that the well-spring of knowledge in the humanities is the individual.

Fellowships for Independent Study and Research

Grants of up to \$25,000 provide support for scholars, teachers, and others to undertake independent study and research.
Eligible Applicants: Individuals.

Fellowships for College Teachers

Grants of up to \$25,000 provide support for teachers in two-year, four-year, and five-year colleges and universities to undertake study and research.
Eligible Applicants: College teachers.

Constitutional Fellowships

Grants of up to \$25,000 provide support for scholars and college teachers to pursue study and research related to the U.S. Constitution.
Eligible Applicants: Individuals.

Fellowships for College Teachers

Medical Ethics and the Nursing Profession

About ten years ago, says Tziporah Kasachkoff, a professor of philosophy at Manhattan Community College, City University of New York, the desire "to do something less abstract than what I was doing" led her to enroll in a course in respiratory therapy.

"I was thinking of doing something in medicine," she says. "Not in medical ethics, but medicine. It seemed a good way to get my feet wet."

As it turned out, some of the philosopher's fellow respiratory therapy students, most of whom had already worked in hospitals in one capacity or another, had meanwhile enrolled in an ethics class taught by Kasachkoff.

"Their questions, the answers they wanted, had practical consequences in their lives," recalls Kasachkoff. "One student was working with a patient who was a diabetic, whose family would bring her candies. The student felt that her relationship with the patient was such that she could not report the candies to the doctor."

Was she, wondered the student, betraying her own professional

standards by not presenting the forbidden candies to the doctor? Would she not, however, be betraying the patient by going to the doctor?

Discussing with the health-care professionals in her class the ethical dilemmas that confronted them almost daily inspired Kasachkoff to design a new course that would treat both abstract ethical principles and concrete practical problems. The course would give students a history of the social, cultural and religious circumstances that have produced specific moral views and codes concerning health care as well as a background in ethical theory.

Supported by an NEH Fellowship for College Teachers, Kasachkoff recently spent a year at Harvard University, studying in the university libraries, talking with Harvard Law faculty interested in questions of medicine and ethics, and auditing medical-ethics courses offered to Harvard undergraduates.

Although the course that she constructed touches on specific issues such as abortion, or informed consent, or euthanasia, Kasachkoff says she prefers to approach those issues by way of broad questions, such as

what our rights are in regard to our own and other's bodies; what distinguishes personhood from non-personhood; when is it not legitimate to extend a person's life; and when is medical paternalism—whether it takes the form of lying to a patient about his prospects for recovery or of searching through a bedside cabinet for candies—justified.

The course does not approach ethics as a mere instrument in clinical

practice, but investigates the serious theoretical issues involved in the relationship between ethics and medicine. Students are taught some of the major theories in ethics. They compare the implications of the deontological view, that some acts are objectively and intrinsically right or wrong, with those of the consequentialist view, that the *result* of an act determines its moral nature. They examine John Rawls's analysis of the



Medical advances often create quandaries for health-care personnel, who find their years of training have not equipped them to cope with moral dilemmas.

Faculty Graduate Study Program for Historically Black Colleges and Universities

Grants provide support for faculty to undertake one year of full-time study leading to a doctoral degree in the humanities with preference given to those individuals who are already at the dissertation stage of their work.

Eligible Applicants: Institutions.
(Historically black college and university officials must select and nominate members of their faculty for this competition.)

Summer Stipends for 1985

Grants provide support for college and university teachers and others to undertake two consecutive months of full-time independent study and research.

Eligible Applicants: Individuals.
College and university teachers must be nominated by their institutions; others apply directly to the division.

Summer Seminars for College Teachers

Participants

Grants provide support primarily for teachers at two-year undergraduate and four-year colleges to participate in eight-week summer seminars directed by distinguished scholars at institutions with libraries suitable for advanced study.

Eligible Applicants: Individuals.

Applications are submitted to the seminar director.

Directors

Grants provide support for scholars at institutions with libraries suitable for advanced study to design and direct summer seminars.

Eligible Applicants: Institutions.

Summer Seminars for Secondary School Teachers

Participants

Grants provide support for full-time or regular part-time secondary school teachers to participate in summer seminars focusing on significant texts in the humanities and directed by distinguished teachers and committed scholars.

Eligible Applicants: Teachers in grades seven through twelve. Applications are submitted to the seminar director.

Directors

Grants provide support for master teachers and scholars at colleges and universities to design and direct summer seminars.

Eligible Applicants: Institutions.

Fellowship Support to Centers for Advanced Study

Grants enable centers for advanced study to provide opportunities for scholars in the humanities to undertake study and research and to exchange ideas with scholars in other fields at the centers.

Eligible Applicants: Independent centers for advanced study, research libraries, and similar institutions. Individuals apply directly to the centers.

concept of justice and the ways in which this analysis can be applied to the determination of just distributions of scarce health-care resources.

Kasachkoff directs her students in finding what sorts of philosophical material they must consider before deciding how to approach a problem. They learn to determine the sorts of questions that are philosophical questions and what constitutes a respectable answer.

"For example, discussions of abortion must begin by determining the question of what constitutes a 'someone,'" Kasachkoff explains. "By asking that epistemological question, we are trying to determine if the fetus is a person."

Kasachkoff refers her students to the "numerous recently published texts that are related specifically to questions of bioethics." Among books she uses in her teaching are *The Problem of Abortion*, edited by Joel Feinberg, *Matters of Life and Death: New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy*, edited by Tom Regan, *Case Studies in Medical Ethics*, by Robert Veatch, and *Doctors' Dilemmas: Moral Conflicts and Medical Care*, by Samuel Gorovitz.

Doctors' dilemmas become students' dilemmas at exam time. Passing out a one-page description of a specific bioethical quandary, Kasachkoff asks students not only to identify the case's "morally relevant considerations," but to construct their strongest possible argument in support of one side of the issue, and then to do the same for the opposing side.

These days, correct answers to problems in medical ethics are no longer the sole concern of doctors, nurses, or even philosophy students. "We're all going to be in a hospital sometime," Kasachkoff points out, "regardless of how we get through this life."

Half a century ago, she writes in an article to be published this year in *Community College Humanities Review*, only 44 percent of America's prospective mothers went to a hospital to give birth to their children. Today, the child is exceedingly rare who cannot count the delivery room as his first place of residence. Likewise, nine out of ten Americans now return to the hospital or clinic when it comes time to die. Medical advances, such as the treatment of fetuses *in utero*, the use of drugs that ease pain without curing illness, or the use of machines to prolong life past consciousness, "have served as a powerful catalyst for our reflecting on and rethinking not only what it is that medicine can do for us," writes Kasachkoff, "but who we are as humans and what that human life is worth."

During her year at Harvard, Kasachkoff became interested in introducing the study of health-care ethics to nursing students. Out of that interest came a four-week institute on Moral Philosophy and Nursing Ethics, held at Tufts University

in June 1983, and funded by the NEH.

Drawing thirty-four participants in seventeen nurse-philosopher teams, the institute was designed to help college nursing and philosophy faculty develop courses that would acquaint nursing students with the moral dimensions of nursing care. After their month at Tufts, says Kasachkoff, some institute participants introduced "post-clinical conferences with nursing students [the sessions follow a student's shift in the hospital] on the ethical issues that came up in nursing practice."

The summer institute at Tufts was also intended to acquaint philosophers with "the practical exigencies of the nursing profession," Kasachkoff wrote in her proposal, "so that an appropriate practical brake may be applied on the moral theorizing about health-care ethics."

In "The Case for Nursing Ethics" (*Community College Humanities Review*, Winter 1984), Kasachkoff writes "A 1974 study reported that nurses viewed their greatest ethical problems to be implementing doctors' orders to resuscitate patients who were terminally ill, assisting in abortions to which they were morally opposed, and deceiving patients who wanted to know the truth about

their medical conditions (Aroskar, "Ethics" 260-64.) All of these issues are of moral significance generally...."

While the nurse, says Kasachkoff, "defines herself as the advocate of the patient, what does advocacy mean when you're working for a bureaucracy, and for physicians who can determine politically whether you work or not. Theorizing is fine, but if you don't understand the constraints under which a person works, you don't understand the ethical decisions that person has to make."

"Generally, the history of medical ethics began as the history of the ethics of physicians' decisions," says Kasachkoff, adding that even now many medical ethics courses and much discussion in the field centers "on the role of the physician as the paradigmatic health-care provider."

"What is generally overlooked," she writes, "is that physicians represent only 8 percent of the total number of health-care personnel in this country and that nurses, whose occupation is the largest among all health-care practitioners, outnumber physicians by a ratio of three to one. In terms of patient contact, therefore, nurses assume responsibility for most patients' care in most health-

care institutions."

In fact, questions of medical ethics are being decided not only by nurses and doctors, but by hospital administrators, paramedical personnel, the courts—"fixing where at least legal liability lies," says Kasachkoff—and by patients and their families. In a nation where almost every individual has received or will receive medical care, no one escapes the burden of confronting ethical questions. And this country's system of health-care subsidies is raising new questions.

"We know that insurance companies pick up the bill for certain hospital procedures," says Kasachkoff. "Do we have certain responsibilities for our own health care if we know society will pick up the cost for some of that health care? People who engage in habits like overeating, high sodium intake, lack of exercise, lost of tobacco—do we want to take a different attitude toward people who ail as a result of self-inflicted illness? Should you subsidize my habits?"

Kasachkoff says that during her year at Harvard her own approach to questions of medical ethics changed. "I had been trained in the analytical tradition, very much an ahistorical approach. You analyze problems as if they were syllogisms out of context." At Harvard, she says, "I began to see the importance of the historical background against which changing medical attitudes, practices, and institutions make sense." Examining the history of medicine can illuminate the origin of forms of medical behavior—such as paternalism—that may now strike us as ethically unsound. Kasachkoff points out that just as paternalistic behavior can seem appropriate within a family or between a husband and wife (he hides her chocolates and she hides his cigarettes, but "there's an intimate relationship that makes that behavior not obnoxious") a physician's paternalistic actions may also have seemed more acceptable in the days when doctors and patients saw one another over a span of decades. "Now in medicine," she says, "the intimacy is diminished"—as it must be in a world of specialist physicians and bureaucratized hospitals—"but the [paternalistic] stance may be a hold-over from earlier times."

The study of medical ethics is as important to the philosopher as it is to the health care professional, Kasachkoff believes. "The study of nursing ethics has much to tell us generally about the contours of almost all human interaction," she says. "For the nurse's ethical situation, brought into especial relief by the complexity of the nurse's place in our health-care system, captures the moral tension that is endemic to all human interaction, and especially that which is characterized by the varied personal and professional roles through which most of us lead our lives."

—Michael Lipske



The nurse is the patient's advocate. "But what does advocacy mean when you're working for a bureaucracy, and for physicians who can determine whether or not you work?"

Fellowships for Independent Study and Research

The Return of Martin Guerre



ARREST DV PARLEMENT
de Tolose, contenant vne histoire memorable,
& prodigieuse, avec cent belles & doctes
Annotations, de monsieur maistre
JEAN DE CORAS, rap-
porteur du proces.
Texte de la toile du proces
& de l'arrest.



V moys de Ianuier, mil
cinq cens cinquante neuf,
Bertrande de Rolz, du lieu
d'Artigat, au diocese de
Rieux, se rend suppliant,
& plaintiue, deuant le lu-
ge de Rieux: disant, que
vingt ans peuuet estre pas-
sez, ou enuiron, qu'elle estant ieune fille, de neuf à
dix ans, fut mariee, avec Martin Guerre, pour lors
aussi fort ieune, & presque de mesmes aage, que
la suppliant.

Annotation I.

Les mariages ainsi contractez auant l'aage legitime, ordonné
de nature, ou par les loix politiques, ne peuuent estre (s'il est loy-
sible de fonder, iusques aux secretz, & inscrutables iugemens de
la diuinité) plaisans, ny agreables à Dieu, & l'issue, en est le plus
souuent piteuse, & miserable, & (comme on voit iournellement
par exemple) pleine, de mille repentances: par tant qu'en telles
precoces, & deuançees conionctions, ceux qui ont tramé, &
proietté le tout, n'ont aucunement respecté l'honneur, & la
gloire de Dieu: & moins la fin, pour laquelle ce saint, & venera-
ble estat de mariage, ha esté par luy institué du commencement

a chap. dernier
au titre de fri-
gid & malefic.
aus Decreta-
les & au ch. vii.
de vot. & vot.
redemp. au six
iesme.



When Natalie Zemon Davis, professor of history at Princeton University and an authority on sixteenth-century France, read the first draft of the script for *The Return of Martin Guerre*, she was dismayed by its departure from historical fact for the sake of dramatic simplicity. "I realized," says Davis, who had been retained as a historical consultant for the film about the legendary French peasant, "that the movie wasn't going to tell the story the way a historian would tell it—accurately and completely, with all the complexities involved."

Yet Davis's visit to Paris during the shooting of the film gave her the opportunity to scour nearby archives as she delved deeper into the film's subject matter. Her dismay dissolved into excitement as she realized she had uncovered enough material to tell the story her own way in a book. Says Davis: "I wasn't just thinking 'gosh, I've got to tell this right,' but 'I've got more to tell.'"

Her research climaxed in a 125-page book written with NEH support and bearing the same name as the 1983 movie, *The Return of Martin Guerre*. Echoing the movie's international popularity, Davis's book now has been published in French, English, Italian and German.

Davis notes that the deceptively complex story of Martin Guerre has been retold many times. In the 1540s, the rich French peasant Martin suddenly deserts his wife Bertrande, his child, and his property. Eight years later, Martin returns—or so everyone thinks. Within three or four years, Martin's uncle and other relatives accuse him of being an imposter. Despite an apparently harmonious marriage, wife Bertrande now alleges that she has been tricked by the charlatan, who is taken away in chains. During a lengthy trial before the criminal court of Toulouse, the pretender almost bamboozles the judges into believing that he is Martin Guerre. At the last moment, however, the real Martin Guerre dramatically enters the courtroom. The imposter is found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged.

This suspenseful story inspired two contemporaneous books, including one by a judge in the case. The French philosopher Michel de Montaigne recalled reading the "marvelous" tale, which also has triggered a play, two novels and an operetta. The legend is still a mainstay of conversation in the Pyrenean village of Artigat where most of the events took place.

Davis became entranced by the story in 1976 when she read the trial judge's 1561 account of this *histoire prodigieuse*. The story, she thought, was a natural for a movie. "Rarely does a historian find so perfect a

narrative structure in the events of the past or one with such dramatic popular appeal," she explains. Davis immediately began trying to think of directors who could transform the story to the screen.

But other scholarly research delayed further action on the story until June 1980, when Davis confided her film idea to a fellow historian attending a conference in Italy. The colleague replied that "two directors in Paris are already doing it." Davis subsequently provided the directors with "huge volumes" of notes and background material and later helped them revise their screenplay.

She calls the film a "beautiful reconstruction of the sixteenth century," which "captivates the audiences today. It makes them think about the past—a society in which identity means something different from what we think of today." But some things were missing.

In a screenplay, as in any art form, dramatic truth must sometimes be achieved by a certain deliberate distortion of fact. Selectivity and emphasis are used to create not reality itself but the all-important illusion of reality. For example, the first scene of *Hamlet* consumes only fifteen minutes of stage time, but Shakespeare asks his audience to live through intense experiences lasting from midnight to dawn.

Davis concedes that similar changes in the *Martin Guerre* film give it a "powerful simplicity that had allowed the story to become a legend in the first place." But Davis also found some of the changes "troubling," as the film focused on the imposter, Pansette, at the expense of other characters in the story.

The Princeton historian says the film script slighted the character of the wife, Bertrande, whom she calls a "woman of considerably more calculation" than the movie suggests. The movie also gave short shrift to the judge-author, and ignored the growing influence of Protestantism on the sixteenth-century French peasantry. The film also is "historically inaccurate," says Davis, in at least one instance—the trial scene, which is framed by a mob of peasants "oohing and aahing" as the judges interrogate the false Martin and his accusers. In reality, notes Davis, the audience wasn't permitted in the courtroom until the verdict was announced. She concedes that adhering to fact would have "robbed this scene of drama," yet she came away from the film convinced that "the historian must tell the story another way."

To accomplish her goal, Davis interviewed citizens in Artigat, consulted rare books and burrowed into archives in Foix, Toulouse and Auch. Notes Davis: "I liked the

Jean de Coras, a "court reporter" in 1572, gives a contemporary account of the trial of Martin Guerre, "a memorable and prodigious history," (above). The confrontation between the accused and a witness, from Jean Milles de Souvigny, *Praxis Criminis Persequendi* (Paris, 1541), (left below).



A shoemaker testifies to the true identity of Martin Guerre in a scene from the unexpectedly popular film *The Return of Martin Guerre*.

challenge of finding every scrap of information I could on those villages."

Her book attempts to take a closer look at the main characters in the story, including the "manipulative" Bertrande, the "golden-tongued" imposter, the "brilliant" judge, and, of course, the enigmatic Martin.

Davis seeks to recreate the legend in what she concedes is an "experimental" style, viewing the story through the differing perspectives of the main characters. One chapter, for instance, attempts to explain the customs of village life through the young Martin's eyes, while another describes the second-class status of women through the view of Bertrande.

Because of gaps in historical documentation of peasant life, Davis relies on imaginative reconstruction to flesh out her tale. Thus she speculates about how neighbors would have treated the young Martin and

Fellowships for Independent Study and Research

By the time Ovid begins the story of Arachne in the sixth book of the *Metamorphoses*, he has described so many transformations of humans into beasts or things or flowers that the fact of a girl changed into a spider is occasion neither for surprise nor special sympathy. But Ovid is so gentle with this foolish girl that readers are drawn to her in spite of her rash arrogance (and new appearance).

"The girl was no one in birth," Ovid writes. "Her mother was dead, a common sort of person... but the daughter was known for her skill." When Arachne flaunts her skill in the contest with Minerva, the divine spinner, the tapestry she produces is, like Ovid's poem, an assemblage of myths of transformation. And here Ovid's motive for tenderness emerges; for as he extols Arachne's talent, he parades his own. Ovid steps into the poem, transforming himself, as artists can, into his creation. It is Ovid we are drawn to—the embattled artist clinging in martyred triumph to artistic integrity:

Neither Minerva, no, nor even Envy
Could find a flaw in the work; the
fair-haired goddess
Was angry now, indeed, and tore
the web
That showed the crimes of the gods,
and with her shuttle
Struck at Arachne's head and kept
on striking.

The contest; Minerva's admonitions and anger; the final, horrible punishment become the ordeal of art—art, the great transformer.

NEH Fellow Leonard Barkan has selected Arachne's web and the macrocyclic poem it reflects as the starting point for a history of myths of transformation for a forthcoming book, *The Gods Made Flesh: Metamorphosis and the Pursuit of Paganism*.

Barkan's history is a comprehensive exegesis of the myths in literature and the visual arts spanning seventeen centuries; the work is concerned less with chronology than with analysis of the reciprocal influences between myth and culture.

From Ovid to a seventeenth-century rebirth of Arachne in Velasquez's painting *Las Hilanderas* or *The Spinners*, Barkan traces the transformation of transformation, contemplates the cultural code manifested in these changing forms, and comments at length on its particular beauty and interpretation in the hands of four masters: Titian, Shakespeare, Dante, and Ronsard.

Barkan, a specialist in Renaissance literature at Northwestern University, became reacquainted with Ovid through a scheduling error when he was teaching at the University of California, San Diego, at La Jolla. The course in the Renaissance that he expected to teach for science majors became instead a course in Rome and the Middle Ages.

"I chose to follow the tradition leading from Ovid to Chaucer rather than the heroic path that leads from Virgil to Dante," recalls Barkan. "And in preparing for that course, I rediscovered in Ovid all the qualities that had attracted me to Renaissance literature: the love of beauty as an end in itself, the concept of a flexible universe, and a sort of irreverence showing that things that seem foolish can be profound and that things heroic can be foolish."

"Ovid's history is not the grand history of civilization, but a personal history of civilization, a record of individual agonies of love and beauty."

Barkan spends the first chapter of the book with Ovid, establishing vocabulary for a discussion of meta-

morphosis and examining some of the classical concepts in the mythology, such as the three-layer structure of the universe—divine, human, and animal—through which beings travel in metamorphosis.

Of the many patterns that emerge in such a history is one striking division between myths that evolve and those that remain surprisingly constant over such a great expanse of time. One interpretation that Barkan discusses, Titian's great painting of the *Rape of Europa*, stands firmly in a tradition stamped with continuity. "The subject has so long and consistent a tradition in literature as well as art," wrote Erwin Panofsky in *Problems in Titian* (19) "that all representations of it have a kind of family likeness."

It takes little effort to see in Titian's painting the description of a maiden sexual experience. Europa, astride the bull in wild *contrapposto*, is an image of both fear and rapture.

Barkan points out that Titian focuses attention on Europa rather than on Jove in his guise of a bull by rendering a bull that is more ideal than life-like. "He is beautified," says Barkan, "until he becomes a prop, a decoration."

The notion of metamorphosis, which is the subject of the painting, is shifted from the god who has changed his shape (the divine's descent to the bestial) to Europa.

"Europa's appearance in the painting—and she is not beautiful; she is in a very awkward pose—expresses the sense that she is being changed. She is twisted and transported at the same time," says Barkan. Titian catches Europa in mid-change, between fear and triumph, between virginity and sexual knowledge.

Barkan explains, "The painting is in some ways an anthropological ex-

pression of the female fear of sexual experience and its resolution through marriage."

The images of celebration in the painting—the scarf that Europa waves above her head, the ceremonial attendants that appear as part of a sea triumph—are also inherited from Ovid, although they are not literally present in his account. The world that Ovid creates in the *Metamorphoses* is one where sexuality is celebrated, "a pagan world," Barkan calls it, "where the power of beauty over morality is exalted." This glorification of carnal love is suppressed during the Middle Ages but re-emerges when Petrarch folds into his love poems the myths developed in antiquity, "which he considered a time of intellectual and aesthetic giants."

In another chapter of his book, Barkan discusses the treatments of metamorphic myths in the Middle Ages and describes two traditions. In one, the stories are perverted to suit moralistic purposes; in the other, they are applied to the natural world as a way of explaining and celebrating the beauty of nature.

The myth of Diana and Actaeon developed through both of the medieval rhetorical conventions that Barkan describes.

Ovid introduces his story of Actaeon with a complaint against fate: "In the story/You will find Actaeon guiltless; put the blame/On luck, not crime: what crime is there in error?"

Actaeon's error, of course, is his accidental discovery, while he is out hunting with his hounds, of Diana at her bath. The outraged goddess transfigures hunter into hunted: she changes Actaeon to a stag, whereupon he is ripped to death by his own dogs.

Bertrande who couldn't seem to produce a child: "The young men who fenced and boxed with Martin must have darkened their faces, put on women's clothes and assembled in front of the Guerre house, beating on wide vats... ringing bells and rattling swords. It was indeed humiliating."

This is the scenario she offers had the fugitive Martin met Pansette: "They learn that they look alike, even though Martin is taller, thinner and a little darker than [Pansette]. They hear this from other people rather than observing it, for sixteenth-century villagers do not build up an image of their faces by frequent glances in a mirror (an object not found in a peasant household). It is unsettling and fascinating, and since there is a stock of popular sayings about how the shape of the eye or the set of the jaw signify certain character traits, they wonder whether their resemblance is more

than skin-deep. They exchange confidences. Martin expresses himself with ambivalence about his patrimony and his wife, perhaps seems to imply to his look-alike 'take her.' And Pansette says to himself, 'Why not?'" In thinking about the impostor's actions, the judge "recognized a man with some of his own qualities. Peasant though he was, the prisoner was poised, intelligent and (especially) eloquent." And when Martin and Bertrande finally reconcile, Martin "probably" had become "a good Catholic, while Bertrande may have been a Protestant."

In recounting the legend, Davis also explores such issues as Protestantism, marriage, rural life, criminal courts, family roles, and the "significance of identity" in the sixteenth-century. She notes, for example, the limitations and benefits experienced by women of that era by framing the explanation around Bertrande: "What did it [life] hold in store for

her? First, a world where organizational structure and public identity were associated exclusively with males. The particle 'de,' so often found in women's names in and around Artigat, did not come from the peasants trying to ape the nobility, but 'was a way of showing the classification system of village society,... The village councils summoned male villagers to their deliberations, convoking wives and widows only when there was an order to be given.... The realities of this peasant world encouraged not only the skills of a good farm wife, but the woman's ability to get her way with the men and to calculate her advantages, say, in remaining a widow."

Adds Davis: "I was attempting to make all of social history flow through a story."

Davis, who is finishing a book on gift-giving in sixteenth-century France, says historical consultants

can bring enormous benefits to the movie industry by supplying source material that can aid writers and directors in shaping the film. She believes that historians should share in the decision-making power—something she lacked in making the film version of Martin Guerre.

Even without that power, however, Davis believes movies have a great deal to offer historians. "The making of a film is a historical fact in itself," she says. "You always learn some things about the past in making a film like this." She notes, for instance, that her interviews with present-day citizens of Artigat forced her to think about historical questions that proved relevant in her archival research.

Davis believes that the saga of Martin Guerre epitomizes the utility of historical research, since "one of the functions of history is to show us there are amazing possibilities."

—Frank O'Donnell

MYTHS OF METAMORPHOSIS

In an article in *English Literary Renaissance* (1981), "Diana and Actaeon: The Myth as Synthesis," Barkan interprets Ovid's account in its context of the Theban cycle of myths.

"Each of the mortal figures in this group has an encounter with a mysterious emanation of divinity that is simultaneously beautiful and terrifying," Barkan writes. He goes on to explain that forbidden, holy knowledge both transforms mortals and destroys them. The presence of mirror images in this cycle and the juxtaposition of the myth of Narcissus suggest parallels between the mysteries of identity and those of divine knowledge: "Diana and Actaeon are both hunters and they have both entered the grove to escape the hot sun.... This equation—of Actaeon with the holy form of himself as hunter—inexorably brings about the complementary equation of Actaeon with the beastly form of himself as hunter...."

Medieval mythographers shun concepts of sacred knowledge and of identity to bend the myth toward lessons of proper moral behavior. Actaeon's death is interpreted as a punishment for the pursuit of vain pleasures (hunting) or for profligacy (the expense of hunting dogs). In the latter interpretation, Actaeon can be seen to be eaten up by his greed.

Barkan has fun with some of the more outlandish "transformations" of myths by mythographers in his book. One of his favorites involves the interpretation of another of Jove's transformations for the love of a mortal woman. Because in this story Jove becomes a flame, the mythographer explains that he won the lady's love by means of a cook.

"In the attempts to remove the pagan elements from myths," Barkan explains, "and to shove

them into moral or political interpretations, the mystery and wonderment is reduced to rubble."

If myths of metamorphosis resist manipulation for moral or political purposes, they are no more cordial to classification for the purposes of intellectual control. Even the simple division noted earlier between the myths that develop and those that manifest certain unities requires elaborate qualifications. Barkan admits a certain sense of being overpowered by the subject that so holds his fancy.

"Over the years... signs moved me less toward encouragement and more toward despair as the big subject rapidly seemed to gobble up everything in sight: poetry and

paintings, history and philosophy, theology and anthropology," he writes.

"Still, I felt the need to hold on and follow wherever it would lead, if only because the material refused to let itself be subdivided and miniaturized. So the present work runs in the face of a double handicap: the subject is huge, and the subject will not hold still."

There is something of the comic image of Titian's *Europa* in this description of the pursuit of metamorphosis. Indeed, there is evidence in the long history of these myths to suggest that those who work in the tradition become a part of it. In Ovid's poem after Arachne has de-

picted the transformations of the gods, her aspirations to divinity are in one sense realized: she reaches immortality through Minerva's jealous spite. "Live, wicked girl; live on, but hang forever," Minerva decrees.

Ovid, too, proclaims himself transformed. Through his work on metamorphoses, he ascends from the human to the divine:

Now I have done my work. It will endure...

I shall be read, and through all centuries,

If prophecies of bards are ever truthful,

I shall be living, always.

—Linda Blanken



Titian, *Rape of Europa* (detail)

Summer Seminars for Secondary School Teachers

My Desert Encounter with Plato

During the past fifteen years I have been privileged to teach an honors English course titled *The Miracle of Greece* to about 400 of the best students who have graduated from John Jay High School, a small suburban school in the Westchester hamlet of Katonah, fifty miles north of New York City.

The course opens with a dramatic reading of Maxwell Anderson's *Barefoot in Athens*. We then proceed to a study of Plato's *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*, the *Symposium* and basic ideas from the *Republic*, introducing my seniors to dualism, the levels of reality, the tripartite soul, the recollection theory of knowledge, the cave analogy, and other philosophic principles. We experiment with the Socratic method as a way of teaching and learning, often inspiring a number of students to write original dialogues. Later we move from the rationalism of Plato to the passion of Greek tragedy (*The Oresteia*, the Oedipus cycle plays, *Medea*, and *Hippolytus*) with side excursions to contemporary plays based on Greek myths like Anouilh's *Antigone* and Sartre's *The Flies*. We culminate the miracle with a study of Robert Fitzgerald's translation of *The Odyssey*. The course is a happy marriage of Greek philosophy and literature, presented in a practical manner palatable to the academic appetites of high school seniors.

It was this course that motivated me to apply for *Plato's Republic* an NEH seminar, ably directed by Steven S. Tigner at the St. John's College campus in Santa Fe last summer. After thirty years of teaching in the same high school, I needed the excitement and challenge of becoming a student again, especially on the scenic campus of a liberal arts school where two former students had studied at my recommendation. I was selected as one of fifteen seminar members from a field of 230 applicants.

Professor Tigner structured the seminar so that each of us, in the manner of a Socratic gadfly, served as discussion leader for one book of the *Republic*. I chose Book VI to "gadfly." Because our seminar group at St. John's began to be known as the "philosophers" in contrast to the "geophysical group,"



who spent most of their day actively mapping the land formations of the nearby desert, I remember being particularly struck by Book VI's indictment of the philosophic nature. Plato ironically agrees with Adeimantus who points out that "those who turn to philosophy, not taking up the subject as young people for the sake of education and then giving it up, but who continue to spend a great deal of time on it, of these the greatest number become quite queer, not to say altogether vicious, while those who seem the best of them suffer from this pursuit you praise to the extent of becoming quite useless to the state." I began to wonder if my attempt to teach philosophy to high school students could indeed render the best of them "quite queer," "vicious" and "useless to the state." Maybe computer training rather than the pursuit of good is the way to save American education. Fortunately, the subsequent books of the *Republic* saved me from my heretical aberration.

Each of us had the additional listening and learning experience of acting as scribe for a day. With the help of personal notes and a taping of the three-hour discussion, the scribe prepared a typed synopsis of the day's deliberations to place in what gradually grew into our seminar bible, more than 100 pages of salient comments sparked by the gadfly, who came armed with a list of questions that he/she had prepared the afternoon before in dialogue with Professor Tigner. The responsibility of each group member who was not serving as gadfly or scribe that day was to read carefully the assigned book from Grube's translation of Plato's *Republic* as well as parallel commentaries from N.P. White's *A Companion to Plato's Republic* and J. Anna's *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*.

Each gadfly brought a special perspective to the seminar. Our linguist kept reminding us that we were reading a translation of the *Republic* and used his knowledge of Greek to make subtleties of meaning clearer to us. Our mathematician kept us from going too far afield in our metaphysical flights of fancy, always returning us to the *given* in the text. I recall one session when he deciphered a

passage from the *Timaeus* to clarify Plato's account of the rational numerical structure underlying the world. The historians in our midst kept our attention on the contemporary relevance or impracticality of Plato's ideal state.

The ultimate value of a mountaintop experience depends on how it can be translated in the valley of routine work and living. Since my return from Santa Fe, memories of the seminar have sustained me as a teacher in and out of the classroom. The seminar reaffirmed my belief that the *Republic* is not just a fanciful blueprint for a just, utopian society but more of a macrocosm of the inner man struggling in his soul to find a balance for his will, his reason, and appetites. Moreover, I am now more convinced than ever that my role as a teacher is not so much to teach facts that can be easily found through independent research, but to be, in Plato's words, a midwife helping students give birth to their own ideas and encouraging them to find that personal balance of will, reason, and appetite that will make their lives more of celebration and less of an ordeal.

The following teaching method is one way I am trying to accomplish this goal in my class. Let's say a student, after our study of the *Phaedo*, makes a dogmatic statement like "I don't believe man has a soul." Instead of using my authority as a teacher and my personal arguments to support or refute his view, I say to him: "Would you be willing to have your opinion questioned by your classmates in a Socratic dialogue tomorrow?" Sometimes there is some hesitancy, but I allay the student's fears by assuring him that only he will be allowed to give opinions and reasons supporting his opinions about the soul. His classmates will be allowed only to ask questions, often specific questions that can be answered with a simple "yes," "no," or "I don't know." (This last response is one I cheer when I hear it because most high school students are afraid to acknowledge their ignorance before their classmates.) Although I sometimes ask questions of the student,

my primary job is to monitor the questions of the other students who have been told that their purpose is *not* to convince their classmate that he is right or wrong, but to ask honest questions that will make him probe deeper into his reasons behind his opinion about the soul.

At first, my students want to give their opinions disguised as questions. For example, they might ask: "Don't you think that man must have a soul because of his intelligence and his superiority over other creatures?" I interrupt the questioner and tell him we are not interested in his opinion today. We simply want to find out why his classmate does not believe man has a soul. I suggest to the budding Socrates that more appropriate questions would be: What do you mean by *soul*? How do you define *intelligence*? Where, in your opinion, does intelligence originate? Do you believe man is superior to other creatures? If so, how?

After a few days' experience with this approach, the students begin to recognize that a good discussion is not shouting down another person with already established opinions but trying instead to understand *what* he is saying and more important *why* he is saying it.

After one of these group seminars, which may last three class sessions, students tell me that they have a better understanding of their own views, a greater awareness of inconsistencies in their own thinking, and a greater tolerance for opinions that differ from their own. The student being questioned usually ends up with more confidence in what he believes or a new realization that perhaps he should change or modify his view.

My desert encounter with Plato has convinced me that *learning* is the best cure for "teacher burnout." How can we expect to remain exciting, alive teachers if we do not periodically rediscover the joy of being a student again?

—Armando Henriquez

"Plato's Republic"/Steven S. Tigner/St. John's College, Santa Fe, New Mexico/1982/Summer Seminars for Secondary School Teachers



Armando Henriquez, a teacher at John Jay High School, Westchester, New York (top). A view of the Agora with The Acropolis in the background, Athens, Greece (above).

The Subtleties of Theory in Practice



I was in deep intellectual despair, attempting to prepare a discussion on semiotics for Professor John Bender's 1980 NEH Summer Seminar, "Literature and the Visual Arts: Theory and Practice," at Stanford University. I had never studied semiotics, had not expected to find it in this seminar, and could understand it only with difficulty. Signifiers, signifieds, discriminators swirled around in a blur.

Then I remembered an experience I'd had in the spring back in Georgia. A colleague had asked me to drive to the airport to pick up Harry Crews, who was to be the principal speaker at our annual writers' conference. I was ill-prepared for the task. I had never seen so much as a photograph of Harry Crews. I didn't know what he looked like, how old he was... how would I recognize him? I knew just three things about him: he was white, a male, and a writer.

When I got to the airport, I scrutinized the disembarking passengers as they walked into the terminal. Then I saw somebody who looked "right." "Are you Harry Crews?" I asked nervously. "Why, yes," he said. I'd found him on the first try.

Now at Stanford it struck me that the airport experience was a paradigm for the processes of sign reading that semiotics addresses. The name "Harry Crews" was the sign, and one person at the airport was the thing signified. As I analyzed the process of identifying the signified, I became aware that my mind had worked through a complicated series of binary oppositions. For instance, there were two main categories of passengers getting off the plane, males and females. I ignored the females. Males could be boys or men. I ignored the boys. The men were black or white. I ignored the black ones. Other discriminators were age (I ignored all but the middle-aged) and dress (he wouldn't be wearing the uniform of either a soldier or a businessman). Among those who were left, I disregarded anyone who was met by someone else, or anyone who walked with the confident air of someone who knew exactly where he was. That left one slightly scruffy, wrinkled, confused and bemused middle-aged man with a can-

vas bag: Harry Crews, writer. I had read the complex codes of dress and behavior and found my man. This experience at the Augusta airport helped me understand the science of signs in Stanford, and that in turn led to more subtle readings of the literary texts with which we were dealing. My forced march into the domain of Umberto Eco had in fact made me conscious of complicated processes in reading and "signifying" which are normally unconscious.

I mention this moment of discovery now not because it changed my life or significantly altered the way I read or teach. It did not. Four years later I realize it was important to me because it was a moment of hard won insight in a teaching career in which such insights had become rare. There had been few enough of them in my office back at Augusta College where my desk was piled high with student compositions and class notes on comma-splices and apostrophes. This is not a complaint. As an English teacher I realize we can do no more important work than to introduce students to the written language. But as year after year students enroll who are unprepared for college level reading or writing, and we spend increasing amounts of time teaching basic skills

while offering fewer and fewer courses to our shrinking numbers of English majors, some of the critical and intellectual skills that drew us to the profession in the first place begin to atrophy. Semiotics? Forget it. I've got forty papers to return tomorrow. So even when what I learned at Stanford had no obvious bearing on what I taught when I got back, it helped tone up my brain—and that did come back with me.

I had a more practical purpose in coming to Stanford. I wanted to study literature and art together so that when I got back I could work on improving our ailing humanities sequence, a three-course requirement taught jointly by the fine arts and English departments. The literature and art segments had drifted apart over the years. We wanted to make the courses more truly interdisciplinary. My chairman put me right to work organizing meetings with our colleagues in fine arts. Over the weeks we hammered out a common syllabus, we tossed ideas back and forth across the table, and we felt at times the same kind of excitement over making unexpected connections which I remembered from John Bender's seminar. These meetings led in the next year to revisions in all three humanities courses, and last year to our department's successful application for an NEH grant for Improving Introductory Courses. With the work we will be able to do through the released time and the consultants the grant will provide, we hope to build a model interdisciplinary program.

Smaller things came back from Stanford, too. The journal I kept each day is as revealing as my seminar notes are. In our first session we studied Giovanni Bellini's *St. Peter Martyr*. My journal entry for the day is, "Today we spent the whole seminar looking at one picture!" Reading that now, I recognize myself as a brother in ignorance to those students who tell their friends over lunch, "Today we spent the

whole class on one Canterbury tale!" I learned what it is like to lack the critical tools to articulate a response. I am more understanding now of my students' silences early in the quarter. I also learned how it feels not to be the smartest guy in the class. "Today," I wrote on July 2, "I began to feel like the odd man out, the runt of the seminar. The ideas and slides flew past me so fast that I'd just be getting excited over a glimmer, a flicker of comprehension, when I'd discover they'd moved on to other things and I was just standing in their dust." Now I'm more sensitive to that lost look in the eyes of my students. I've been there.

In the four years since the seminar, my interests and obligations have shifted. There has been a communications major to design, journalism courses to teach, writing projects to finish. Our arguments over Wolfflin, our discussions of *ut pictura poesis* and iconography and literary pictorialism seem farther away from me now than just the width of a continent. Nevertheless, the work of the seminar keeps popping up in the classroom in unexpected ways: in journalism, our discussions of the iconography of consumption in advertising; in literature courses, the stress I find myself laying on the pictorial element in literature; in writing classes, my adaptation of the great Harry Crews search to writing assignments which teach students they are much smarter than they think they are and that comparison, contrast, and analysis are vital mental processes. Most significantly, the seminar helped connect two departments and bring about changes in a program which affect one thousand students a year.

Four years later and that summer still looks terrific.

—James Garvey

"Literature and the Visual Arts: Theory and Practice"/John Bender, Stanford University, California/1980/Summer Seminars for College Teachers



Summer seminarian, James Garvey(top). *The Assassination of St. Peter Martyr*, Giovanni Bellini (1459 - 1516), above.



The Procession of the Doge on Palm Sunday, Matteo Pagan. Some discrepancies exist between this engraving and the order required by the ceremonial legislation.

Summer Stipends

From the time he was an undergraduate student during the politically charged 1960s to his recent scholarly achievements as a Renaissance historian, Edward Muir has been fascinated by the interrelationship of politics and ritual.

Long before his book *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice* (Princeton University Press, 1981) would win the American Historical Association's 1982 award for Best Book in European History, Muir found an atavistic quality in students' candlelit vigils and processions in protest to the war in Vietnam.

"I remember watching a production of radical theater—remember radical theater?—and I was struck by its similarity to medieval masques, even though it was a highly secular affair," Muir says.

Indeed, Muir saw in the rallies of the anti-war movement "an almost mystical, liturgical sense, like some underlying but forgotten culture."

In *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice*, Muir combined the anthropologist's tool of studying ritual as a way to learn how societies create meanings with his chief interest as a historian, the measurement and evaluation of change.

"Anthropologists ask questions historians don't always ask," Muir says, "I wanted to reconcile the essentially ahistorical, static approach of anthropology" with the dynamism of history.

Richard Trexler (whose book *Public Life in Renaissance Florence* examines the psychology of ritual) praised Muir's book for its historical and methodological achievements. *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice* not only sheds new light on the much debated history of the Venetian republic in the sixteenth century, it also

pioneers a new method for studying how ideas emerge from popular tradition into formal ideology. Muir's book provides students of "the Myth of Venice" with new written and visual documents and may open a new field of study for students of northern European states' rituals.

During the sixteenth century, when most Italian cities were wracked by political upheaval, Venice endured as an independent republic, enjoying relatively stable and harmonious social relations and political institutions. Ruled by a hereditary caste of 2,500 nobles, sixteenth-century Venice was the most famous living example in early modern Europe of the advantages gained from government not by a king, but by a thoughtful patrician elite.

Praise for Venetian republican government took two forms: admiration for the wisdom embodied in Venice's political institutions (e.g. equality of all patrician members before the law) and for the devoted civil service practiced by the patrician rulers. Through the writings of such humanists as Gasparo Contarini and Fra Paola Sarpi, a coherent republican ideology emerged that endures as Venice's lasting contribution to the political ideals of European civilization.

Muir analyzes Venetian civic ritual and its accompanying legends as a method for understanding the rise of this Venetian republican ideology. He contends that civic ritual during the Renaissance was as important in developing the Venetian republican ideology as the formal writings of the educationally and politically advantaged classes. While humanists extolled the virtues of Venetian republican government, Venetian civic ritual peaked; never were pageantry, processions and festivals more lav-

ish, frequent or visible in the streets of Venice. Muir suggests that civic ritual helped foster the social stability and intense community life for which Venice is famous.

Muir's methodology involved measuring and evaluating civic time (e.g. creation of specialized routes); changes in number and frequency of rituals; the gradual secularization of ritual; the metamorphosis of secular institutions into sacred ones; how ceremonies revealed citizens' political perceptions of Venetian life; and political ideas represented in ritual as compared with those transmitted in literature.

Ducal processions, carnivals and numerous other festivals and parades were used for political ends. During the sixteenth century, Venice boasted a large, specialized ceremonial bureaucracy that testified to the importance of ritual affairs in Venetian society as well as to the extent

of political centralization. Muir argues that the ducal procession was, in effect, the constitution. He writes:

The procession, a subject of much legislation and a charge of the ceremonial specialists, created in its ranking of officials a constitutional ideal for Venice that existed nowhere else, neither in visual nor even in written form.


Because the ruling patricians borrowed heavily from liturgical means of display—Catholic rites of worship—the gradual accumulation of political imagery in rituals and their accompanying legends succeeded in directing citizens' loyalties away from local ones (church parishes, for instance) and toward the State. Venetian rulers were the most successful among their contemporaries in developing a political structure and devices to awaken the republican community's sense of self-sacredness.



The New York Public Library



Giacomo Franco's, On Ascension Day the Doge in the Bucintoro is Rowed to the Marriage of the Sea (left). Frontispiece of a pamphlet containing poetic paraphrases of the Psalms of David, published in Venice in 1571 (right).



Leading the procession are the standard-bearers, the commanders, and the trumpeters, who will sound the arrival of the Doge who follows them.

The Politics of Ritual

Muir's analysis of the evolution of the Festival of the Twelve Marys—from its origin in legend to its formal abolition in 1379 and subsequent transformation—illustrates how the Venetian government gradually gained neighborhood loyalties through control of certain tradition-based rituals.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it was generally believed that the origins of the annual ceremonies at the church of Santa Maria Formosa had begun as a celebration of a victory over pirates in the tenth century. The Festival of the Twelve Marys, celebrated from the mid-twelfth century to 1379, provided poor but deserving girls with dowries, underscoring the foremost element of the festival: its charitable and moralistic dimension.

The medieval neighborhoods and local parishes were the chief organizers of the ceremonies and were

strong binding forces within the community. Neighborhoods were formally organized into groups called *contrade*, which assumed financial responsibility for sponsorship of the festival on a rotating basis.

In 1379 the city fathers suspended the festival under the pretext of war with Genoa. When they reintroduced the celebration, the ceremonies were altered and the *contrade* were resolutely pushed aside in order for the ruling patricians to display their control over public charity and the centralization and unity of the republic.

During the Renaissance, the Festival of the Twelve Marys was remembered as the predecessor to the ducal procession to the church at Santa Maria Formosa. To demonstrate its hegemony in civic life, the government redesigned the spatial pattern of that procession so that the political center of the city at Piazza

San Marco was linked solely to Santa Maria Formosa. By the time of the Renaissance, all processional paths in Venice led to and from San Marco, making the square the unchallenged political center of the city. The State had triumphed over local loyalties, not by force or internal strife, but by gradually assuming power over a ritual.

The visual effect of ritual helped cultivate Venice's reputation for strong, stable republican rule in the political ideals of other countries. British and American reformers, in their respective revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were attracted to the Venetian example as an effective alternative to monarchy.

James Harrington, inspired by a trip to Venice, created a utopian plan for England in his book *Oceana* (1656). *Oceana* was read widely first in England and then in America in the eighteenth century. William Penn, for example, extracted from Harrington's writings the Venetian institutions of bicameral legislation and secret balloting, which he adopted in the draft plans for the colonial constitutions of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Thomas Jefferson's high regard for Venetian republicanism invests his political philosophy; his worship of Venetian humanism is evinced by his palatial home, Monticello, designed after the style of Venetian architect Andrea Palladio.

Among Muir's principal archival sources were sixteenth-century pamphlets which described public events. These pamphlets came in three genres—battle descriptions, odd occurrences, and ceremonies—and served as after-the-fact mementos that helped recreate a public event for participants as well as for those

unable to attend. The popularity of the pamphlets, Muir said, helped legitimize the Venetian government in public opinion by making state-sponsored celebrations a matter of utmost social concern.

He used these pamphlets as checks against *The Book of Ceremonies*, the official government compilation of ceremonies put together in the sixteenth century. The mere existence of such a book bears testimony to the significance the government attached to ritual in order to maintain its ruling position.

Muir is currently teaching his graduate students to read some of the manuscripts. "There is so much more (to study) in the Italian Renaissance," Muir said, "the students must learn very quickly what they should extract" from the primary sources. "It may sound very basic, but going through the sources teaches them what to read."

Muir has already generated undergraduate and graduate study among students who read his book. He received a Harvard student's dissertation on Saint Martin of Tour, based heavily on the methodology he developed in *Civic Ritual*. Venetian students writing their theses on ritual in Greek colonies have consulted with Muir. At Syracuse University, he has taught "Readings in Research in European Studies," "Italian Renaissance," and a "Renaissance Seminar."

Throughout the history of modern European political thought, Venice proudly bore the reputation for a stable society ruled by a republican-minded aristocracy. Muir's work shows the extent to which elaborate ceremony and ritual played a role in cementing the fabric of Venetian society.

—Louise Kowitch



Cesare Vecellio, *Procession in Piazza San Marco*. To demonstrate hegemony in civic life, the Venetian government designed religious processions so that they emphasized the political center of the city, the Piazza San Marco.

Utilitarian Confucianism

At first glance, the term *utilitarian Confucianism* might seem a contradiction not only in terms but in time and place. Rooted squarely in the ethics of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, utilitarianism has tended to be defined not only by its philosophical meaning—that the ethical value of conduct is determined by the utility of its results—but also in the historical context of the individualism that characterized the Enlightenment. Confucianism, on the other hand, is so clearly identified with China—especially China of the classical age—that it is difficult to imagine how the ethics of Confucius with their emphasis on the cultivation of personal virtue, wisdom, and faithfulness to oneself and others could be linked with a term that originated, according to Webster's dictionary, in 1827 nearly half a world away.

This contradiction is resolved in *Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch'en Liang's*

Challenge to Chu Hsi, an analysis by Hoyt Tillman, associate professor of history at Arizona State University, of a series of debates over the Confucian ethic that occurred during the Sung Dynasty. Tillman completed the book in 1983 with the help of an NEH Summer Stipend.

The debates between Chu Hsi and Ch'en Liang, conducted through letters and visits from 1182 to 1186, centered on a national and cultural crisis that had its roots in the failure of both reformist and conservative programs to resolve national problems. Weakened by factional disputes, the country fell prey to Jurchen conquerors from Manchuria, who destroyed the Sung Dynasty in the mid-1120s. Although the dynasty managed to reestablish itself as the Southern Sung in 1127, it had lost North China.

There followed a period of cultural retrenchment, characterized by a spirit of accommodation among

scholars with more attention given to Taoism and Buddhism than to Confucianism, except in the limited areas of textual criticism and interpretation. Nevertheless, the country's social and economic problems, as well as the foreign invasion, continued to encourage scholars to pose basic questions and express different opinions about values and policies. Rejecting the somewhat diffuse intellectual positions of the middle part of the century, both Chu Hsi and Ch'en Liang tried to create more systematic and defined approaches to China's problems. They debated their political differences in terms of Confucian polarities, which emphasized the cultivation of personal virtue on the one hand and the importance of social and political effectiveness on the other. While Chu Hsi defended the ethic of absolute ends or personal virtue, Ch'en Liang championed the ethic of utility or social and political effectiveness.

These debates about the relations between values and history shed light on the Chinese predilection for making strong connections between philosophical principles and social and political realities. For example, in contrast to the pervasive Western notion of history as progress, Chu Hsi perceived of history as a restriction on optimum ideals. To him, history served mainly as a negative example of the failure of people to actualize Confucian principles.

Rather than accepting the sordid state of affairs past and present, one should transcend them through the *tao-hsueh* (School of the True Way).

Both Chu Hsi and Ch'en Liang advocated restoration of the Sung Dynasty by military action to regain the conquered territories. However, Chu Hsi's appeals to the emperor relied heavily on ethical principles and quotations from the Classics as absolute authority.

Ch'en Liang's ideals were more socially than ethically oriented, and he tended to be more receptive to history's "sordid state." By making standards relative to epochs and situations, Ch'en was seeking to establish a broader, more utilitarian approach to problems. Claiming that the Confucian Classics were not actual history but an idealized version of what should have happened in antiquity, Ch'en Liang focused his appeals for action on the practical military and administrative means to regain North China. Especially in times of war or national emergencies, he believed that any preoccupation with philosophy and absolute values restricted the search for practical means to pursue national goals. To Ch'en, waging a successful war to regain the lost territories overrode any abstract issues of philosophy or ethics.

Although Ch'en Liang made considerable progress in rehabilitating utilitarian symbols and establishing a theoretical and ethical base for them, his legal problems and an untimely death prevented the development of

Ch'en's ideas into a systematic philosophy or cohesive school of thought. The significance of the debates, according to Tillman, is that they crystallized thinking of the time to the point where Chu Hsi's system of Neo-Confucianism became China's intellectual and state orthodoxy until the twentieth century.

Since 1976, Chinese scholars have engaged in a reevaluation of the Legalist label often applied to Ch'en Liang by Marxist scholars of the early 1970s. Until Tillman unearthed a 1212 edition of Ch'en Liang's essays in the rare book collection of the National Central Library in Taiwan, available studies did not fully explain Ch'en Liang's metamorphosis from a student of *tao-hsueh* to a utilitarian thinker. Today, because most post-Mao Chinese favor utilitarian approaches and disparage Neo-Confucian ones, Ch'en Liang's utilitarian Confucianism has gained in popularity.

Although the reader is cautioned against allowing Western parallels to hinder comprehension of the issues in their Chinese context, the debates do contain material for cross-cultural comparison. By raising basic questions about values that have also been of major concern to the modern West, the debates strike a responsive chord. Are values and truths universal, or are they relative and limited to a particular ethnic culture or individual at a certain point in time? How feasible are idealistic, in contrast to utilitarian or pragmatic, methods of government? How important are social ideology and personal ethics in government, especially when they draw attention away from the more practical functioning of government? In the pursuit of material welfare and practical policies, how much can one afford to be influenced by absolute personal or social standards of conduct?

Writing in the book's foreword, Benjamin I. Schwartz, Leroy B. Williams Professor of History and Government at Harvard, states that "it is precisely the fact that the same or similar issues [results vs. motives] may arise within entirely different cultural and historical contexts which provides the mind-stretching challenge of comparative thought. The observation that a utilitarian approach to ethics in China may be linked to a Confucian ethic rather than to Victorian individualism is an observation that may open new perspectives on the question of utilitarianism itself."

These perspectives have been opened for both Chinese and Western scholars in Tillman's book. Indeed, the author reminds us, "the modern revolt against ethical absolutes still has difficulty answering two objections raised by Chu Hsi: the means employed to attain a goal affects the goal itself; and the standards of truth or value relative to a time, situation, or individual encourage *anomie* and uncertainty."

—Caroline Taylor

Portrait of a Chinese Sage. The inscription in the upper left by Kanoseisen-in-Osanobu, identifies this portrait as "Throneless King," an alternate term for Confucius.



Centers for
Advanced
Study

Demographics and the American Dream



U.S. Library of Congress

The evolution of the "American Dream" over the last three hundred years has depended to a great extent on shifts in population.

In his most recent book, *Structures of American Social History* (Indiana University Press, 1981), Indiana University Professor of History Walter Nugent shows how fluctuations in birth, death, and migration patterns are fundamental to the broadening and perception of opportunity, as well as to the periods of social unrest that have marked the American experience. Completed at the Huntington Library, where Nugent was an NEH Visiting Fellow from November 1979 to May 1980, the book uses demographic methods to construct the American social and economic history and to explain broad changes in the values and organization of American society. Drawing upon the work of demographers, economists, and historians from Malthus to Vinovskis, Nugent separates American social history into three periods.

The first period—demographically speaking—lasted from 1720 to 1870, and was characterized by extremely high birth rates; in fact, population increases equalled or even surpassed gloomy Malthusian predictions of the eighteenth century. The pattern was similar to that of developing countries today, but with a major difference—in nineteenth-century America the population explosion was accompanied by the westward expansion, which opened up millions of square miles for settlement. The Puritan descendants who left communities in the East practiced the virtues of thrift and hard work, and believed that "opportunity," in the form of land acquisition, would reward their labors. By providing the human capi-

tal to develop the West, high birth rates enriched rather than impoverished America, and gave rise to the individualism and belief in personal fulfillment that spurred the mass immigration and industrial development of the later nineteenth century.

Significantly, the rate of population growth, which could have outstripped resources in a few generations if left unchecked, dropped sharply after 1870. Nugent attributes the decline to increased urbanization—between 1870 and 1900 the number of people living in cities grew by more than twice the rate of those on farms. Urbanization brought the dramatic changes in life styles and values that we associate with the modern era—more and completely new types of occupations; expanding bureaucratization and education; mass transportation and communication; and changing patterns of family life. In addition, wealth was increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and industrialists.

While people from the countryside and hundreds of thousands of immigrants flocked to cities in search of a better life, the promise of the "American Dream" seemed to slip away for many Americans. Disappointment and frustration led to conflict between labor and capital in the cities, and to populism in the West. The ensuing social struggle was resolved with the reforms of the Progressive Era and the establishment of a new range of opportunities based on an industrial economy. Thus, the closing of the frontier, which Turner greeted with such pessimism in 1893, marked the end of one kind of opportunity; but the concept of personal progress was transferred to an urban setting where expectation of the middle class changed from acqui-

sition of land to that of capital, consumer goods, and status.

While radical shifts in migration patterns accounted for the changing nineteenth-century social structures, Nugent sees fluctuations in birth rates as responsible for twentieth-century trends and upheavals. He marks a third period of American history beginning in 1920, with another sharp drop in birth rates. The present era has belied the fears of both Malthus and Turner; birth rates, except for the anomalous "baby boom" of the forties and fifties, have continued to drop. At the same time, the assumptions of opportunity that undergirded the settling of America held firm and expanded to include new groups.

The one demographic peculiarity was the post-World War II rise in the birth rate, a phenomenon that temporarily reversed a seventy-five-year-old pattern of declining population growth. Nugent suggests that the social unrest of the sixties and seventies can be explained, in part, by the unusually large numbers of youth coming to adulthood in a period when the economy did not expand sufficiently to accommodate them. The expectations of many were thwarted by stiff competition from the swollen cohort seeking entry into the labor market—a group that also included increased percentages of minorities and women. The demographic situation corresponded to that of the early nineteenth century, when a youthful population could not find sufficient land in settled areas. However, no "safety valve" equivalent to the frontier was available in the twentieth century.

Birth rates resumed their previous pattern of decline in the 1960s, and

if trends hold, the U.S. population will stabilize by the year 2000, at which time a fourth period of American history will begin, according to Nugent. Demographic patterns will continue to affect social structures; for example, increased life expectancy will result in a higher proportion of aged people in the population, placing a greater burden on society to care for its dependent members. Nevertheless, Nugent predicts that if birth rates continue to fall, the "American Dream" will remain a reality for many people, well into the twenty-first century.

The application of demography to the larger narrative of history is a fairly recent development. Although the first census in America was conducted in 1790, the data rarely got out of the Census Bureau and were used primarily by government workers to estimate needs in such areas as transportation and taxation. A few historians and economists before 1900 saw that birth and death rates, sex ratios, and patterns of migration had far-reaching historical consequences. Frederick Jackson Turner's "frontier thesis," which has had such impact on interpretations of American history, was based directly on data from the 1890 census.

However, it was not until the recent emphasis on social history that demographic methods have been used as a tool for historical research in America. Previously, history focused on elites and political events, and its primary sources were written records. Scholars were forced to turn to census data and other materials to reconstruct the daily lives of the masses of people who have left no such documents.

In the 1960s historians such as John Demos and P.J. Greven began

to apply demography to the study of colonial America, an era known until then mainly through the writings of the clergy of the period. Dismayed by their lack of concrete knowledge about the settlers, these scholars reconstituted family structures from existing records, and then calculated patterns of birth, death, and migration. The resulting studies have produced some unexpected findings—Demos's work shows, for example, that the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay were surprisingly mobile and that the rate of premarital pregnancy was fully half that of today. In addition, the assumption that early Americans were bound together in extended families turns out to be false, with nuclear families the norm in the seventeenth century, as now.

It was to earlier historians and demographers that Nugent turned during his fellowship year at the Huntington Library, however. The Huntington, which is located in San Marino, California, contains 5 million volumes and 2.5 million manuscript items. The collections are particularly strong in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British history and literature, and in the nineteenth-century American West. Nugent compared first editions of Malthus, Franklin, and Jefferson from the Huntington collection with more recent imprints and traced changing ideas of the authors through the revisions. Also, the complete papers of Frederick Jackson Turner enabled Nugent to establish that the historian did not attach any significance to the declining rate of population growth that was revealed by the 1920 and

1930 censuses. To the end of his life, Turner saw the closing of the frontier as a harbinger of narrowed opportunity for Americans.

Nugent reviewed the nineteenth-century western collections, a body of material he hopes to incorporate into a cross-national study of the 1880s. The holdings include a number of travel accounts, full runs of many state and local periodicals, and the papers of the library's founder, Henry Huntington. Other items of interest relate to nineteenth century mining, transportation, banking, and community development. Nugent comments that an additional advantage of his research at the Huntington was the opportunity to exchange ideas with scholars such as western historian and Turner biographer Ray Billington and economist Charlotte Erickson.

Structures of American Social History grew out of insights that Nugent gained while writing an earlier book, *From Centennial to World War: American Society, 1876-1917* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1977). While researching this social history of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, Nugent noticed the apparent relationship between demographic and social changes. An NEH summer seminar that he taught in the summer of 1979 also helped him develop his thesis; as a result of dialogue with the seminar participants, he substantially revised and expanded his manuscript. Many of Nugent's concepts will be incorporated into a second seminar that he will teach this summer on attitudes toward the environment and the West.

—Perry Frank

Programs for Historically Black Colleges and Universities



Howard University, Washington, D.C.

New Directions

Following a presidential initiative that called on all federal agencies to find ways in which historically black colleges and universities could participate in various government programs, the NEH established an ad hoc, agency-wide committee to consider how the Endowment could implement the president's directive.

The committee responded with an ambitious program. The first step was to hire an NEH liaison who would travel to black colleges and universities and inform them about current NEH programs to which they might apply; and to solicit advice from faculty and administration about the kinds of programs which would most benefit their institutions.

Next, a series of high school humanities institutes was developed by the Division of Education Programs which would identify promising high school juniors and enable them to study under the direction of scholars on the campuses of historically black colleges and universities. Next summer, 105 high school juniors—thirty-five in each of three seminars—will study comparative literature, history, and American literature for four weeks and explore these topics in greater depth than is usually feasible in the high school curriculum. They will reside on the campuses of the University of Maryland, Tougaloo College, and Albany State College.

In the Division of Fellowships and Seminars, two programs are already underway. Summer Seminars for College Teachers has selected directors to offer five eight-week seminars on the campuses of the Hampton Institute, Hampton, Virginia; Bennett College, Greensboro, North Carolina;

Atlanta University, Atlanta, Georgia; Tougaloo College, Mississippi; and Howard University, Washington, D.C. These will be attended by sixty faculty members in two-, four- and five-year institutions from throughout the United States. College teachers who are selected will have the opportunity to work with distinguished scholars in their fields at institutions with libraries and other resources suitable for advanced study. Thus, their ability to convey their own understanding of the humanities to students will be enhanced. Seminar topics range from a "History of Afro-American Music, 1880-1980" to "The Novel of Slave Unrest."

A first for the Endowment is the program that allows faculty at historically black colleges and universities to complete their graduate study. Designed to strengthen the teaching of the humanities at these institutions, grants administered through the applying institution will allow faculty members, in many cases, to complete their doctoral dissertations. Dissertation topics from among those faculty members already selected include "Spiritual Vision in the Novels of Graham Greene," and "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in Early Christianity."

Maben Herring, assistant director, Division of Fellowships and Seminars, says that the initiative was originally scheduled for a two-year period. "The Endowment has decided to extend the time limit because of the institutions' response and interest in the programs," Herring continued. "Because we made a concerted effort to ascertain these institutions' needs, the NEH can provide appropriate assistance."



A cowboy pensively watches his herd grazing on a diminishing stretch of pasture with the Dallas skyline of 1945 in the background. In the forty years that have passed since this photograph was taken, the skyline's growth reflects that of the city.



A Natural Historian

The history of humanity can be seen as a vast march toward mastery over a largely hostile environment. Even before Jacob Bronowski coined the metaphor, we have seen this mastery as a summit; our journey toward it, an ascent.

What brands this climb as a peculiarly human endeavor, even more than the great leaps of heroism that sometimes mark its ordinarily slow, arduous progress, is its self-consciousness. For always among the climbers there are those who stop to chart and appraise the journey so far, to suppose its next direction and describe its current character, and to place the individual against the huge landscape it has traversed.

Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
When a new planet swims into his ken;
Or like stout Cortez when with eagle eyes
He star'd at the Pacific—and all his men
Look'd at each other with a wild surmise—
Silent, upon a peak in Darien.

—John Keats, "On First Looking Into Chapman's Homer"

Historian Stephen Pyne has spent a great deal of time thinking and writing about the encounters between humans and nature and about the way those encounters have been reported to society. In the survey courses in American intellectual history that he teaches at the University of Iowa, Pyne discusses William Goetzmann's idea of a Second Great Age of Discovery, when explorers, finished with the world's coastlines and the circumnavigation of the globe, looked inward to traverse the

continents that their forebears had discovered.

Pyne's studies of explorations in the American West have produced two works: a biography of geologist Grove Karl Gilbert and a monograph on the intellectual history of the Grand Canyon. His undergraduate work at Stanford University, which included a minor in geology as well as a degree in English, enabled him to write the technical explanations of Gilbert's contributions to the science of geology that constitute most of *Grove Karl Gilbert, A Great Engine of Research*. The book also describes the heroic age of American geology as part of the intellectual harvest of America's Western migration, a treatment of history as tidal flow between science and culture that characterizes Pyne's work on other topics.

"The story of the Grand Canyon," Pyne writes in the Author's Note to *Dutton's Point: An Intellectual History of the Grand Canyon*, "is a story of what happened when a great civilization encountered a great natural phenomenon. Neither was the same afterwards."

His monograph explains the kind of revelation the Canyon was to nineteenth-century explorers steeped in European tradition, who, unlike the Hopi who had lived so long with the Canyon, had still to come to cultural terms with it.

Pyne's narrative begins with a brief account of the almost 300 years of exploration into the interior of what is now Arizona before the Grand Canyon confronted the world. The Canyon, encountered, was largely ignored.

"This indifference betrayed something more than the steely soul of a

conquistador," Pyne writes of the sixteenth-century Spanish expeditions. "Coming three years before Copernicus published *De Revolutionibus*, twenty years after Magellan's fleet circumnavigated the globe, and nearly thirty years before Mercator synthesized the known geography of the *terra nova orbis* with his famous projection, the Spanish had little context for the revelation of the Canyon...."

Pyne offers the Mexican War as the most significant event in the sociopolitical life of the Grand Canyon. Once a part of the Manifest Destiny, only a few years remained before the canyon would be engaged, and this time, by a civilization that had at its disposal not only paleontology and stratigraphy but also literary romanticism.

The U.S. Army Corps of Topographic Engineers, who steamed up the Colorado River in search of a better route to Utah in 1858, blazed trails, according to Pyne, in art, science, and adventure narratives that would be followed in the subsequent efforts at defining the Grand Canyon. The greatest contribution of the expedition was that of its naturalist John Strong Newberry, who concluded that the wondrous formations were caused not by structural catastrophes but by fluvial erosion, that is, by the action of rivers. Pyne believes, however, that the expedition's *Report upon the Colorado River of the West* only initiated the assimilation of the Canyon.

Of the reports of expeditions that followed, "one succeeding another like the canyons of the Colorado itself," the most comprehensive and the most successful at communicating the idea of the canyon as well as its physical presence is Clarence Dutton's *Tertiary History of the Grand Canyon District*, which Pyne calls "that splendid ensemble of science, aesthetics, cartography, painting, photography, and illustration."

Dutton's narrative is organized by several journeys along the canyon's rim. In this it is unique: Pyne points

out that previous efforts approached the canyon from the vantage of the river. Each journey unfolds a geologic lesson, followed by scenic description. Dutton points out geographic features: faults, rivers, monoclines, volcanoes. He explains the mechanics of cliff recession and the significance of particular weathering patterns, then follows these explanations with descriptions of color, shape, impressions. "Aesthetics and science, impression and fact," writes Pyne, "develop in counterpoint, a literary fugue."

It is a literary form that Pyne plans to imitate in an explanation of that which he believes to be a symbol of a "Third Great Age of Discovery," as the Grand Canyon was to the Second: Antarctica.

Suddenly I saw the cold and rook-delighting heaven
That seemed as though ice burned
and was but the more ice,
And thereupon imagination and heart were driven
So wild that every casual thought
of that and this
Vanished . . .

—William Butler Yeats,
"The Cold Heaven"

In what has become a fairly large genre of literature, explorers' logs and journals and biographical accounts of experiences in Antarctic realms, the attempts at exploration of the continent are called "assaults." The continent answers in kind: No other body of literature describes the human capacity for such physical strain and punishment as that chronicling the challenge to Antarctica. This excerpt from Apsley Cherry-Garrard's memoirs of a journey in 1910 during which he and two companions man-hauled their sledges (long sleds for transporting supplies) is a typical example:

The temperature was -47° F., and I was a fool to take my hands out of my mitts to haul on the ropes to bring the sledges up. I started away from the Barrier edge with all ten fingers frost-bitten. They did not really come back until we were in



Stephen Pyne in the Antarctic. Above left, fire working over Cold Springs Divide from Maricopa Road, Los Padres National Forest, California.

the tent for our night meal, and within a few hours there were two or three large blisters, up to an inch long, on all of them... the matter inside these big blisters was frozen into ice. To handle the cooking gear or the food bags was agony....

Cherry-Garrard's memoirs are called "The Worst Journey in the World." Titles of similar works do nothing to improve the Antarctic reputation: "This Accursed Land," "The Unrelenting Ice," "Antarctica: The Worst Place in the World," "Alone," "Voyage Into Danger." Known to humans for a mere century and a half, Antarctica's image is the personification of Nature at her nastiest.

Still "the Ice," as it is called, beckons. Its tiny but continuous population of scientists attests to its importance to knowledge of the earth. Especially since 1957-58, the International Geophysical Year, when twelve nations cooperated to construct thirty-eight stations for scientific observations, Antarctica has been the site of important studies in seismology, glaciology, oceanography, meteorology, solar activity, and any number of scientific fields.

How to reconcile the paradoxical images of perilous wasteland and productive laboratory into one history of a civilization that has been controlled by the politics of scientific inquiry is the problem now before Stephen Pyne.

Pyne first thought of going to the Ice while he was working on a cultural history of fire. A colleague recommended to him a book about the 1914 *Endurance* expedition of Antarctic explorer Ernest Shackleton. (Shackleton's ship the *Endurance* was crushed by the ice in an Antarctic sea. His crew camped on an ice floe for five months, then crossed in a twenty-foot boat 800 miles of stormy, treacherous ocean in what is the most extraordinary sea adventure in the history of the Antarctic.) Pyne's fascination with exploration and discovery, his experience as a historian, and his knowledge of geology inspired the plan for an intellectual history of Antarctica. An NEH fellowship and travel support from the

National Science Foundation gave him the opportunity to study the continent first-hand for three months in 1982.

"It is a world of sensory deprivation," Pyne says. "Color and shape vanish, as well as a sense of time and space." The appropriate aesthetic for the Antarctic, says Pyne, is that of minimalist painting.

"I felt as though I had visited a completely alien planet," Pyne says. "And the farther you get from the coast, the more alien it becomes—more like a landscape on Mars than on Earth."

The landscape has two dimensions: flat and white. It is interrupted rarely by a cone of rock—actually the tip of a mountain rearing out of the magnitude of the ice cap, which covers all but several hundred feet of the mountain's 9,000-foot altitude.

"There's a kind of gallows humor about the appearance of the land close to the Pole," says Pyne. "One of the standing jokes is that the skiing there is great: there's two inches of powder and 9,000 feet of base."

During his time on the ice, Pyne thought often about a scene from E.M. Forster's *Passage to India* in which Forster describes the kind of reduction to simplest forms that Pyne experienced in Antarctica:

The echo in Marabar Cave is... entirely devoid of distinction. Whatever is said, the same monotonous voice replies, and quivers up and down the walls until it is absorbed into the roof. "Boum" is the sound as far as the human alphabet can express it... utterly dull. Hope, politeness, the blowing of a nose, the squeak of a boot, all produce "boum."

No matter what thought one flings at the Antarctic landscape, the reply, like that at Marabar Cave, is always the same, Pyne explains. "It all comes back white ice."

The ice, 90 percent of all that there is of it in the world, is Antarctica. It covers the entire continent, cementing the archipelago of West Antarctica with the land mass of the East.

In its milky whiteness is the mystery, power, and ferocity of nature.

In the interior—so complete a desert is Antarctica—precipitation takes the form of "Diamond Dust," fine prisms of ice, rather than snowstorms. The nature of the nuclei for the "dust" is still a mystery. Whatever the nucleus of its tiny crystals, the massive bulk of the ice is engaged in a slow spill into the sea.

Pyne plans to structure his intellectual history of the continent by following this ice journey in reverse. His book, he says, will "open with a vision of a gigantic Antarctic berg riding along the circumpolar current." Essays on Antarctica and exploration, Antarctic aesthetics, the earth sciences, and the geopolitics of Antarctica will accompany the journey from the iceberg to its source and will relate the history of the human encounter with the continent.

"Penetrating to the interior," Pyne says, "is a ruthless process of reduction, with color, form, stimulants and information of all sorts, everything replaced by ice."

Some say the world will end in fire. Some say in ice.

From what I've tasted of desire I hold with those who favor fire. But if it had to perish twice, I think I know enough of hate To say that for destruction ice Is also great And would suffice.

—Robert Frost, "Fire and Ice"

Pyne laughs at the observation that his cultural histories reflect poetic extremes. In his book *Fire in America, A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural Fire*, Pyne writes, "Many a historian could have researched this subject, but probably only a firefighter would have thought of the project at all."

Pyne, a firefighter before he was a historian, thought of the project in the way that he thinks of his work on the Antarctic. "I'm interested in the way people study and understand great natural phenomena; in the way humans encounter nature in its most elemental, dramatic forms."

Pyne recalls conversations at the National Humanities Center, where he worked on the cultural history of fire, that questioned fire as a subject

for study in the humanities. But Pyne approaches fire as the historians of science approach science. "I'm principally interested in Nature," Pyne says, "but I go at it with the tools of the humanities."

Fire in America traces the history of the use and impact of fire in the regions of the United States. Pyne places this history in the context of the three great waves in which fire came to North America: its natural source, lightning; the "Pleistocene immigrants" who brought fire across the Bering Strait from Asia; and the immigrants who brought fire from Europe.

The book describes the role of fire in myths, cults and rituals and traces certain principles of its use to native American techniques of hunting and to thirteenth-century land-clearing practices known as the "Great Reclamation, a heroic assault on the woodlands of interior Europe in which forest, swamp, and estuary were converted to arable land."

"Fire is a cultural phenomenon," Pyne writes. "It is among man's oldest tools, the first product of the natural world he learned to domesticate."

After he finishes his work on Antarctica, Pyne plans to begin a global study of fire. "The capture of fire is one of the great themes of global history," he says. "It is part of our heritage as a species."

When he was on the Ice, Pyne helped a Chinese astrophysicist from Taiwan, a Japanese meteorologist, and an American scientist with an experiment that would provide information about the upper wind over the Antarctic continent. The four men ran back and forth over the polar plain trying to tease a special red kite high enough in that frigid air to be lifted by the wind. After reading Pyne's work, one has a vision of these four, lumbering in heavy, awkward clothes to get the wind to take the kite. After several moments, one man steps back to watch the other three and to contemplate the red streamer against the vast white wilderness.

—Linda Blanken



The Canyon as gorge: William Holmes, *View from Toroweap*. In this most widely admired single piece of Canyon art, Holmes achieves an almost perfect balance between the vertical, the depth of the gorge, and the horizontal, the receding cliffs.

—From the *Atlas, Tertiary History*

1984 NEH FELLOWSHIP AWARDS

Archaeology & Anthropology

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Christopher H. Boehm, Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights
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SUMMER SEMINARS FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS

Stanely H. Brandes, University of California, Berkeley *Humor in Cross-Cultural Perspectives*

Lawrence Rosen, Princeton University, New Jersey, *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Law* (Seminar location: Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire)
John F. Szwed, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, *A Folkloristic and Anthropological View of Afro-American Culture*

SUMMER STIPENDS

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SUMMER SEMINARS FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS

Jon Appleton, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, *Music and Technology*
Richard I. Betts, University of Illinois, Champaign, *Architectural Theorists of the Renaissance and their Challengers*
A. Peter Brown, Indiana University, Bloomington, *Patterns of Stylistic Development in Joseph Haydn's Music*
Nick Browne, University of California, Los Angeles, *Television: Form and Function*
Richard Crawford, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, *American Music and its Professions*
Caecilia Davis-Weyer, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, *Roman Wall Mosaics (350-1300): Success and Failure in Medieval Patronage* (Seminar location: Villa Massenzia of Bryn Mawr College, Rome, Italy)

Lewis H. Lockwood, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, *The Beethoven Symphonies: Current Analytical and Historical Perspectives*

Doris E. McGinty, Howard University, Washington, D.C., *A History of Afro-American Music, 1880-1980**

Richard Pommer, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York, *Mies van der Rohe and American Architecture* (Seminar location: Columbia University, New York)

Harold S. Powers, Princeton University, New Jersey, *Comparative Studies in Melodic Typology*

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Mary R. Lefkowitz, Wellesley College, Massachusetts, *Women in Antiquity*
Gregory Nagy, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, *The Ancient Greek Concept of Myth and Contemporary Theory and Criticism*

SUMMER SEMINARS FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS

John V. Fleming, Princeton University, New Jersey, *The Classical Heritage of Medieval European Literature* (Seminar location: The Bread Loaf School of Middlebury College, Vermont)
G. Karl Galinsky, The University of Texas, Austin, *The Iliad, the Odyssey, and the Aeneid* (Seminar location: University of Colorado, Boulder)

Marsh H. McCall, Jr., Stanford University, California, *Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides: Performance and Interpretation of Greek Tragedy*
John J. Peradotto, SUNY at Buffalo, New York, *Homer, Vergil, Dante: Continuity and Change in Epic Literature*

James M. Redfield, University of Chicago, Illinois, *The Iliad and the Odyssey* (Seminar location: Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire)

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American Philological Association, Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, New York and Munich, George P. Goold

History—Non-U.S.

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 Alice Stroup, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York
 James B. Wood, Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts

SUMMER SEMINARS FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS

Richard Herr, University of California, Berkeley, *Agriculture and Rural Society in Europe and the Americas*
 Firuz Kazemzadeh, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, *The Russian Empire in the 19th and 20th Centuries*
 William Monter, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, *Women in Early Modern Europe*
 Karen Offen and Susan Groag Bell, Stanford University, California, *The Woman Question as a Central Theme in Western Thought: 1750-1950*
 J.G.A. Pocock, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, *Writing and Understanding History in Britain and America 1688-1789*
 Frank M. Turner, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, *Ideas and Society in Victorian Britain*
 Robin W. Winks, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, *The Problem of Imperialism in Comparative Perspective: Britain and the United States*

SUMMER SEMINARS FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS

Alvin H. Bernstein, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, *Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Mahan: Masterpieces of Strategic Thought*
 William R. Cook, SUNY, College at Geneseo, New York, *Thucydides, Plutarch, Bede: Three Approaches to History*
 Richard N. Frye and Eden Naby, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, *Firdosi's Iranian Book of Kings: Myth, History, and Cultural Identity*

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 Altina L. Waller, Southwestern University at Memphis, Tennessee

FACULTY GRADUATE STUDY PROGRAM

Polly A. Owen, LeMoyné-Owen College, Memphis, Tennessee

SUMMER SEMINARS FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS

Richard M. Abrams, University of California, Berkeley, *Business in the History of American Society*
 Robert A. Divine, University of Texas, Austin, *The American Presidency from FDR to Nixon*
 Ellis Hawley and Lawrence Gelfand, University of Iowa, Iowa City, *Planners and Politicians in Wartime and Inter-War America: 1917-1945*
 Walter Nugent, Indiana University, Bloomington, *The Frontier and Environment in America*
 Jack N. Rakove, Stanford University, Califor-

nia, *Political Experience and Political Thought in Revolutionary America*

SUMMER SEMINARS FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS

Elizabeth Rauh Bethel, Lander College, Greenwood, South Carolina, *Frederick Douglass: Black Autobiography and the Quest for Identity* (Seminar location: Rhode Island Black Heritage Society, Providence, Rhode Island)
 Betty Fladeland, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, *Douglass, Fitzhugh, Stowe: Slavery and Antislavery in America*
 W. Turrentine Jackson, University of California, Davis, *Turner, Parkman, Powell, Roosevelt, Cather: American Frontier Experience*
 Michael S. Mahoney, Princeton University, New Jersey, *Technology and the Human Experience*
 James P. Shenton, Columbia University, New York, *Classic Studies in American Ethnic and Racial History*

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Lois Banner, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, *Popular Culture and Gender in the United States from 1860 to 1960* (Seminar location: George Washington University, Washington, D.C.)
 Hubert L. Dreyfus, and Stuart E. Dreyfus, University of California, Berkeley, *The Place of Computers in Our Culture*
 Roger B. Henkle and L. Perry Curtis, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, *Culture and Society in England, 1840-1918: An Interdisciplinary Approach*
 Martin J. Klein, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, *Physicists in Historical Context*
 Richard A. Long, Atlanta University, Georgia, *Africa to America: Diaspora, Continuum, Creolization**
 Everett Mendelsohn, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, *The Social History of Modern Science*

SUMMER SEMINARS FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS

Robert R. Benedetti and James G. Moseley, New College of University of South Florida, Sarasota, *Winthrop, Jefferson, and the Supreme Court: Religion and Politics in America*
 William F. May, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., *The Humanities and the Civic Self: Selected Texts*

SUMMER STIPENDS

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
CENTERS FOR ADVANCED STUDY

American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Massachusetts, John B. Hench
 Hastings Center, Hastings-on-Hudson, New York, Daniel Callahan
 Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery, San Marino, California, Martin Ridge
 Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, Michael Walzer
 Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, Thad W. Tate
 National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, Charles Blitzer
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Yakini B. Kemp, Clark College, Atlanta, Georgia
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SUMMER SEMINARS FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS

Joshua A. Fishman, Yeshiva University, Bronx, New York, *Language Maintenance and Language Shift Among American Ethno-Linguistic Minorities* (Seminar location: Stanford University, California)

*Denotes a seminar held at a historically black college or university.

James J. Murphy, University of California at Davis, *Ciceronian Rhetoric and Its Influence on Modern Writing*
Michael Shapiro, Princeton University, New Jersey, *Semiotic Perspectives on Linguistics and Verbal Art*
John P. Warnock, University of Wyoming, Laramie, *The Writing Process: A Humanistic View*

SUMMER STIPENDS

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Manorma Pandit, Alabama State University, Montgomery
Valerie F. Sedlak, Morgan State University, Baltimore, Maryland
Wei-hsiung K. Wu, Bowie State College, Maryland

SUMMER SEMINARS FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS

Edward J. Ahearn, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, *Literature, History, and Ideology in the Nineteenth Century*
Jules Brody, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, *French Classical Literature: A Textual Approach*
Victor H. Brombert, Princeton University, New Jersey, *The Modern Anti-Hero*
David F. Dorsey, Jr., Atlanta University, Georgia, *Approaches to African Fiction*
Morris Eaves, and **Michael Fischer**, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, *Literary Theory and the Romantic Self*
Donald L. Fanger, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, *The Russian Novel: Poetics, Tradition, European Connections*
Frances Ferguson, University of California, Berkeley, *The Aesthetics and Politics of the Sublime*
Joan M. Ferrante, Columbia University, New York, New York, *Women in Medieval Life and Literature*
George Ford, University of Rochester, New York, *Dickens and His Development as a Writer*
Sander L. Gilman, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, *The 1890s in Germany and Austria*
Alfred Glauser, University of Wisconsin, Madison, *French Poetry and Poetics*
Ihab Hassan, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, *The Question of Postmodernism: Text,*

Context, Theory

Donald R. Howard, Stanford University, California, *Late Medieval Fictions: Boccaccio and Chaucer*
Gabriele Bernhard Jackson, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, *History and Fiction: The Examples of Shakespeare*
Ulrich C. Knoepfelmacher, Princeton University, New Jersey, *The Emergence of Children's Literature: 1840-1920*
Luis Leal, University of California, Santa Barbara, *Chicano Literature and Cultural Identity*
Francois Rigolot, Princeton University, New Jersey, *Modern Critical Theory and French Narrative*
Elias L. Rivers, SUNY at Stony Brook, New York, *Hispanic Drama: Social Contracts and Speech Acts*
Lynn Veach Sadler, Bennett College, Greensboro, North Carolina, *The Novel of Slave Unrest**
Murray M. Schwartz, and **David Willbern**, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, *Psychoanalysis, Contemporary Criticism, and Shakespeare*
Daniel R. Schwarz, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, *Critical Perspectives on the Early Twentieth-Century British Novel*
Elaine C. Showalter, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, *Women's Writing and Women's Culture*
Howard Stein, Columbia University, New York, *The American Playwright, 1920-1980*
Wendy Steiner, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, *Literature and Painting*
John M. Wallace, University of Chicago, Illinois, *Literature and Politics in Seventeenth-Century England*
Jerry W. Ward, Tougaloo College, Mississippi, *Black South: Opening the Text**

SUMMER SEMINARS FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS

Philip R. Berk, University of Rochester, New York, *Moliere: Comedy as Pedagogy*
Albert Berml, CUNY Lehman College, Bronx, New York, *Ibsen, Strindberg, Chekhov, and Shaw as Contemporary Playwrights*
Lawrence Buell, Oberlin College, Ohio, *Hawthorne, Stowe, Thoreau, Dickinson: Romantic Imagination in New England*
Michael B. Cooke, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, *Conrad, Ellison, Garcia Marquez: Estrangement and Self-Fulfillment*
Carol T. Christ, University of California, Berkeley, *The Brontes, Eliot, Dickens, Hardy: Five Victorian Novels*
Huston Diehl, University of Oklahoma, Norman, *Milton's Paradise Lost* (Seminar location: Colorado College, Colorado Springs)
Edwin Folsom, University of Iowa, Iowa City, *Whitman's Leaves of Grass: Interplay Between Poem, Poet, and Place*
David William Foster, Arizona State University, Tempe, *Vasconcelos, Paz, Rulfo, Fuentes, Poniatowska: Twentieth-Century Mexican Literature*
Sol Gittleman, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts, *Hesse, Mann, Grass: Three German Texts and the Road to Hitler*
Alan Grob, Rice University, Houston, Texas, *Wordsworth and Keats: Versions of Romanticism*
Michael L. Hall, Centenary College of Louisiana, Shreveport, *Montaigne, Bacon, Donne: Emergence of the Essay and the Idea of Discovery*
Walter Harding, SUNY, College at Geneseo, New York, *Thoreau, Emerson, Hawthorne: The Concord Authors* (Seminar location: Concord, Massachusetts)
Peter Heller, SUNY at Buffalo, New York, *Goethe, Nietzsche, Mann, Kafka, Brecht: The Quest for Greatness*
Robert S. Knapp, Reed College, Portland, Oregon, *Shakespeare: The Question of Genre*
Walter G. Langlois, University of Wyoming, Laramie, *Gide, Malraux, Sartre, Camus: Ethical Dimensions of the Modern French Novel*
Michael Lund, Longwood College, Farmville, Virginia, *Dickens, Eliot, James: Great Serial Novels*
Russell A. Peck, University of Rochester, New York, *Chaucer's Canterbury Tales*
Enrique Pupo-Walker, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, *The Spanish American Short Story in the Twentieth Century*
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U.S. Constitution

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More on the Poetry Debate

If McClatchey's argument is granted, then why does a culture steeped in narcissistic self-concern such as ours not make more use of poetry? Perhaps because one fundamental ground for support of poetry is a widely instilled love of language. I mean a love of what Ezra Pound called *logopoeia*, the dance of intellect among words (to which must be added the dance of feeling among words, as well). Alas, the love of language now suffers devastating competition from the seductiveness of video screens and of convenience-processed packaged communication everywhere we turn. And our critics and teachers of poetry seem to put up less of a countering struggle every semester. Among non-poet scholars, the love of language is losing out to the love of theoretics.

McClatchey offers us Harold Bloom's definition of poetry as essentially a "defense of the self" against everything which threatens the integrity of the self, including

even itself. Who will disagree that the self is indeed a chief concern among us? Nor do we lack for advice on how to discover, maintain, and defend it. And so the poetry that McClatchey recommends—Adrienne Rich provides him an illustration—speaks primarily not to our public self but to our private self, where the enabling powers of the world are to be confronted and then harnessed. McClatchey tells us we may look with confidence to the poetic imagination of inward struggle for help in compassing the formidable mysteries of the self. As it negotiates stays against the debilitating agitations of the inner life, poetry supplies the ordering images we need to arrange our life in common with others.

So poetry is a potentially powerful cultural force, however limited its present audience. I agree, preferring as I do McClatchey's perspective to that of Clausen, whose argument serves not so much poetry, not so much the love of language (or the concern for self), as the Baconian,

Wordsworthian, C.P. Snow vision of the powers of mind and the forces of culture distributed into irreducibly separate, often warring faculties and activities. Clausen, it will be noted, gives the reader no lines of poetry for illuminating inspection. McClatchey does: Rich's "Power."

Both McClatchey and Clausen may be right, each on his own grounds. But whether a genuine love of poetic uses of language can be kindled throughout a contemporary population, or whether historian-moralists (like Clausen) can find common ground with poet-critics (like McClatchey), there remains another important perspective to consider: the formally interdisciplinary.

When W.H. Auden in 1939 observed that "Poetry makes nothing happen," he was giving voice to the apparent helplessness of the western democracies in the face of the increasing threat posed by the Fascist dictators. He was noting the failures of cultural liberal humanism (and of collective will) more than of poetry itself in that time of growing crisis. And he was about to turn his indictment upon liberal Protestantism. Both Clausen and McClatchey refer to this and other of Auden's influential *dicta* respecting the role of poetry in modern life.

The perceptions of Auden, a political realist and amateur psychologist who knew theology as well as most theologians, remain a promising source for reflection on the role of poetry now. The breadth and integration of his learning, together with his exemplary commitment to the vocation of poet, ensure it. His example challenges those of us who

would help restore poetry to its rightful place in the larger life of the mind. For example, connections between the religious and the poetic imaginations have been drawn again and again in various ways over the centuries. Today poetry and religion are as intimately linked in the Communist bloc countries, where the suppression of religion has increased the value of poetry, as in the free West, where they have suffered a parallel decline. Clausen is absolutely right when acknowledging that the momentous cultural changes responsible for this decline are "complicated, controversial, and incapable of easy analysis." This is precisely why scholars who care not only for poetry but for the work of the humanities in toto must continue this discussion, emulating the multi-sidedness of Auden, by enlarging its frame. Those who love poetic language and submit to poetic vision will never want long to leave off reading poetry closely (as McClatchey does) to find and to embrace what's *there*. But, when appropriate, we must also enter those complementing, cross-disciplinary discussions of the relations among poetry, religion, and history which clarify perceptions of the full human context for poetic art.

The readership for poetry will increase when we demonstrate more successfully than heretofore, and from our differing perspectives as humanities scholars, how its power relates to all other promptings of the imagination, of the mind generally, and of the *gestalt* of human life.

—Kevin Lewis

Department of Religious Studies
University of South Carolina

NEH Notes & News

Conferences on the U.S. Constitution

High school students will be hearing more about the U.S. Constitution as a result of a series of conferences that the NEH is sponsoring for high school teachers on college campuses. Part of the Endowment's Special Initiative on the Bicentennial, the conferences will bring together distinguished scholars in the fields of American history, political science, and jurisprudence with high school teachers for a series of public lectures, panels and workshops, open to the public. The conferences will be held at the following institutions:

- Wake Forest University/April 9-12 "The Principles of the Constitutional Order: the Ratification Debate"
- Boston College/April 26-28 "Interpreting the Constitution"
- San Jose State University/May 1-3 "Does the Constitution Have a Foundation in Higher Law?"
- Brigham Young University/May 16-18 "Statesmanship and the Constitution"

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Featured in this issue of *Humanities*



1 **Sidney Hook: Humanist Pragmatist, Democrat, American** by Irving Kristol. John Dewey's most distinguished student is the 1984 Jefferson Lecturer. The author explains why "Sidney Hook ... is the preeminent American social philosopher...."



10 **The Aftermath of the Student Revolt** by Nathan Glazer. Does unrest still simmer beneath the surface of today's quiet campuses? Or did American education's "biggest convulsion" leave no permanent mark?

13-26

Time for Scholarship. The articles in this section describe the achievements of scholars who have received NEH fellowships or stipends. To these Fellows, their awards represent a way of buying time—for research, for reflection, for writing. The various kinds of Endowment support available to individuals and institutions are described on page 13. The essays that follow represent work performed with the support of each program in the Division of Fellowships and Stipends.



• **Medical Ethics and the Nursing Profession**, page 13. A professor of philosophy gains insights during a "year off" at Harvard. • **The Return of Martin Guerre**, page 15. The historical consultant for the film writes a social history of sixteenth-



century France. • **Myths of Metamorphosis**, page 16. A forthcoming history of these myths in literature and art considers transformation. • **The Subtleties of Theory in Practice and My Desert Encounter with Plato**, pages 18/19. Two Summer Seminarists reflect on their experiences. • **Utilitarian Confucianism**, page 20. A debate between two twelfth-century Chinese scholars has implications for present-day China. • **The Politics of Ritual**, page 21. The role of civic rituals in sixteenth-century Venice may account for the endurance of the Venetian Republic. • **Demographics and the American Dream**, page 24. Fluctuations in population patterns are fundamental to the perception of opportunity as well as social unrest. • **New Directions**, page 25. The NEH launches four initiatives for historically black colleges and universities. • **A Natural Historian**, page 26. A historian who has written about fire is embarked on a study of ice.



27 **The 1984 Fellowship Awards.** For *Humanities*, April is not "the cruellest month." This is the time when, along with celebrating the 1984 Jefferson Lecturer, we salute the 1984 NEH Fellowship and Stipend recipients, all 2,372 of them. Fellows are listed alphabetically in each program. If your name is on the list, congratulations. If not, perhaps you'll be encouraged to apply next year.

4 **Shifts in the Pragmatic Scene: From the Real to the True to the Good** by David Sidor-sky. Pragmatism from its beginnings at the turn of the century to the social and cultural criticism of pragmatist philosopher, Sidney Hook.



8 **Communism and Anti-Communism in America** by Leo P. Ribuffo. Why the veterans of the ideological battles of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, "now scattered across the political spectrum, continue to publish their memoirs.

- 3** The Jefferson Lecture
- 12** Grant Application Deadlines
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