Humanities



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Humanities

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Editor's Notes

Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski will deliver the fifteenth Jefferson Lecture in the Humanities in Washington, D.C., on May 7, and in Chicago on May 16. The highest honor conferred by the U.S. government for outstanding achievement in the humanities, the award recognizes the combination of intellectual vitality and social concern exemplified by Thomas Jefferson.

Professor Kolakowski, a senior research fellow at All Soul's College, Oxford, and member of the University of Chicago's department of philosophy and Committee on Social Thought, has written more than thirty books on philosophy and the history of ideas. His life and work have exemplified the Jeffersonian ideal of tolerance and an enduring commitment to the betterment of society. In this issue we present the range of this work, from his tireless resistance to totalitarian oppression to his explorations of religious faith.

Professor Gesine Schwan of the University of Berlin explained how Kolakowski's philosophy has worked as a force for freedom in an address, which we reprint here, honoring him as the 1977 winner of the *Friedenpreis des Deutschen Buchhandels*. Kolakowski's principle of rationalistic doubt, said Schwan, has been "a means for shattering all the spiritual and material incrustations that force people into constrained categories of belief."

The Jefferson Lecture was established in 1972 as an opportunity for outstanding thinkers to explore matters of broad concern in a public forum. Previous Jefferson lecturers have been Cleanth Brooks, Sidney Hook, Jaroslav Pelikan, Emily T. Vermeule, Gerald Holton, Barbara Tuchman, Edward Shils, C. Vann Woodward, Saul Bellow, John Hope Franklin, Paul A. Freund, Robert Penn Warren, Erik H. Erikson, and Lionel Trilling.

—Linda Blanken

The Philosophical Resistance of Leszek Kolakowski

Any young German at the beginning of the 1960s who considered himself "leftist" felt his political commitment less as a condemnation of the Western political or socioeconomic system—in general he scarcely thought in categories of the "system"—than as a moral burden of guilt bequeathed by the recent past. This burden not only rested on the older generation, but was inherited by the younger. National socialism, not yet categorized as a special case in the general phenomenon of "fascism" and not yet approached, therefore, with academic distance, was part of the reality concretely experienced or retold. Preoccupation with it was of primary importance in shaping political consciousness.

The most pressing political task besides the theoretical debate on how national socialism could have come about-was the practical repaying of the debt, or to put it more prudently, the attempt to come to an understanding, and perhaps even to a reconciliation with the deeply ravaged neighboring countries. Because the West German government focused efforts at reconciliation on the most important Western neighbor, France, the attention of the "leftists" of the day came to be increasingly directed toward the East—not as an opposition but as a supplement to government policy.

Besides Czechoslovakia, Poland in particular came to be the center of their interest. Communication began to be reestablished between Poland and Germany despite the barriers of

general ideological differences between the East and West; despite the bitterness over the incomprehensible atrocities of the past, which transcended all else; and despite unresolved territorial questions.

One of the ways that Germans became reacquainted with neighboring Poland was by reading an officially published magazine distributed abroad and entitled "Poland." It attempted to provide representative glimpses of the political, social and cultural events of the nation. Here Germans met a promising young representative of the Polish intellectual scene and an already influential academic instructor of the young generation, a philosophy professor from Warsaw: Leszek Kolakowski.

Now, Kolakowski has not taught in Warsaw since 1968, but rather at Berkeley, Montreal, Yale, Chicago, and Oxford, and yet the magazine was correct in honoring him as an outstanding representative of Polish intellectual life. With extraordinary international resonance, he embodies the resurrected vitality of the postwar Polish spirit. This vitality is not characterized by a narrow nationalism, but by an expansive, cosmopolitan awareness of European history and of the European present. In Kolakowski's work, one sees the philosophical tradition of Europe. His command of this tradition pushes to the background the issue of national origins. And yet he is unmistakably a Polish patriot—even outside the geographical borders of his country.

For years in the past, intellectuals of leftist origins who came from Eastern Europe and criticized the socialism established there were ostracized by the very people from whom they expected empathy and productive discussion: from, as Kolakowski called it, the humanistic Left. In those years, however, these people, especially in Germany, were abandoning humanist thought, believing it to be politically noncommittal and too moralizing, in favor of an apparently less ambiguous division of people into friend and foe, the exploited and the exploiter-two neatly divided political camps. Whoever broke out of this pattern, whoever discriminatingly refused to accept the boundaries by criticizing socialism as a socialist, was either dropped from memory or highhandedly assigned to one of the two camps—when in doubt, that of the enemy. This censure approximated the same mechanism that Kolakowski has described and criticized in his own country after 1956 as "extortion by the sole alternative." It is encouraging that Kolakowski's unwavering nonconformity, his foiling of every intellectual fashion, is meeting with an increasingly positive response from the West.

Admittedly, it is not entirely in-

comprehensible that independent thinkers like Kolakowski were considered inconvenient in the wake of the policy of detente between East and West. After years of Cold War and an anticommunism, which in Germany fed on the remains of antidemocratic thinking, fear of a relapse into sterile Western self-right-eousness might have played a role.

losophy.

Kolakowski's theoretical, and at the same time existential, analysis of German national socialism and Soviet Stalinism elevates the phenomenon of responsibility in his thinking to the category of *Grunderfahrung*, a fundamental philosophical experience. "Our primary relationship to the world," he writes in *Traktat ueber*

[The Survival of the pluralist society] depends not only on the continued existence of its institutions, but also on a belief in their value and a widespread will to defend them... We are accustomed to expect from the state ever more solutions not only to social questions but also to private problems and difficulties.... This tendency to bear less and less responsibility for our own lives furthers the danger of totalitarian development.

—Leszek Kolakowski

But just as reconciliation with the democratic neighbors after the Second World War could not be built on the negative foundation of anticommunism—the graves torn open by history had to be truly filled and not just covered over, in makeshift fashion—true detente with the neighbors to the East could take place only when existing differences, either of history or of the current social and political order, are confronted courageously and openly, with the desire for understanding. It is obvious that politicians with official responsibilities and independent thinkers play different roles in this effort. But the absence of tension is not an indication of or a requirement for detente, or even for reconciliation and peace. On the contrary, the courage to name and to analyze differences, not for reasons of political opportunism but for purposes of understanding the reasons behind differences, is indispensable for genuine peace. The life and thought of Kolakowski the nonconformist are tirelessly directed toward the achievement of this understanding.

For Kolakowski, peace, that still precarious balance of conflicts, cannot emerge through the forceful suppression of opposites, but rather through positive solidarity, founded on unconditional moral responsibility. Freedom and unconditionally committed responsibility are fundamental tenets in Kolakowski's phi-

die Sterblichkeit der Vernunft: Philosophische Essays (Treatise on the Mortality of Reason: Philosophical Essays, Munich, 1967), can be interpreted "as the relationship of a voluntarily assumed responsibility." He continues: "If we live, we voluntarily accept this situation. We put, so to speak, our signature under the fiat by which the world has been formed in the shape in which we see it; and since that fiat refers to the whole, it applies our signature to the whole as well for the simple reason that one cannot live partially. Consequently, one cannot partially choose the world in which one lives, the history in which one participates. In this way, we are debtors in every occasion where there is a debt, and all claims for compensation— everything that can be changed—are our concern."

How should these debts and the meaning of responsible action, however, be defined and substantiated? Did Kolakowski not, beginning with the revision of Stalinist Marxism, postulate a permanent revisionism that radically challenged all dogmas, traditional truths, and values? Kolakowski claims to be able to define the meaning of responsibility phenomenologically and at the same time conditionally: "The imperative of responsibility actually weighs on us only when we at least know that something does constitute a value, and as such the object of responsibility, even if it remains unclear in which concrete forms these values are to be realized."

"That something does constitute a value ...": This very statement cannot be justified within the bounds of rational, discursive, historical argumentation; to get there, the bounds must be crossed into a transcendental reality. Kolakowski began as a militantly atheistic Marxist, who, against the background of human liberation, proclaimed man's unlimited autonomy, and went on to criticize and reject first the communist practice of Marxism, and later the central elements of the theory itself, because instead of contributing to the liberation of man it led to his subjugation. In this progression, Kolakowski in fact went a long way toward accepting a transcendental reality. He describes this reality more precisely as that of myth, meaning an unconditioned, absolute truth, by which each conditioned, finite experience is relativized and thus gains its meaning.

That of all people a philosopher who had for years fought against the mythicization of consciousness and of politics in the name of rationalism should now declare myth to be an inalienable element of human culture was bound to elicit bewilderment. But it would be a mistake to assume that Kolakowski in this way abandoned the principle of rationalistic doubt and radical criticism. This doubt, however, is not an end in itself, but rather a means for breaking up all the spiritual and material incrustations that force people into constrained categories of belief, thereby preventing free communication and jeopardizing "peaceful" coexistence. This doubt is in the service of the human community, which for its part needs a bond unifying it in freedom if it is not to fall apart from its internal differences. Such a bond can be established only by the transcendental reality of a myth. The myth serves as an orientation to human behavior and activity. It presents a nontemporal model explaining the deficiency, the organic incompleteness of being, the very incompleteness that in the fundamental philosophical experience of responsibility is felt as a call to diminish personally the debt of mankind. Historical projections or ideas of societal order, which maintain

Christian to complete the integration of the two orders into one coherent whole."

Kolakowski's strictly anthropocentric philosophy encounters the experience of the Christian philosopher: The realm of the finites—of autonomous reason, of discursive thought in science and philosophy-cannot and should not simply be relinquished by man. However, the absolutization of this realm as a self-sufficient truth would rob him of the opportunity to understand his existence as meaningful and to establish his community with others in free solidarity. Participation in the myth is the only way to reach the absolute, which alone is able to constitute the meaning of the existence and the community of human

If this is how Kolakowski approaches the Christian philosophy of Pascal, then at the same time he distances himself from a system of thought that among all modern trends was initially the most closely related to his: the thought of Albert Camus. The two share a fundamental ethical impetus. They are courageous and radical in their questioning. They share insight into human finiteness, and they reject all dogmatism and any reliance on certainties. Both start from the point that man cannot discern any order, absolute reason, or meaning in the world as a whole. However, Camus challenges

values, but, in view of the absurd, without recourse to transcendence.

Kolakowski, despite his deepest respect for the courage necessary to hold consistently the conviction of the absurdity of the world and thus of one's own existence, finds this position unfeasible. This conviction not only forces man to choose between despair and diversion, but in addition denies him any opportunity for a determination of the responsibility to which he is unconditionally committed. Unconditionalness and purposelessness are incompatible. Merely living with what is known in philosophy and science is not possible; participation in the myth is part of our existence.

Nevertheless, science and myth, like the two orders that they represent, are not indifferent to one another and do not complement one another. Each truth tends to declare itself as the sole legitimate truth and to make total claims on man. Participation in the myth is an act of faith without a need for argumentative justification and in this way threatens to degenerate into irrational superiority. Science, on the other hand, demands that only that which stands up to its discursive and empirical tests be recognized as the truth. Without the possibility of a reciprocal relationship or subordination, they call one another into question, mutually fend off their respective claims to absolute truth and

Unlimited freedom for everyone means unlimited rights for the strong or, according to Dostoevsky, in the end, absolute freedom equals absolute slavery. Wherever freedom finds itself in opposition to the law, to intellectual standards, or to tradition, it turns against itself and becomes the weapon of its enemies.

—Leszek Kolakowski

man to live only with what he knows and not to count on anything about which he is uncertain. (Here the influence of the Cartesian tradition is evident.) The obvious inability to discern the orders or meaning of the world as a whole induces in him a belief in its absurdity. The "first and only evidence" of this conviction is the call to rebellion, thus to the obligation to take action for the sake of realizing absolutely binding

validity, and, in this way, show man's irrevocable state of conflict, uncertainty, openness and incompleteness, which owe their origins to his participation in both orders—the finite and the infinite.

The philosopher thus has the important task of shedding light on this basic human situation in its continually emerging forms and of preserving it in memory, of exploding all rigid structures that threaten to

obstruct the openness of existential possibilities. He has the responsibility of promoting tolerance towards different positions, not in order to unify all possible or historically achieved perspectives into one definitive synthesis, but to understand them and make them understandable in their diversity.

All attempts to possess man intellectually, to incarcerate him in an understandable order, are caught in a swirl of doubt. Man remains in the area of conflict between different, even contradictory orders and demands. He cannot entrust himself to any one of them, and it is precisely through resistance that he gains his freedom. And thus even peace, associated with the tempting idea of definitive harmony and calm, finds no justification in Kolakowski's philosophy. The insight into the relativity of competing claims among human demands, not the least of all being political and social designs to satisfy them, undermines the hubris, the presumptuousness, which even today in the name of peace so frequently grants itself the right to use force in implementing political objectives, without concern for the freedom of those who think differently. If this insight wrests theoretical legitimacy away from violence, then it alone makes room for the establishment of genuine peace. Peace, which could be ensured by an appropriate societal structure, would then not be something static, but rather dynamic, marked by debate, creative efforts for withstanding and dealing with conflicts. It would require an awareness of the common bonds and obligations of all people with respect to values that owe their validity to a transcendental reality. In this understanding, peace can be seen as a central issue of Kolakowski's thought and work. It is not a leisurely, not a comfortable peace, but indeed the only possible and human one, and Leszek Kolakowski might add: the only lively and interesting peace.

-Gesine Schwan

Professor Schwan is a professor of political sciences specializing in political philosophy at the University of Berlin. Her published works on political theory and on the policy of the German Social Democratic Party include Leszek Kolakowski: A Philsophy of Freedom after Marxism (1971).

that their validity can be proved scientifically or philosophically— thus, immanently—may presume to force popular consent, even by totalitarian means. The myth, however, binds people together in freedom, because the truth of its nontemporal, preempirical model defies all attempts to prove it immanently, to decree it theoretically, and thus to impose it politically. "The function of mythical consciousness," Kolakowski writes, "is primarily to arouse the feeling of obligation, the awareness of being indebted to existence, and this awareness is capable of creating a mutual bond of cooperation between the sharers of the debt, in fact a bond that is relatively resistant to change."

Kolakowski makes a clear distinction between this sort of myth that joins people in a common state of indebtedness, and the types that proclaim goals of conquest or decree the shape of utopias. The latter types promise the total fulfillment of individual or collective demands. These myths cannot bring about true solidarity because they do not provide a basis for the acknowledgment of norms that are binding for all people and that include everyone as equal members of the community. For this reason, Kolakowski rejects the potentially egoistic central Marxist topos of the right to the satisfaction of one's needs as a basis for all political action.

An appeal by a philosopher for a category that in terms of content has its concrete form in the great religions, and for which the *philosophical* substantiation of its truth and validity has from the outset been rejected as a futile undertaking, is bound to cause displeasure. However, it is understandable and reasonable in its consequences when viewed as an attempt to think ahead philosophically beyond the "end of metaphysics," and to try to formulate and shed light on the traditional problems of human existence.

The fascination (even if overwhelmingly negative at the outset) that Kolakowski has had over the years for Christianity and religion is matched here by philosophical reflection. Religion and Christianity are after all undeniably integrated elements of human culture, but not in the form, so vehemently attacked, of a dogmatic system and an ecclesiastical organization claiming temporal power. For Kolakowski, Christianity and religion form an adequate expression of the internal inconsistencies and contradictions of the human situation, which stem from the participation of man in the two incommensurable orders of the finite and the infinite. The work of the Jansenist Pascal, which is often described as contradictory, provides evidence from Christian experience of insight into this basic human situation. Interpreting Pascal, Kolakowski writes: "The human being lives simultaneously in both orders, which cannot be accepted together. Yet neither can be simply eliminated. Both attract man and both demand tribute from him. It is not the duty of a



Photo by Layle Silbert 1986



The Fifteenth
Jefferson Lecturer
in the Humanities

His watch still keeping London time, a package of French, black-tobacco cigarettes in his hand, Polish expatriate Leszek Kolakowski gazed from his eighth-floor window over the rooftops that fringe the University of Chicago campus and proclaimed himself an admirer of the United States, despite "irritations," such as a "lack of historical sense" on the part of the population.

"It is the most democratic country in the world, not just in its institutions but in its way of life and in the feelings of its people. But I am a visitor here," he said. Kolakowski, one of the world's foremost authorities on Marxism, has not been in his own country for almost twenty years—since 1968, when he was dismissed from the University of Warsaw following his denunciation by Communist party chief Wladyslaw Gomulka. Gomulka, searching for scapegoats for student unrest that had been fanned into violence by an overzealous military seeking to discredit Gomulka's regime, denounced Kolakowski as one of a group of intellectuals who had inspired the rebellious youth. Kolakowski accepted a year's visiting professorship at McGill University in Montreal and never returned to Poland.

The next year Kolakowski taught at the University of California, Berkeley, and in 1970 became a senior research fellow at All Soul's College, Oxford. Since 1981 he has divided the academic year between Oxford and Chicago, where, as a member of the University's Committee on Social Thought and department of philosophy, he teaches seminars and tutorials during the spring and summer quarters.

In more than thirty books, among

them the three-volume Main Currents of Marxism (Oxford University Press, 1978), as near a definitive study as is possible on the philosophy and its twentieth-century descendants, Kolakowski has explored subjects ranging over the history of ideas, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of culture and of politics. He has confronted in his scholarship and political commentary the gravest issues of the age, yet preserves a streak of mischievousness, obvious in his fiction (The Key to Heaven and Conversations with the Devil, Grove Press, 1973) and in occasional irreverence toward the philosophical enterprise. "Philosophers," he says, "neither sow nor harvest, they just move the soil around."

His self-portrait of the philosopher as jester, a role that combines a mild roguishness with the dangerous and urgent task of criticism, introduced him to his first general readership in the United States.

The now famous essay, "The Priest and the Jester," was first published in the United States in an anthology of short fiction, political essays, and memoirs by contemporary Polish writers, The Modern Polish Mind, edited and translated by Maria Kuncewicz in 1962. It became well known in this country, however, after its appearance in a collection of Kolakowski's own works, Toward a Marxist Humanism (Grove Press, 1968), a collection of social critiques representing Kolakowski's progression through stages of Marxist "revisionism." In "The Priest and the Jester," Kolakowski champions a philosophy that "exposes as doubtful what seems most unshakable, reveals the contradictions in what appears obvious and incontrovertible,

derides common sense and reads sense into the absurd." A learned scholar of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation and of various Christian heretical movements, he had studied the processes by which ideas are transformed into dogma, then challenged by new ideas that are in turn fossilized. He wrote, "we know of no completely flexible final method invulnerable to history's threat of petrifaction. We know only methods that maintain durable vitality because they have succeeded in creating tools of self-criticism, even though they may originally have included certain dogmatic premises or a belief in certain absolutes."

In Poland, Kolakowski's message to the Communist party, of which he was a member, was clear. This was the period following the "Polish Spring," the years of de-Stalinization and the relaxation of censorship introduced by Khrushchev's 1956 renunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist party. (It is significant that, of all the peoples' republics in the Eastern bloc, only the Polish Communist party circulated printed copies of Khrushchev's speech.) The increase in civil liberties and expansion of cultural freedom enjoyed in Poland in 1955-56, before Gomulka returned to power, were the direct result of the disintegration of party rule, according to Kolakowski. As he watched Gomulka retighten the party reins, he warned that if Marxism were to retain its vitality in Poland, it must stand up to rational argument.

Norman Davies describes the Polish reactions to Kolakowski's essay in his two-volume history of Poland, *God's Playground* (Columbia University Press, 1982): "The overt compar-

ison between communist and Catholic dogmatism caused immense delight in intellectual circles; and the role of court jester fitted Kolakowski's temper exactly."

As the party became more oppressive, Kolakowski grew more critical.

"I joined the communist party when I was eighteen years old," he says, "being driven by various motivations which perhaps are not easily explained. In part my decision was based on some utopian fantasies; in part it was a reaction, which was very common among the Polish intelligentsia at this time, against a very powerful stream in prewar Polish culture of bigotry and nationalism. There was also the feeling that the Soviet Union had proved to be the most powerful force in combating the horrors of Nazism and that Western democracies had somehow proved to be feeble and incapable of facing this diabolic force.

"Part of the time, I accepted this doctrine. Later I tried, as many of my colleagues tried, to work as an opponent from within."

"Both myself and many of my friends—though not all—believed that although we no longer accepted the party ideology, we should stay in the party because we believed —rightly or wrongly—that it was the only framework within which criticism could be efficiently voiced."

In 1966 Kolakowski delivered a lecture that measured Gomulka's achievements over the past decade against the promises made in 1956. The following day, he was summoned to the Control Commission of the Central Committee and expelled from the party.

"Later in 1968," Kolakowski remembers, "everywhere I was accompanied by the secret police. They make their surveillance obvious. This is to intimidate you . . . to remind you always that you are at the mercy of gangsters."

Then came the student protests of 1968, Gomulka's excuse to silence his eloquent and influential critic.

Kolakowski's career paralleled the development and demise of Marxism in Poland, according to historian Norman Davies:

The rise and fall of Kolakowski over the two decades after 1948 mark the brief period when Polish Marxism showed signs of life.... The guardians of Party truth have never felt sufficiently certain about their principles, or about the reactions of

their Soviet masters, for a sustaining debate to take place. Increasingly, they place their trust in policemen rather than in philosophers.

Toward a Marxist Humanism found a large readership among American scholars and university students in the last years of the sixties. In this collection of essays, American readers were introduced to a philosopher who despised foolish consistencies, who upheld intellectual tolerance, who demonstrated the necessary yoke between responsibility and individual freedom, and who wrote about such matters with grace and wit, as in the last essay in the anthology, "In Praise of Inconsistency":

... the race of inconsistent people continues to be one of the greatest sources of hope that possibly the human species will somehow manage to survive.... For this is the race of which part believes in God and the superiority of eternal salvation over temporal well-being, yet does not demand that heretics be converted at the stake; while the other part, not believing in God, espouses revolutionary changes in social conditions yet rejects methods purporting to bring about these changes which openly contradict a certain moral tradition in which these people were raised.

Kolakowski, rejecting the mendacity and repressive orthodoxy of communism, continued at Oxford for the next ten years the work he was prevented from doing in Poland: subjecting Marxism to the rigors of philosophical analysis. The result is the work for which he is best known, Main Currents of Marxism, a history and critical analysis of "the strange fate of an idea which began in Promethean humanism and culminated in the monstrous tyranny of Stalin."

Calling the work an "intellectual event of the first order" in a review in *The American Scholar* (Spring, 1980) that applauded both its originality and fair-mindedness, Sidney Hook asserted that "hereafter, no one who undertakes to expound or criticize Marxism can afford to ignore [Main Currents of Marxism] . . ., the most comprehensive treatment of Marx, and of thinkers in the Marxist tradition, so far published."

Volume I, The Founders, opens with a simple declaration, "Karl Marx was a German philosopher," the introduction to a long, careful



Student unrest in Warsaw was the reason Gomulka gave for his denunciation of intellectuals who had criticized him. Kolakowski was among the five professors subsequently dismissed from the University of Warsaw.

explanation of Marx's Hegelian heritage and of the influence of Hess and Feuerbach. The volume also traces the origins of dialectic from the soteriology of Plotinus, analyzes the elements of Marx's philosophy contained in *The Communist Manifesto* and *Capital*, and places his theories in the context of nineteenth-century socialism.

With similar comprehensiveness, Kolakowski treats the Golden Age of Marxism in Volume 2 and the Breakdown in Volume 3. In the last volume, he is unequivocal in his assertion that Stalin was Lenin's legitimate ideological heir. "There is absolutely nothing in the worst excesses of the worst years of Stalinism," he writes, "that cannot be justified on Leninist principles if only it can be shown that Soviet power was increased thereby." A more controversial assertion was his evaluation of Leon Trotsky, which Sidney Hook calls a "fascinating chapter that should be prescribed reading for literary intellectuals who have been beguiled by Leon Trotsky's tragic fate and by his rhetorical brilliance."

Kolakowski has received international recognition for both his scholarship and his courage on behalf of intellectual freedom. A foreign member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, he was awarded the Friedenpreis des Deutschen Buchhandels in 1977, the Jurzykowski Foundation Award in 1968, and the Charles Veillou Prix European d'Essai in 1980. In 1983 he won the Erasmus Prize "as a highly gifted representative of a typical European, nondogmatic, intellectual tradition characterized by critical sense and respect for the freedom of the individual." His American honors include the prestigious Mac-Arthur Prize as well as the 1986 Jefferson Lecture in the Humanities.

If pressed, Kolakowski will identify other "irritating sides" of the United States besides the lack of historical consciousness. He is distressed by some shortcomings in public education. ("And yet here in every field there are trained some of the greatest scholars in the world!")

Kolakowski's own educational experience makes understandable his impatience with what he sees as American failures. World War II deprived him of a formal high school. He taught himself Latin, French, and German and read extensively. With this preparation and with some help from the underground educational network conducted by the government-in-exile, Kolakowski passed the examination that gained him entrance to the University of Lodz, and the University of Warsaw awarded him a Ph.D. in 1953 in the history of philosophy.


In his published Cassirer lectures, Husserl and the Search for Certitude (Yale University Press, 1975), Kolakowski quotes Bergson's opinion that "every philosopher in his life says only one thing, one leading idea or intention that endows all his works with meaning." If a single ordering principle could be ascribed to Kolakowski's massive scholarship, from his early challenges of Roman Catholic dogma (Szkice a filozofii katolickiej or Essays on Catholic Philosophy, 1955) to his study of Bergson published last year by Oxford University Press, it would be his reverence for intellectual freedom. One of his first major works, published in Polish in 1958, was an edition of Spinoza's letters and a study of his philosophy, The Individual and the Infinite: Freedom and the Antinomies of

Freedom in the Philosophy of Spinoza. Chrētiens sans ēglise (Christians without a Church), written in Polish in 1964 and translated into French in 1968, is an investigation of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century heretical and mystical movements in Holland and France that focuses on the alternatives to an imposition of orthodoxy. In The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought, translated into English in 1966, Kolakowski attacks the radical positivist restraint on philosophy.

Of course, Kolakowski resisted the application of a single ordering principle to his work as strenuously as he has resisted the imposition of such a principle on the human experience. "I do believe," he concludes in *Husserl and the Search for Certitude*, "that human culture cannot ever reach a perfect synthesis of its diversified and incompatible components. Its richness is supported by this very incompatibility of its ingredients."

Asked for the single intention that governs his approach to knowledge, Kolakowski looked at the empty grey-green expanse of Lake Michigan and replied, "I think it would be very skeptical."

-Linda Blanken



Cobb Hall, The University of Chicago



ON CERTAINTY

At first glance, phenomenology appears to be a very "technical" kind of philosophy. It strives to be a "science," not a Weltanschauung. But its impulse toward a Weltanschauung peeps out again and again. Husserl himself expected that his method would play a great role in saving European culture from skeptical decay. Like any philosopher, he is intelligible only in contrast to, and against the background of, the philosophical culture he was attacking. In many of his works, his antididactic way of writing discouraged readers: for Husserl the discipline of content was the only thing that counted. And so, his impulse toward a Weltanschauung is often concealed. Sometimes nevertheless it appears clearly (as in *Philosophie als strenge* Wissenschaft or in Crisis). And, after all, without knowing that we would not know what his philosophy is

The concept of certainty can be regarded as the key to Husserl's thought. He noticed that the project of scientific philosophy in the sense popularized by German thinkers in the second half of the nineteenth century was misleading and dangerous. The slogan of "scientificity" smuggled a renunciation of what had passed for science in the genuine—Platonic—sense throughout the European intellectual tradition. It blurred the basic distinction between doxa and episteme, between opinion and knowledge. In giving up the tradition of German idealism, philosophy gave up its independence from

the sciences. It started regarding itself either as a synthesis of the sciences or as a psychological analysis. Even new variants of Kantianism shifted to the psychological standpoint and explained the Kantian a priori not as a set of transcendental conditions of knowledge (valid for any rational being) but as specific qualities of the human psyche, and this led fatefully to generic relativism.

Husserl's concept of "scientific philosophy" was entirely different. Philosophy must not accept any ready-made results from the sciences and "generalize" them. Its calling is to inquire into the meaning and foundation of these results. Philosophy does not have to be a "crown" or a synthesis, but a meaning-founding activity which logically precedes the sciences, as they are incapable of interpreting themselves. The idea of an epistemology based on a science, on psychology in particular, is revoltingly absurd.

To believe in a psychological epistemology amounts to believing that we are allowed to accept the results of one particular science in order to legitimate the claims of any science to objectivity or to endow with meaning all sciences, and this obviously involves a vicious circle. Thus Husserl took over the antiskeptical tradition of European philosophy the tradition of Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant, all of whom had asked (1) What may be doubted and what may not? (2) Are we entitled to ask (and to answer) not only "how is the world?" but also "how is the world bound to be?" and what is the sense and the purpose of the latter question?

Husserl believed that the search for certitude was constitutive of European culture and that giving up this search would amount to destroying that culture. Husserl was probably right: the history of science and philosophy in Europe would indeed be unintelligible if we neglected the pursuit of such a certitude, a certitude that is more than practically satisfying; a pursuit of truth as distinct from the pursuit of technically reliable knowledge. We do not have to explain why we look for certainty when doubt hinders our practical life; but the need for certainty is not so obvious when no direct, indirect, or even possible, practical considerations are involved. Every high-school student is taught that geometry, in conformity with its name, originated from the need to measure land. Still, it would be hard to explain how, in measuring the land, the axiomatic system of Euclid—the system we admire today as a miracle—was necessary. We know what arithmetic is for, but no practical needs could have incited Euclid to build his well-known beautiful proof that the set of prime numbers is infinite. One can hardly imagine how the knowledge that the set of prime numbers is infinite, rather than finite, would make any practical difference at all. No practical considerations can explain the great turning points in the history of knowledge, even if their results later prove to be of great practical use. That this is often the case proves that if people had not expected to derive from their knowledge more than technical use, and had not sought after truth and certitude as values in themselves, they would not have produced technically fruitful science. This bears out the idea that it ultimately pays in science to neglect its possible usefulness, but it does not explain why people actually did neglect it: only the fruit, not the reasons of this search are revealed to us.

The task that European philosophy assumed from the very beginning, not only from Descartes, was this: to destroy apparent certitudes in order to gain "genuine" ones; to cast doubt on everything, in order to free oneself from doubting. As a rule, its destructive results proved to

be more efficient and more convincing than its postive programs: philosophers have always been stronger in shattering old certitudes than in establishing new ones.

... Finally, it is arguable—again, a moral from Husserl's development—that a truly radical search for certitude always ends with the conclusion that certitude is accessible only in immanence, that the perfect transparence of the object is to be found only when the object and subject (empirical or transcendental Ego, no matter) come to identity. This means that a certitude mediated in words is no longer certitude. We gain or we imagine to have gained access to certitude only as far as we gain or imagine to have gained perfect identity with the object, an identity whose model is the mystical experience. This experience however is incommunicable; any attempt to hand it over to others destroys the very immediacy that was supposed to be its value-consequently it destroys certitude. Whatever enters the field of human communication is inevitably uncertain, always questionable, fragile, provisory, and mortal. Still, the search for certitude is unlikely to be given up, and we may doubt if it would be desirable to stop it. This search has little to do with the progress of science and technology. Its background is religious rather than intellectual; it is, as Husserl perfectly knew, a search for meaning. It is a desire to live in a world out of which contingency is banned, where sense (and this means purpose) is given to everything. Science is incapable of providing us with that kind of certitude, and it is unlikely that people could ever give up their attempts to go beyond scientific rationality. Husserl and the Search for Certitude,

ON THE ROLE OF THE PHILOSOPHER:
"The Priest and the Jester"

Yale University Press, 1975.

The antagonism between a philosophy that perpetuates the absolute and a philosophy that questions accepted absolutes seems incurable, as incurable as that which exists between conservatism and radicalism in all aspects of human life. This is the antagonism between the priest

and the jester, and in almost every epoch the philosophy of the priest and the philosophy of the jester are the two most general forms of intellectual culture. The priest is the guardian of the absolute; he sustains the cult of the final and the obvious as acknowledged by and contained in tradition. The jester is he who moves in good society without belonging to it, and treats it with impertinence; he who doubts all that appears self-evident. He could not do this if he belonged to good society; he would then be at best a salon scandalmonger. The jester must stand outside good society and observe it from the sidelines in order to unveil the nonobvious behind the obvious, the nonfinal behind the final; yet he must frequent society so as to know what it holds sacred and to have the opportunity to address it impertinently. Georges Sorel wrote about the jesting role of philosophy in connection with the encyclopedists, but in a pejorative sense. For him the jester was simply a toy of the aristocrats. But though it is true that philosophers have amused monarchs, their antics have played a part in earthquakes-precisely when they were the gambols of jesters. Priests and jesters cannot be reconciled unless one of them is transformed into the other, as sometimes happens. (Most often the jester becomes a priest—as Socrates became Plato—and not vice versa.) In every era the jester's philosophy exposes

as doubtful what seems most unshakable, reveals the contradictions in what appears obvious and incontrovertible, derides common sense and reads sense into the absurd. In short, it undertakes the daily chores of the jester's profession together with the inevitable risk of appearing ridiculous. Depending on time and place, the jester's thinking can range through all the extremes of thought, for what is sacred today was paradoxical yesterday, and absolutes on the equator are often blasphemies at the poles. The jester's constant effort is to consider all the possible reasons for contradictory ideas. It is thus dialectical by nature—simply the attempt to change what is because it is. He is motivated not by a desire to be perverse but by distrust of a stabilized system. In a world where apparently everything has already happened, he represents an active imagination defined by the opposition it must overcome.

Fichte's great contribution was the simple observation that thought cannot move without obstacles, just as a car cannot start on ice or an airplane take off in a vacuum. For the same reason, any philosophy that is pure autoreflection or that is realized in the closed world of a monad is sheer delusion. And to suppose that the subject is identical with the object in the act of cognition is internally contradictory; to posit such an identity is tantamount to assuming immobility—a situation where no cognition




The Uprising by Honore Daumier, ca. 1860

Karl Marx. 1818-1883

can occur. If, then, philosophy undermines the absolute, if it rejects the uniform principles to which all reality can be reduced, if it confirms the pluralism of the world and the mutual nonreducibility of things, and at the same time affirms human individuality, it does not do so in the name of monadology or a concept of the individual as a selfsufficient atom. For human individuality can be upheld only in opposition to the rest of the world, that is, in its relations to the world-relations of dependence, responsibility, resistance.

A philosophy that tries to dispense with absolutes and with the prospect of finality cannot, by the nature of things, be a consistent structure, for it has no foundations and does not want a roof; it undermines existing structures and rips off existing roofs. In intellectual life it has all the vices and virtues of an indiscreet person with a stunted sense of respect. That is why in certain periods the conflict between the philosophy of the jester and that of the priest reminds us of the clash between the unbearable traits of adolescence and the equally unbearable traits of senility. The difference, of course, is that only the former are curable.

It is easy to see that all our reasoning up to this point can be suspected of falling prey to the monistic temptation its criticizes; the tendency to try to understand the multiplicity of facts by means of a single ordering principle. However, it is not the act of putting facts in order that is the opposite of anti-absolutist philosophy. Order can be a police slogan or the catchword of revolution. The opposite of an anti-absolutist philosophy is only a specific type of order, one that has put the whole multitude of existing and possible worlds into a unifying classification and is satisfied with the job. The police ideal is the order of a comprehensive file; philosophy's ideal is the order of an active imagination. The priest and the jester both violate the mind: the priest with the garrote of catechism, the fool with the needle of mockery. There are more priests than jesters at a king's court, just as there are more policemen than artists in his realm. Apparently it cannot be otherwise. The preponderance of believers in mythology over absolute, the effort to equalize ten-



its critics seems inevitable and natural; it is the preponderance of a single world over the multiplicity of possible worlds, the preponderance of the ease of falling over the difficulty of climbing to the top. We observe this preponderance when we see the astonishing speed with which new mythologies displace old ones. In the intellectual life of a society in which the mechanism of traditional faith has become corroded, new myths proliferate with the greatest ease, even though they may originate in technical advancements or scientific discoveries. Thousands of people fondly imagine that the friendly inhabitants of other planets will one day solve the problems from which humans cannot extricate themsevles. For others the word "cybernetics" embodies the hope of resolving all social conflicts. The rain of the gods falls from the heavens on the grave of the one God who has outlived himself. Atheists have their saints, and blasphemers build temples. Perhaps the longing for the

sions, must fill an incomparably greater amount of space in the system than the growth of tensions, if the whole thing is to be kept from blowing sky-high. If this is so, then it explains why priests exist, though it is no reason for joining their ranks.

We declare ourselves in favor of the jester's philosophy, and thus vigilant against any absolute; but not as a result of a confrontation of arguments, for in these matters important choices are value judgments. We declare ourselves in favor of the possibilities contained in the extraintellectual values inherent in this attitude, although we also know its dangers and absurdities. Thus we opt for a vision of the world that offers us the burden of reconciling in our social behavior those opposites that are the most difficult to combine: goodness without universal toleration, courage without fanaticism, intelligence without discouragement, and hope without blindness. All other fruits of philosophical thinking are unimportant.

ON CONSCIENCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

We profess the doctrine of total responsibility of the individual for his deeds and of the amorality of the historical process. In the latter we avail ourselves of Hegel; in the former of Descartes. It was he who formulated the famous principle, whose consequences are not always visible at first glance, "There is not a soul so weak that it cannot, with good guidance, gain an absolute mastery over its passions." This means that we cannot explain away any of our actions on the grounds of emotion, passion, or the moral impotence to act differently and that we have no right to transfer the responsibility for our conscious acts to any factor which determines our behavior; because in every instance we have the power to choose freely.

This assumption—which, as I have mentioned, can be accepted without contradicting the deterministic interpretation of the worldmust also be extended to all the justifications we find for ourselves in historical necessities and historical determinism. Neither our personal, supposedly invincible emotions ("I could not resist the desire"), nor anyone's command ("I was a soldier"), nor conformity with the customs of one's environment ("everybody did it"), nor theoretically deduced exigencies of the demiurge of history ("I judged I was acting for the sake of progress")—none of these four most typical and popular rationalizations has any validity. This is not to say that these four types of determination do not actually occur in life, but merely to state that none of them releases us from individual responsibility, because none of them destroys the freedom of individual choice. Individual action remains in the absolute power of the individual. We walk the main roads of our life on our own:

Not I, not anyone else can travel that road for you
You must travel it for yourself....
—Whitman

I stress that we are concerned with *moral* responsibility. The soldier who executes his commander's erroneous orders—orders which are inefficient as military tactics—is not thereby responsible for the loss of the battle. A soldier who, on orders, participates in the mass murder of civilians is responsible for homicide. His moral duty is to not carry out the command. Only on this basis were we able to try SS men.

That is why, regardless of what philosophy of history we may wish to accept, we will be rightly judged for everything subject to moral appraisal that we do in its name.

And it is not true that our philosophy of history decides our main choices in life. They are determined by our moral sense. We are not communists because we recognized communism to be a historical necessity. We are communists because we stand on the side of the oppressed against their oppressors, on the side of wretches against their masters, on the side of the persecuted against their persecutors. Although we know that a theoretically correct division of society is not between "rich" and "poor" or "persecuted" and "persecutors," still when we have to accompany our theories with an act of *practical* choice, which means a *pledge*, then we act out of moral motivations, not theoretical concerns. It cannot be otherwise, for the most convincing theory is unable to make us lift our little finger. Practical choice is a choice of values, that is, a moral act, and that means an act for which everyone bears his own, personal responsibility.

> Toward a Marxist Humanism, Grove Press, 1968.

ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY

It is a pious illusion, Marx argues, to expect individuals to live together without the aid of the community and its institutions. It is not in the power of the individual to decide whether his relations with others are to be personal or institutional; the division of labour means that personal relations are bound to transform themselves into class relations, and the superiority of one individual over another is expressed in the social relationship of privilege. Whatever individuals may intend, the nature and level of needs and productive forces determine the social character of their mutual relations.

Individuals have always and in all circumstances stood on their own

feet, but they were not 'unique' [einzig] in the sense of not needing one another: their needs (sex, trade, the division of labour) are such as to make them mutually dependent, and so they have been obliged to enter into relationships. This they did not as pure egos but as individuals at a particular stage of development of their productive forces and needs, which were in turn determined by their mutual intercourse. In this way their personal, individual behaviour towards one another has created their existing relationships and renews them day by day ... The history of an individual cannot be detached from that of his predecessors or contemporaries, but is determined by them.

For Marx, then, the intentions of individuals are of little account in determining the effect and social significance of their behaviour in a situation in which it is not individuals that regulate social ties, but the ties they have created become an independent, alien force regulating the lives of individuals. In the present age individuality is overwhelmed by material forms or by 'contingency'; this constraint has reached an extreme form and has thereby imposed on humanity the necessity of bringing about a revolution which will destroy the element of contingency and give individuals the power once again to control their mutual relations. That is what communism means: restoring the control of individuals over the material, reified forms in which their mutual ties are expressed. In the last analysis, the task facing humanity consists of abolishing the division of labour; and this presupposes the attainment of a stage of technological development at which the system of private property and division of labour presents itself as a hindrance, so that technology itself requires their abolition. 'Private property can only be abolished on condition of an all-round development of individuals, since the existing forms of exchange and productive forces are universal and only individuals developing in a universal manner can assimilate them, that is to say transform them into free vital activity.' In a communist society the universal development of individuals is no empty phrase, but it does not mean that the individual is

to seek self-affirmation independently of others (which is in any case impossible), in monadic isolation and in the assertion of his rights against the community. On the contrary, 'This development is conditioned by the existing link between them—a link constituted partly by economic premisses, partly by the necessary solidarity of the free development of all, and finally by the universal nature of the activity of individuals on the basis of the productive forces existing at a given time."

In the light of this analysis we can easily perceive the error of those totalitarian interpretations of Marx, less frequent now than formerly, which represent his ideal of communism as a society in which the individual is identified with the species by the extinction of all creative initiative and all qualities that might distinguish him from his fellows. On the other hand, Marx does not believe that individuals can determine or assert their true personality by a mere act of self-knowledge. Selfaffirmation of this kind can take place in any conditions, it calls for no change in the world of social ties, and therefore it cannot eradicate human servitude or the process by which human beings eternally forge and re-forge the bonds of their own alienation. In Marx's view, the affirmation of one's own individuality involves the restoration of man's 'social character' or 'species-nature' as distinct from, and opposed to, the state of 'contingency', i.e. enslavement to alienated forces. Under communism, the disappearance of the antagonism between personal aspirations and the species is not a matter of identification, whether forced or voluntary, between the two, and thus of generalized mediocrity and uniformity. What it means is that conditions will be such that individuals can develop their aptitudes fully, not in conflict with one another but in a socially valuable way, instead of superiority turning itself, as now, into privilege or the subjugation of others. 'Depersonalization', if we may introduce this modern term, derives from the subjection of individuals to the work of their own hands and brains; it cannot be cured by a mere reform of ideas, but by reasserting control over inanimate forces which have gained the upper hand over their

creators.

However, to say that Marx did not intend the totalitarian version of his theory is not to say that that version is a mistake and nothing more. We shall have to consider in due course whether Marx's vision of social unity did not contain elements contrary to his own intention, and whether he is not to some extent responsible for the totalitarian form of Marxism. Can that unity in fact be imagined in any other way than that of a totalitarian state, however little Marx himself supposed this to be the

Main Currents of Marxism, Volume I: The Founders, Oxford University Press, 1978.

ON THE FUSION OF MAN'S ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE

The class struggle in capitalist society is a historical form of the struggle for the distribution of surplus product. Why should we presume that the same struggle for surplus product will not go on within an economy based on public ownership (whether that means an authoritarian or a democratic system)? And since public ownership must inevitably beget social layers endowed with privileges in controlling the means of production, the labour force and the instruments of coercion, what reasons could we possibly have to deny that all devices will be employed to safeguard the position of these layers and increase their privileges? (Unless, of course, we predict a sudden restoration of the angelic nature in the human race.)

It is arguable that, in dealing with these questions and in predicting the return of man to the lost unity of his social and personal existence, Marx admitted, among others, two very common false premises: that all human evil is rooted in social (as distinct from biological) circumstances and that all important human conflicts are ultimately reducible to class antagonisms. Thus he entirely overlooked the possibility that some sources of conflict and aggression may be inherent in the permananent characteristics of the species and are unlikely to be eradicated by institutional changes. In this sense he really remained a Rousseauist. He also overlooked the

formidable force of human aspirations for power for its own sake and the extreme antagonisms arising from the relations of power as such, i.e., irrespective of the social origin of given ruling bodies. Of all the famous sentences which have had a dizzy career in history, this is one of the most striking in its falsity: that the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles. That political bodies are nothing more than instruments of classes; that their interests may always be identified with the interests of the classes they are supposed to represent; that they do not produce interests of their own of any noteworthy importance; that people delude themselves if they imagine they struggle for other values (for freedom or for power, for equality or for national goals) as values in themselves, since these values are only vehicles for class interests-all these beliefs are consequences of this one sentence. They gave to Marxism its stupendous efficiency and its catechismal simplicity. Needless to say, Marx's work shows convincingly that in all detailed analyses his thought was much subtler and more differentiated than this sentence would suggest. And yet without basically taking this belief he would not be able to nourish his hope for a unified man.

The Socialist Idea: A Reappraisal, Oxford University Press, 1974.

ON THE FATE OF MARXISM

Marxism has been the greatest fantasy of our century. It was a dream offering the prospect of a society of perfect unity, in which all human aspirations would be fulfilled and all values reconciled. It took over Hegel's theory of the 'contradictions of progress', but also the liberalevolutionist belief that 'in the last resort' the course of history was inevitably for the better, and that man's increasing command over nature would, after an interval, be matched by increasing freedom. It owed much of its success to the combination of Messianic fantasies with a specific and genuine social cause, the struggle of the European working class against poverty and exploitation. This combination was ex-

pressed in a coherent doctrine with the absurd name (derived from Proudhon) of 'scientific socialism' absurd because the means of attaining an end may be scientific, but not the choice of the end itself. The name, however, reflected more than the mere cult of science which Marx shared with the rest of his generation. It expressed the belief, discussed critically more than once in the course of the present work, that human knowledge and human practice, directed by the will, must ultimately coincide and become inseparable in a perfect unity: so that the choice of ends would indeed become identical with the cognitive and practical means of attaining them. The natural consequence of this confusion was the idea that the success of a particular social movement was a proof that it was scientifically 'true', or, in effect, that whoever proved to be stronger must have 'science' on his side. This idea is largely responsible for all the antiscientific and anti-intellectual features of Marxism in its particular guise as the ideology of Com-


To say that Marxism is a fantasy does not mean that it is nothing else. Marxism as an interpretation of past history must be distinguished from Marxism as a political ideology. No reasonable person would deny that the doctrine of historical materialism has been a valuable addition to our intellectual equipment and has enriched our understanding of the past. True, it has been argued that in a strict form the doctrine is nonsense and in a loose form it is a commonplace; but, if it has become a commonplace, this is largely thanks to Marx's originality. Moreover, if Marxism has led towards a better understanding of the economics and civilization of past ages, this is no doubt connected with the fact that Marx at times enunciated his theory in extreme, dogmatic, and unacceptable forms. If his views had been hedged round with all the restrictions and reservations that are usual in rational thought, they would have had less influence and might have gone unnoticed altogether. As it was, and as often happens with humanistic theories, the element of absurdity was effective in transmitting their rational content. From this point of view the role of

Marxism may be compared to that of psychoanalysis or behaviourism in the social sciences. By expressing their theories in extreme forms, Freud and Watson succeeded in bringing real problems to general notice and opening up valuable fields of exploration; this they could probably not have done if they had qualified their views with scrupulous reservations and so deprived them of clear-cut outlines and polemical force. The sociological approach to the study of civilization was expounded by writers before Marx, such as Vico, Herder, and Montesquieu, or contemporary but independent of him, such as Michelet, Renan, and Taine; but none of these expressed his ideas in the extreme, one-sided, dogmatic form which constituted the strength of Marxism.

Marxism, it can hardly be disputed, would not be Marxism without its claim to 'scientific knowledge' of the future, and the question is how far such knowledge is possible. Prediction is, of course, not only a component of many sciences but an inseparable aspect of even the most trivial actions, although we cannot 'know' the future in the same way as the past, since all prediction has an element of uncertainty. The 'future' is either what will happen in the next moment or what will happen in a million years; the difficulty of prediction increases, of course, with distance and with the complication of the subject. In social matters, as we know, predictions are especially deceptive, even if they relate to the short term and to a single quantifiable factor, as in demographic prognoses. In general we forecast the future by extrapolating existing tendencies, while realizing that such extrapolations are, always and everywhere, of extremely limited value, and that no developmental curves in any field of inquiry extend indefinitely in accordance with the same equation. As to prognoses on a global scale and without any limitation of time, these are no more than fantasies, whether the prospect they offer is good or evil. There are no rational means of predicting 'the future of humanity' over a long period or foretelling the nature of 'social formations' in ages to come. The idea that we can make such forecasts 'scientifically', and that without

doing so we cannot even understand the past, is inherent in the Marxist theory of 'social formations'; it is one reason why that theory is a fantasy, and also why it is politically effective. The influence that Marxism has achieved, far from being the result or proof of its scientific character, is almost entirely due to its prophetic, fantastic, and irrational elements.

Main Currents of Marxism, Volume 3: The Breakdown, Oxford University Press, 1978.




ON FAITH AND REASON

The curious fate of the never-ending faith-versus-reason debate in the centuries which followed the salutary shock of the Reformation (salutary for the Roman Church, that is) seems to bear out the commonsense truth that in an urban civilization where movement, change, development, and novelty pass for eminent values, no permanent and satisfactory covenant or armistice between the Sacred and the Profane is likely. By doing away with the Church's continuous tradition as a source of authority in interpreting the Scriptures, the Reformation, as it turned out and precisely in opposition to the wishes of its great initiators, promoted a more, rather than

less extensive use of Reason in theological matters. The march of rationalism could not be stopped and it produced ideological rearrangements on both sides of the conflict between Enlightenment and Tradition. Scholastic methods of supporting religious truth with rational arguments were progressively losing credibility and efficacy, and although the masters of the mediaeval schools never stopped exercising their semantic and logical skills, they were soon to be regarded as uninteresting remnants of a past age, incapable of competing with, let alone of matching, new intellectual trends either of the empiricist or the rationalist kind, all of them contributing to the merciless corrosion of faith. Seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury deists and adherents of 'natural religion' who cut away from the Christian legacy whatever they thought was rationally unprovable, clearly crossed the limits within which Christianity could remain recognizably itself; their successors were prompt to show that if we want to apply strictly the rigours of rationality to the prophetic books of old, the entire fabric of ancient wisdom would fall apart. The first generation of deists were people led to despair by the spectacle of a religious fanaticism, displayed by warring sects and factions, which the eruption of the Reformation had brought to life; their religious rationalism was at the service of tolerance and peace. Most of them certainly believed that the few basic religious tenets which really mattered—God's existence and providential rule of the world, the immortality of souls, Christian moral norms—could be well justified on rational grounds, whereas all the intricate and in fact unintelligible mysteries of trinitology or the theory of grace, all the dogmas and anti-dogmas which incite sectarian wars, killing and persecutions, have no meaning whatsoever and are beyond the legitimate interrational religion did away with all the beliefs on which the distinction between various churches within Christianity—or even, in a more radical interpretation, the distinction between all the religions of the world—had been grounded. It took a long time before this instrument of tolerance would breed the intolerance of fanatical rationalism.

In this respect we are still heirs to the conflict which has been going on since the late Middle Ages, and which became increasingly conspicuous in the seventeenth century, when the rules of the modern scientific spirit were codified in the works of Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Locke and Gassendi, among others. Christian intellectuals were ever more aware of the simple fact that in terms of the discipline governing empirical investigations and of the expanding use of mathematical methods, the legitimacy of the traditional metaphysical approach was increasingly open to question. The position of natural theology was becoming obviously shaky and insecure in confrontation with a concept of Reason monopolistically defined by the norms of scientific procedures. One may speak of the 'escape into irrationality', yet the expression carries a strong and contestable value judgement. In stigmatizing beliefs of kinds of behaviour as "irrational' we necessarily imply a welldefined concept of Ratio and this concept itself is always open to doubt: can we produce any compelling grounds for a definition of *Ratio* without employing criteria whose validity depends on the previous acceptance of this very concept? And so, let us talk not of an 'escape into irrationality', but of an expanding awareness of the irreducibly different ways in which religious beliefs are validated in contrast to scientific propositions, of the incommensurable meanings of 'validity' in those respective areas...

> Religion, Oxford University Press, 1980



Political Theory and Political Practice

Philosopher Alfred North Whitehead maintained that "the task of the university is the creation of the future." Today many college students would agree. The "future" that they have in mind may be a more specific, immediate concept than that contemplated by Whitehead, however. The trend among students is to view their education as training for a career, rather than as a means of developing the "rational thought and civilized modes of appreciation" advocated by Whitehead. Fortunately, the two can be compatible.

An NEH-supported program is combining the two approaches to learning at the University of Maryland at Baltimore (UMBC) and at Goucher College by integrating the study of political philosophy and the study of political science. Over the next two years, students in political science courses at UMBC and Goucher will have the opportunity to discuss with leading political thinkers how political philosophy can inform contemporary public life. Each semester Christopher Kelly, assistant professor of political science at UMBC, and James Stoner, instructor of politics and public policy at Goucher, will bring two guest speakers to their Baltimore-area schools to address students and faculty and conduct classes in ancient and modern political theory.

Inaugurated during the 1985 fall semester, the program marks the first joint venture between two



rather dissimilar institutions. Goucher is a small, private liberal arts college for women, whose curriculum has long emphasized the relation of liberal arts theory and practice. UMBC is a medium-sized public university whose curriculum was developed in the 1960s and 1970s with an emphasis on preparing students for future employment. At present, many departments at UMBC are revising their requirements for graduation with a view to strengthening the traditional liberal arts. Despite these differences, however, the political science curricula of the two schools share certain features. Both are exclusively undergraduate departments, both have strong internship programs, and both offer preparation for careers in public administration or graduate study leading to such careers. In addition, both institutions are able to benefit from a program that neither could afford to sustain by itself.

As the sole instructors of political philosophy at their respective institutions, Kelly and Stoner originally conceived of the joint program as a way to "create a community of scholars that goes beyond a single institution," says Kelly. Stoner believes that "students come to see that learning is bigger than any one school when they see that students at different schools are arguing about the same questions, and that scholars at leading universities are doing the same thing.

Some guest speakers have repre-

sented the theoretical, others, the practical, aspects of political life. Their lecture topics have been geared toward the works being read in Kelly's and Stoner's courses. Thomas Pangle of the University of Toronto used examples drawn from twentieth-century politics to explain Aguinas to students in middle- and upper-level courses. Citing the concept of "conscience" as the principal difference between Aristotle and Aquinas, Pangle went on to show how Aguinas's dictum that "an unjust law is not law" influenced Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the civil rights movement. At the end of one class session, students pressed Pangle to continue the discussion in the student snack bar.

William Galston, former campaign manager for Walter Mondale and now director of economic and social programs at the Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies, addressed the relationship between liberalism and political morality. Defining liberalism as the American belief, based on an Enlightenment view of natural rights, that the role of government is to safeguard individual liberties, Galston went on to examine contemporary public policy in terms of political morality, or "the basic understanding of human excellence in a good society shared by the citizens of a specific political community and embodied in its institutions." Besides offering students a broader definition of liberalism than they usually encounter in discussions of contemporary politics, Galston, the author of *Justice and the Human Good*, introduced Stoner's class in Western political thought to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.

This type of engagement with political theorists from other institutions offers students "a diversity of point of view and helps them overcome a perceived split in their studies between practical courses and liberal arts courses," according to Kelly. "Both schools are committed to providing a liberal arts education along with professional training, but the attempt to do both very often leads students to see their education as divided between the practical and the liberal arts. Students can also tend to divide into those who are interested in furthering their careers and those who want to explore other areas. By having contact with the guest lecturers, students see that the split that they perceive in their courses is not really reflected in life outside the university."

A long-term effect of the guest speaker series may be reflected in the political science curriculum at UMBC. Guest speakers are asked to evaluate the courses offered in political philosophy and their place in the curriculum of each department. The UMBC department of political science recently approved a minor in political philosophy. According to Kelly, students who have participated in the courses associated with the lecture series-many of whom are in the prelaw and public administration programs—have shown a great deal of interest in the minor in political philosophy. The minor will provide students with guidance and structure in selecting political philosophy courses. Rather than choosing political philosophy courses in a haphazard fashion, students in the preprofessional programs, for example, will be able to examine a tradition in political thought in a coherent fashion and receive formal recognition for doing so-thus satisfying both intellectual needs and the desire to prepare for a career.

-Mary T. Chunko

"Political Philosophy and Political Practice"/Christopher J. Kelly, Jr./ University of Maryland, Baltimore County/\$16,575/1985-87/Promoting Excellence in a Field The practice of

The European Struggle against Totalitarianism

(right) Albert Camus, 1913–1960; (below) Joseph Stalin, 1879–1953



"The world in which I live is repugnant," wrote Albert Camus in the midst of the Second World War, "but I feel myself one with the human beings who suffer in it. It seems to me there is one ambition which should be that of all writers: to bear witness and shout, each time it is possible, and according to our ability, for those who, like us are enslaved."

And shout he did. In both fiction and works of philosophy, Camus loudly defended human values. He became absorbed in a crusade in which he would become the spokesman of his own generation and the mentor of the next, not only in France, but throughout Europe.

This was not a one-man crusade. Camus was influenced and encouraged by an international fellowship of intellectuals. In 1939, in an issue of the *Alger Republican*, Camus reviewed the French translation of *Bread and Wine* by his future friend, the Italian anti-Fascist, Ignazio Silone. Camus saw a true revolutionary work in this book. Silone had been a high-ranking member of the Italian Communist party before he quarreled with its leader, Palmo

Togliatti, and left the party. In the review of *Bread and Wine*, which narrates in fictional form how Silone turned against communism after the expulsion of Trotsky from the party, Camus relived his own change of heart.

He and Silone shared a time in history when humanism and personal freedom were being smothered. They also shared a moral impulse to do something about it. In the tide of totalitarianism during the 1930s and 1940s, this "moral impulse" allied them with other writers. When Camus drafted an appeal in 1949 for the creation of a committee of support for Spanish Republican emigres, it was signed by Silone and George Orwell, among others.

In 1937, Orwell had been forced to flee Spain after having fought in Barcelona against Communists who were trying to suppress their political opponents. He wrote Homage of Catalonia, in which he expressed his dread of totalitarianism in a vivid account of his Spanish experience. Camus could have been referring to either of his friends, Silone or Orwell, as well as himself, when he wrote, "By his very function, the artist is a witness for liberty, and it is a justification for which he sometimes has to pay dearly. It is not the combat which makes artists out of us, but art which compels us to be combatants."

The antitotalitarian ideas of these three artistic combatants and a fourth, Milovan Djilas of Yugoslavia, were studied this past summer in an NEH funded Seminar for Secondary School Teachers at Canisius University. Directed by David Costello, a Russian history professor at Canisius, the seminar, "Camus, Silone, Orwell, and Djilas: The



Quest for a Democratic Humanism in Twentieth Century Europe," was attended by fifteen specially chosen high school teachers from varied disciplines (history, English, and political science). They met in Buffalo, New York, to discuss the four authors' different literary approaches to the concept of personal freedom in a totalitarian system.

Costello selected two works from each writer. The Camus texts were *The Rebel* (1951), a long, general essay of political philosophy, and *The Fall* (1956), a technically brilliant novel that calls into question many of the same political premises he so confidently asserts in *The Rebel*.

From Silone came two works of fiction, *Fontamara* (1930) and *Bread and Wine* (1939). Both of these are somewhat autobiographical accounts of the Italian peasantry under fascist rule.

The works by Orwell were *The Road to Wigan Pier* (1936), and *Homage to Catalonia* (1938). The first is a rather unusual combination of an investigative report and a political tract. It begins by describing Orwell's experiences when he went to live among the unemployed miners of northern England, sharing and observing their lives, and ends in a series of sharp criticisms of existing Socialist movements. The latter, as mentioned previously, deals with his experiences fighting communism in Spain.

The fourth author chosen by Costello was Milovan Djilas of Yugoslavia. His works, *The New*

Class (1954), is similar to *The Rebel* in that it too is a book of political philosophy and a critique of a revolutionary movement corrupted by success. *Conversations with Stalin* (1961) is a highly politicized memoir in which Djilas writes about the failure of the Communist promise in the Soviet Union.

Almost two decades separate the works of Orwell and Silone from those of Camus and Djilas, yet they all focus on the same dilemma. "All four were profoundly affected by the breakdown of European order and community after World War I, and all fought fascism actively," said Costello. "As intellectuals defending the principles of democratic humanism in a world changed by Nietzsche, Freud, the new physics, and World War I, they could not look to history or revealed text for absolute comfort and assurance. Men of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the mid-nineteenth century could always fall back on a belief in something larger than themselves, whether it was Christianity, human reason, or science. The fear of anarchy and the cultural pessimism of the period between the wars drove many intellectuals either to despair or to the thought-suppressing rigidities of one or another of the totalitarian systems." But this was not the case with Camus, Silone, Orwell, and Djilas. "Each felt obligated," continues Costello, "often at personal risk, to reject the nihilism of the era and to offer alternatives."



Orwell wanted an England in which goods would be distributed equitably. Djilas became a supporter of political pluralism as the only alternative to the corruption of a victorious revolution. Silone, possibly the most pessimistic of the four, considered martyrdom at the service of the downtrodden. Camus attempted systematically to criticize those thinkers whose works he felt rationalized the need for totalitarian systems in the modern age.

According to Costello, the seminar indicates "There are no quick fixes to the problem of totalitarianism. Mankind changes gradually."

In the six weeks the teachers met in twenty-four, two-hour sessions. These included some lectures by Costello on the historical context of the four authors, but the bulk of the seminar was actually in the hands of the participants, with Costello acting as coordinator. The teachers studied each author and his two texts for four sessions: The first two sessions involved a discussion of the texts and the next two a discussion of what others have said about the texts. Two participants from the group were responsible for leading the discussion on each author. During the final sessions of the seminar, each participant presented a short paper on issues related to the seminar but somewhat more general than those raised in earlier sessions. Many of the papers involved reading an additional work by one of the authors, or a critical work or relevant novel dealing with one of the four or the problems they encountered.


Guy McDaniels of Houston, Texas, entitled his paper, "Obstacles to Social Justice." In it, he analyzed another Silone work, Handful of Blackberries, and found the same theme of cruelty to peasants by the Fascists that was present in the two novels discussed in the seminar. In his Twentieth-Century European History class, McDaniels has already added Bread and Wine to his curriculum. "Silone recognized barriers that were insurmountable to totalitarianism. He realized it would take a long time to achieve freedom." In the seminar McDaniels reread Kant, Nietzsche, and Hegel. He is now helping his students to do the same. "The seminar in Buffalo was tremendously exciting. It gave me an opportunity to do what high school teachers rarely do, that is, sit and think with other adults and push myself to a higher degree of intellectualism than I can achieve with high school students."

John Kenny, an English teacher from Buffalo, focused his paper on a lesser-known play by Camus entitled *The Just Assassins* (1958). His literary analysis of the play cast a new light on what Camus was trying to say in *The Rebel*. Kenny remarks, "The theme of the whole seminar was how do you maintain an optimistic perspective on humanity in a world which has so many reasons for pessimism? The response to oppression is universal and revolution only changes the names of the oppressors."

Costello has received a grant to conduct a similar seminar this summer. However, Djilas will be replaced with two works by Alfred Koestler, *Darkness at Noon* and *The Yogi and the Commissar*. But the theme of the seminar will remain intact: No system, whether religious or political, can claim a monopoly on the truth.

-Stanley E. Wolk

"Camus, Djilas, Orwell and Silone: The Quest for a Democratic Humanism in Twentieth-Century Europe"/David R. Costello/Canisius College, Buffalo, NY/\$47,116/1984–85/Summer Seminars for Secondary School Teachers



Yugoslavia's Memory, Vladimir Dedijer

(right) Colonel Vladimir Dedijer (head bandaged) and Colonel Milente Popovich in Cairo British Army hospital where they were being treated for serious wounds in 1943. (opposite page) Marshal Tito (Josip Broz, 1892-1979) directing the operations of the Communist forces in Yugoslavia from a cave on the island of Vis in July 1944.

May 9, 1943—This battalion of seriously wounded is working well. The wounded are bandaged and washed, the nurses are capable, and even cook tasty meals despite the shortage of food... They spent a lovely First of May. On one side of a river were the wounded, on the other a battalion of the Second Proletarian Brigade. They lit fires on both sides of the river. The wounded sang, the fighters sang. A contest ensued to see who could sing the nicest. The wounded won.

And Vladimir Dedijer made note of their victory. Yugoslav revolutionary, close associate and biographer of Tito, Dedijer is also a historian and political scientist who has witnessed—often from on stage, sometimes from the balconies—pivotal events in recent Yugoslavian and world history. Since World War II, when he was a colonel with Tito's Partisans, Dedijer has also been a diarist, one blessed with an observant eye and an impulse to tell truths.

Dedijer's diaries, which span the years from 1941 to the present, are now being translated and published, in six volumes, by the University of Michigan Press. (Only a small portion of the diaries had been previously published, and that in Serbo-Croatian.)

The diaries are important sources for scholars. Dedijer's record covers not only his experiences as a member of Tito's general staff in World War II, but also Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Soviet Bloc. The diaries recount Dedijer's diplomatic career, and his celebrated defense of Milovan Djilas's freedom of speech. Moreover, the diaries are diaries, not tidied memoirs.

"He's seen all kinds of tremendous events of the second half of the twentieth century," says John V.A. Fine, Jr., of the University of Michigan Department of History, and what Dedijer tells of those events is "based on notes written at the time." Fine points out that Dedijer puts flesh on functionaries and political figures who might otherwise remain "ciphers."

"He knew all sorts of important people, and he has all sorts of personal asides. Which ones cheat at cards. And with people you wouldn't imagine playing cards at all."

The English-language edition of Dedijer's diaries will include footnotes correcting and expanding information in his previously published war diaries and in his later diaries. Dedijer, who is 72, is assisting in the publication project, and is incorporating new information from Tito's state papers and from letters and papers he has been given by other Yugoslav leaders. In poor health, and unable to publish the complete diaries in Yugoslavia, he has felt compelled to find a publisher in the United States.

The first volume of the diaries, covering World War II, is expected to be in print in about a year, according to Fine. It will include a preface by Dedijer, elaborating on the war years in Yugoslavia, and a foreword by Fine. The remaining handwritten diaries will be translated and prepared for publication by both Dedijer and Fine, who speaks and reads Serbo-Croation fluently and who is a friend of the author.

Dedijer lives in Belgrade and in a village on the Istria peninsula. Born in Belgrade in 1914, he studied at Belgrade University while working as a journalist for the newspaper *Politika*, a job from which he was fired because he refused to write articles condemning the Republican government of Spain.

In those same years, Dedijer associated with members of the political underground, including Tito.

Dedijer's mother, a leader of the Yugoslav women's liberation movement, "knew that members of the underground would come to see me and even sleep over," he recalls in one of his books. "She never asked questions. She loved me and required only two things of me: 'Complete the university degree which you've started and shave every



morning ... After that you can do whatever you like, even if you want to be a communist.' A good woman, my mother."

When war broke out, Dedijer fought with the Partisans against the German occupiers. Wounded three times, he also lost his first wife, Olga Popovic. Chief of a Partisan surgical team, Popovic was mortally injured by a bomb that also wounded Tito. Dedijer's account of her remaining days, spent admidst major fighting, is one of his diary's most harrowing sections.

Olga was exhausted and we barely managed to get her off her horse onto a bed of leaves and branches beneath a beech, when the order came to set off again at once. We had gone another kilometer or two when we were told to stop in some steep ravine through which flowed a stream. All around us, from both sides, could be heard the battle . . . Smoke, mixed with the angry stench of gunpowder and the acid odor of husked trees, filled up the entire forest. The bombs fell about us, their fragments ripping off the tree branches. I pulled out my bag with my diary and covered Olga's head with it, hoping to protect her from the bomb fragments. A huge boulder jumped right over us. . . All during the bombing Olga held my hand, and when it had stopped she said to me, "It will be all right."

Dedijer's wife died ten days later.



We dug Olga's grave with our bare hands and knives, because we did not have any shovels.

It was on Tito's instructions that Dedijer kept his diary of the war years. For families of Partisans, the diaries are said to be regarded as an almost sacred text; Dedijer's account contains names of thousands of Partisans killed in the war. Tito called the diaries "our great obituary," but the diaries record more than Partisan dead.

The Third Krajina surrounded five groups of Germans and totally destroyed four of them. Over two hundred Germans were killed. The soldiers from the Krajina stacked the dead Germans in piles of eight and left them that way. Let it be known that the celebrated brigade from Drvar killed them.

Elsewhere, Dedijer preserves moments of idleness.

The rain is dribbling down, an honest to goodness boring fall rain. Cika Janko has taken up a position by a rock, and stretched out the tent flap like an eave, but the water keeps dripping down between the rock and the flap. He's angry because of this and because he lost two games of chess with me. Stari [Tito] says from his tent, "I once played with him in Lepoglava, and he became furious when I beat him!"

A few weeks earlier, Dedijer had been on an inspection tour of Partisan hospitals. Food was in short supply. He recorded an anecdote told by a battalion commander from a Dalmatian brigade: "I went from Kifino Selo to Morine. I crossed by a fence and heard goats bleating as if a snake were biting them. I ran to save the animals, but when I arrived I could not believe what I saw. One of our typhus patients was lying under a goat sucking her teat."

After the war, Dedijer remained a diarist, and he remained in the thick of world affairs. He was a Yugoslav representative at the Paris Peace Talks, and at the United Nations. A diplomatic troubleshooter, he visited Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and India. His biography of Tito was translated into some twenty languages and serialized in Life, Le Monde, and other publications.

In the 1950s, Dedijer was expelled from the Communist Party and lost his job at Belgrade University after he defended the right of Milovan Djilas to publicly criticize the development of a communist elite.

"He subsequently went into exile," writes John Fine, "then returned to Yugoslavia, became editor of the Serbian state papers for 1914, wrote a major study on the Sarajevo assassination, became a major figure on the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal.... Through it all, he rehe died in 1980, made Dedijer the executor of his papers."

With those documents, Dedijer embarked on an expanded Tito biography. "Maybe someone will reproach me for writing a biased book, for writing it with passion, with hatred or love," he says in the foreword to his controversial New Contributions Toward the Biography of Josip Broz Tito. "One thing I will not hide—that I love my land and that I University of Michigan Press, Ann love Tito." Dedijer's massive new

Tito biography is being published, volume by volume, despite opposition from what Fine calls "the more Stalinist types in Yugoslavia." Whether Yugoslavians will be able to read his diaries is another matter.

"Who knows how things are going to be changing there," says Fine. "I could imagine an abridged version. Not only would there be incentive for Yugoslavian scholars-these are absolutely a major source on Yugoslavia-but for Yugoslavian publishers, because he sells very well there."

In the meantime, the diaries published by the University of Michigan Press will enlighten other scholars, and introduce new readers to the war the Partisans fought. Dedijer has seen to that much.

June 4, 1943, en route-Rain, hunger. We are climbing along Vucevo from Mratinje. I cannot carry anything else but my rifle, some ammunition, and the diary. The fighters march and stop every fifteen minutes. On their faces are grimained a friend of Tito, who, when maces, but almost each one of them has a new German poncho on his back. This is the booty from Budanj. Olga is sitting on some rock on Prepelicie. She has heard that I am climbing up, and is waiting for me. She gave me a German poncho and her last canned goods, also captured from the Germans, as a gift.

-Michael Lipske

"War Diaries of Dedijer, official biographer of Marshall Tito"/Mary C. Erwin/ Arbor/\$30,000/1984-86/Translations



World War II Yugoslav Partisans man a machine gun installation.

What Constitutes the Good Life?

How can a society's economic system produce the greatest good for the largest number of its members? Can the Aristotelian idea of the "good life" be conceived independently of the ability to acquire wealth? What is the happiness that Americans believe they have the right to pursue?

The people of Seattle are confronting questions like these in an NEH-funded adult education program created by the Metrocenter YMCA with the continuing education program at the University of Washington. The program brings the ideas of the great social and economic philosophers—Aristotle, Adam Smith, Karl Marx—to groups of adults who are seeking a broad understanding of economic problems and are exploring how societies attempt to promote collective well-being.

In 1981 some of the citizens of Seattle examined the hard economic questions facing their city during a CityFair program sponsored by the YMCA.

"People felt that decisions about economic growth involved more than statistics," says Richard Conlin, a project director for Metrocenter YMCA. They discovered that economic questions are not only technical and political, but ethical and religious as well.

"People wanted to talk about the economy in terms of values, Conlin says. "Yet when they began to discuss the economy, they felt they lacked the ability to understand and articulate the philosophical issues



that lie at the heart of the social contract."

To help the lay public reclaim the ability to debate economic issues in the broad context of history and social philosophy the YMCA created the program "The Wealth and Wellbeing of Our People." Consisting of a series of six seminars, an annual lecture series, and media programming produced by the Seattle NBC affiliate KING-TV, the program is structured by an anthology of readings from Aristotle, Adam Smith, Tocqueville, Marx and Engels, and John Maynard Keynes, as well as short selections by theologians, novelists, poets, and contemporary scholars, such as Ivan Illich, Irving Kristol, Michael Walzer, Walter Lippmann, and J.R. Lucas.

"We wanted to present a diversity of sentiment and philosophical positions," says Paul Heyne, professor of economics at the University of Washington, whose academic background also includes ethics and religion. Heyne led the team of scholars involved in selecting works for the anthology.

The readings are heavy going. "Aristotle's *Politics*, for instance, bristles with difficulties," says Heyne. "It reads like a student's lecture notes—which it quite possibly was—with repetitions, inconsistencies, and missing transitions."

To make the readings more accessible, the scholars included commentaries, which place them in social and historical contexts.

"When Plato and Aristotle examined the question, 'What is the good life?' they were living in an age of anxiety. The city-state of Athens was in decline. Their best hopes were a society that could ensure a reasonable quality of life for individuals, despite a political environment threatening chaos," says Heyne.

When Aristotle asserted that 'man is by nature a political animal,' he meant that man, who is neither beast nor god, does not live in isolation," says Heyne, "but in a community."

Thus, according to Aristotle, the pursuit of material wealth should be a means to strengthen the community, the *polis*. People who pursue

material wealth for its own sake, Aristotle wrote, "are intent upon living only and not living well."

"Adam Smith, on the other hand, did not believe that the desire for wealth was in any way unnatural or a threat to the well-being of the society," says Heyne. Increasing wealth was a universal urge, Smith wrote in his classic treatise of 1776, The Wealth of Nations. People want to "better their condition, . . . a desire that comes with us from the womb and never leaves us till we fall into the grave."

"But Smith knew something that Aristotle couldn't consider," says Heyne. "Smith had observed the process of economic growth visible in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He had seen how a society could increase the production power over time, expanding the supply of 'necessities and conveniences of life.' This was not unnatural or a threat to the wellbeing of future generations. 'Capital has been silently and gradually accumulated by the private frugality ... of individuals to better their own condition.... This effort, protected by law and allowed by liberty . . . has maintained the progress of England toward opulence and improvement ...,' Smith wrote."

To Tocqueville, who observed the U.S. economy in the 1830s, Americans were the incarnation of Adam Smith's social vision. "Self-interest, properly understood," wrote Tocqueville, may not make a life virtuous, but its discipline "establishes habits which unconsciously turn it that way."

Only seventeen years after Tocqueville wrote *Democracy in America*, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote the *Communist Manifesto*. "Even Marx and Engels, fierce critics of the system of capitalism, freely admitted that it passed the test of productivity," says Heyne.

But, while capitalism freed humanity from its enslavement to nature, average English industrial workers had "no intellectual life and were interested solely in their petty private affairs such as their looms and their gardens," wrote Engels. "They vegetated happily [yet they] were not human beings but little more than human machines in the service of a small aristocratic class." Marx and Engels believed that al-

though the "epoch of the bourgeoisie" was a necessary stage toward a society where all people are at last free to develop their potential as human beings, "modern society, which has conjured up such gigantic means of production, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells."

"We won't find simple answers for our age in the writing of these philosophers," says Heyne. "Their worlds differed so much from ours. But those differences can be instructive. If we can understand why Aristotle opposed economic growth and why Adam Smith extolled it, it will prompt us to think about how decisions are actually made in modern democracies."

Arlis Stewart, director of Metrocenter YMCA's community development programs says that "the challenge of this project was to select an anthology that people would not only read but would reflect upon before coming together in the discussion groups. As an aid to such reflection, the reading selections are followed by questions such as these:

—"Aristotle took the institution of slavery for granted and even defended it as natural and just. We repudiate it. But do we repudiate it as thoroughly as we think? Do we believe that people should always be free to do as they please as long as they respect the similar freedom of others? Don't our laws as well as our political morality support a substantial amount of 'paternalism'?"

—"Tocqueville maintains that 'self-interest properly understood' manages to get things done. Our economic system, as Adam Smith noted, depends basically upon self-interested behavior. Could a system based on nobler obligations be as effective in coordinating the everyday details of a highly specialized economic system?"

The anthology and curriculum is being tested and refined in Seattle before being presented to 100 other urban Y's. Ten of these YMCAs will attend a training program to learn how to implement this program, how to establish a working relationship with scholars in their community, and how to develop a realistic financial plan for each city.

Metrocenter YMCA, a branch of the Seattle YMCA, frequently works with the National YMCA on such new programs. "The YMCA is more than a 'swim and gym' organization," says Stewart. "It originated in London to address the needs of young men coming from the country into what was considered an unsavory urban environment. The "Y" was not only a place of shelter and fellowship but an organization meant to reinforce positive social values. Its programs traditionally reach beyond the most visible and political aspects of the issues and raise fundamental questions of history, philosophy, and ethics."

—Susan Rasmussen Goodman

"The Wealth and Well-Being of Our People"/Jarlath Hume/Metrocenter YMCA, Seattle, WA/\$53,347/1984–86/ Humanities Programs for Adults



hilosophy, once viewed as the handmaiden of theology, has toiled most of this century as the chambermaid of science. For quite some time the various natural sciences have been widely regarded as providing clear paradigms of success in the overall human enterprise of acquiring knowledge about our world. It is thus no great surprise to find that philosophers, whose task it is to understand the nature and scope of human knowledge, would come to be so impressed with the range of procedures and techniques loosely referred to as 'the scientific method' that they would treat it as a sort of standard for all our cognitive endeavors. In consequence, questions amenable to resolution by empirical, logical, or conceptual means have been considered worthy of intellectual effort. Questions about reality not of this sort have been largely ignored and considered inappropriate objects of serious inquiry.


Of course, it is no twentiethcentury novelty for philosophers to focus their attention on the methods of science. What is distinctive of our time is the extent to which leading and active members of the philosophical community have allowed their interests to be narrowed by the concerns and constraints of empirical science. It is a well-known feature of recent philosophy, at least of the philosophy that has dominated the English-speaking world, that it has not concerned itself much with many of the big questions traditionally and commonly associated with philosophical inquiry—questions concerning such matters as the meaning of life, the nature and destiny of human beings, and the existence of God. The philosophers have fiddled with technical issues of logic and language while leaving unattended such burning issues of human existence.

The historical precedents and causes of this turn in philosophy are many and diverse. One of the best known philosophical developments in the twenties and thirties was the conception and deployment of a verification principle of cognitive meaningfulness, according to which putative questions of factual significance that could not in principle be adjudicated by sense experience were ruled to be devoid of cognitive,

factual meaning. As Leszek Kolakowski noted with regret some twenty years ago in The Alienation of Reason: "Suffering, death, ideological conflict, social clashes, antithetical values of any kind-all are declared out of bounds, matters we can only be silent about, in obedience to the principle of verifiability." But the principle of verifiability ultimately was found unfit for its task of serving the scientific mind-set and supplanting questions of theology, values, and meaning. No cogent formulation of it could be devised. Yet even without the sort of focused theoretical justification of restricted cognitive inquiry that a verification principle would have provided, philosophers continued for many years to disregard numerous issues traditionally seen as vitally relevant to any reflective, fully human world

Religious questions in particular seem to have suffered a studied neglect among many of the most prominent philosophers of the century. One reason for the lack of philosophical work on religious issues has surely been a widespread lack of personal interest in religion on the part of the philosophers of the recent past themselves. It is safe to surmise in many cases that a personal religious skepticism has given birth to a religious indifference which, in turn, has weighed heavily in the perception of what is or is not an interesting or promising, or even a worthwhile subject of philosophical inquiry. The resultant neglect and even disparagement of religious questions is certainly a phenomenon worthy of critical attention. How should we assess it? A quick look at some features of skepticism and indifference will amplify some noteworthy comments that the great scientist and mathematician of the seventeenth century Blaise Pascal once made about a parallel phenomenon in his own time. And this, I think, will help provide a perspective on the attitude toward religious questions prevalent among philosophers in this century.

In a famous essay published in 1879, W.K. Clifford claimed that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." Notoriously, skeptics demand evidence. Proof is even better. What is less



Philosopl Religion

well known is that relentless skeptical questioning reveals that, ultimately, the universal demand for evidence or proof cannot possibly be met. Consider for example a belief we all hold, a claim that probably very few people ever conciously entertain or reflect on, but a claim which is such that if we did not believe it, and believe it rationally, we could not have any other rational beliefs: What I have in mind is the belief that "the sources of our beliefs (sense experience, memory, the testimony of others, and inductive reasoning, for example) are sometimes reliable." Careful reflection will show that this reliability conviction cannot be proved to be true. Moreover, there cannot exist a shred of good evidence that it is true, because we could not be justified in ac-



cepting anything as good evidence for the truth of this belief without already assuming it to be true. And yet we must hold this belief. If denying its truth were really possible, it would be a paradigm of irrationality. And there are many more such beliefs we all hold, beliefs for which we cannot have proof or even evidence. We all believe there is an external world, that other people have mental experience, that the world has existed for more than five minutes, that we are not now dreaming. But if a skeptic asks "How do we know there is an external world?" or "How do we know the world has existed for more than five minutes?" we quickly find that not a single good argument or piece of noncircular evidence can be marshaled in behalf of these fundamental beliefs.

What should we make of this? Pascal said "Reason's last step is the recognition that there are an infinite number of things which are beyond it. It is merely feeble if it does not go as far as to realize that." Many fundamental convictions, even many necessary for the doing of science, lie beyond the range of rational guarantee. On inspection, though, there seem to be two sorts of questions beyond the range of simple proof or compelling, publicly available evidence. There are, first, nearly universal beliefs, such as those we have just considered. But there are also widely disputed questions, such as questions concerning basic religious issues. Belief in the existence of God may be like belief in the existence of an external physical world, in being beyond the reach of conclusive proof or even generally compelling, publicly available evidence. But it is surely unlike the latter in that it is a widely disputed

Pascal once said, "Those who do not love truth excuse themselves on the ground that it is disputed." No one is clearly victorious in the endless disputes between outspoken theists and committed atheists. Real life is rarely like the Peter De Vries story in which the village atheist debates the town pastor on a public stage and each convinces the other. But even if it were, many people would draw the same conclusions they draw from the actual histories of such arguments: The wise person should keep a cool head and retire from such battles, turning his or her attention to other things, to less lofty matters, to matters clearly within our ken. Reflection on the interminable nature of religious disputes is one cause of religious indifference, and is a very common rationalization of it.

But disputed topics beyond the scope of simple proof are themselves of two important types. There are what we may call existentially peripheral disputed topics, and existentially central disputed topics. An example of the former might be provided by the question "What is art?" or perhaps by the attempt to specify a rigorous and exact definition of the phrase 'work of art.' With or without such a definition, life goes on, and life goes on with just as rich an

aesthetic component. Or consider the question of whether numbers and other alleged abstract objects really exist, of whether mathematical platonism is true. These are disputed topics beyond the realm of rational guarantees. But they are not topics whose resolution would greatly affect in any obvious way at all our existential self-understanding, the way we view ourselves and live our lives. From a Pascalian point of view, indifference concerning existentially peripheral topics is thus acceptable, morally and rationally. But an attitude of indifference concerning existentially central topics, topics whose resolution would greatly affect our self-understanding and the way we live, is, Pascal thought, monstrous. It was his further insistence that religious questions, at least the most basic religious questions concerning such issues as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, are precisely of this type. He said, for example:

The immortality of the soul is something of such vital importance to us, affecting us so deeply, that one must have lost all feeling not to care about knowing the facts of the matter. All our thoughts and actions must follow such different paths, according to whether there is hope of eternal blessings or not, that the only possible way of acting with sense and judgment is to decide our course in the light of this point, which ought to be our ultimate objective.

And went on to conclude:

Thus our chief interest and chief duty is to seek enlightenment on this subject, on which all our conduct depends. And that is why, amongst those who are not convinced, I make an absolute distinction between those who strive with all their might to learn and those who live without troubling themselves or thinking about it.

Is Pascal right about this? What difference could the existence of a God and the promise of personal immortality make to the way we live our lives now? In his book Religion,

Kolakowski has said:

If personal life is doomed to irreversible destruction, so are all the fruits of human creativity, whether material or spiritual and it does not matter how long we, or our own performances, might last. There is little difference between the work of Giovanni Papini's imaginary sculptor carving his statues in smoke for

a few seconds' duration, and Michelangelo's 'immortal' marbles. The question is one of permanency and one of meaning, objective eternal meaning.

It has been pointed out by some philosophers that we can endow our activities with meaning, either by valuing them in themselves or by valuing them as means to goals we value in themselves. But is such valuation an empty gesture in an indifferent, or even hostile, universe? Anything properly placed in a valuational context thereby has meaning. It is endowed with meaning. But do our lives themselves and our valuational activities have meaning? The answer of the western religious traditions is that they do. Our lives have a meaning which is both objective and permanent, transcending what we can now see, a value with which they are endowed by an eternally existent, absolutely perfect God. Much in life is up to us, these religious teach, but much is provided. There are objective, proper goals for all human life and activity, moral and spiritual goals whose attainment is to issue in an everlasting fulfillment of intrinsic good. According to the view which Pascal represents, we thus need not with Russell build our souls' habitation "on the firm foundation of unyielding despair."

But even if it can be argued that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are existentially central questions, issues of the greatest importance, how can we come to know the truth about such matters? Pascal believed that there is a significant amount of evidence favoring the central claims of his religious world view, but that it could not be appreciated by an unfavorably disposed person. He said of God that

...wishing to appear openly to those who seek him with all their heart and hidden from those who shun him with all their heart, he has qualified our knowledge of him by giving signs which can be seen by those who seek him and not by those who do not...

adding that there is enough light for those who desire only to see, and enough darkness for those of a contrary disposition. It was one of Pascal's most profound accomplishments to appreciate the moral, spiritual, volitional, and attitudinal conditions for attaining certain sorts of knowledge. He was convinced that faith, the attainment of truth of these central religious matters, was a matter of the heart, meaning not that it was a matter of emotion, but that it required an involvement of the whole person.

Pascal would remind us that it is not just God who is hidden from the casual observer. In an introduction to one of his scientific writings, he pointed out that the secrets of nature are hidden as well. Human beings must seek them out arduously by devising techniques of observation and experimentation, by carefully applying those techniques, by painstaking checks, and so forth. To achieve a proper position from which to see the truth on religious questions will require the cultivation of different capacities and abilities, but will be no less difficult. Indeed, it may be a good deal more difficult. But Pascal was convinced that a sincere search, in either case, would be rewarded. With this conviction, he said about the question of God that ... there are only two classes of persons who can be called reasonable: those who serve God with all their heart because they know him and those who seek him with all their heart because they do not know him.

Pascal, I think, would be pleased with the very recent contemporary rediscovery of the philosophy of religion, the activity of the past decade or so which is redressing the century's neglect of religious topics



Blaise Pascal, 1623-1662

among philosophers. There are growing numbers of philosophers, just over the past few years, who belong to Pascal's two classes of persons who can be called reasonable, and who are letting their service or search, as the case may be, affect their philosophical work. One indication of this is the growth of a professional organization, the Society of Christian Philosophers, from a half dozen founders in 1978 to a current membership of more than 800, including many of the most active and respected philosophers in this country.

If they are beyond the reach of simple proof and compelling available evidence, the questions of religion are not beyond the scope of reason. They are not beyond the realm of fruitful and exciting philosophical exploration, as numerous contemporary philosophers are now coming to see, and as recently published work in many of the major professional journals as well as from many of the best academic presses amply attests. There is still a great deal of reluctance on the part of many of the philosophical community to acknowledge the interest and importance of religious issues. It would not be true to say that the dominant attitude among philosophers through most of the century has collapsed in the last few years, but it is being eroded at a rapid rate.

Is this, though, really a change of which Pascal would have approved? He abhorred religious indifference, but would he have valued *philosophical* attention to religion? He did seem to hold that religion is a matter of the heart, not of philosophical reason. However, although he did insist that a knowledge of religious truth could not be attained by philosophical reasoning alone, his own efforts in behalf of religious belief in the *Pensees* are eloquent testimony to the salutary relationship between philosophy and the religious quest.

—Thomas V. Morris

Mr. Morris, assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, is the author of Understanding Identity Statements (Aberdeen University Press and Humanities Press, 1984) and The Logic of God Incarnate (Cornell University Press) as well as Anselmian Explorations to be published by the University of Notre Dame Press.

On April 30, 1821, Georg W.F. Hegel nervously paused to clear his throat as he took the lecture podium to address forty-nine students at the University of Berlin.

His resolve fortified by a pinch of snuff, the former divinity school student, admirer of Napoleon and now renowned philosopher, unleashed a broadside against Friedrich Schleiermacher, his colleague and rival on the university faculty.

Hegel had learned that his philosophical adversary was preparing to publish a book detailing his view that religious feeling was more important than a systematic theology in discussing the spiritual realm. Convinced that Schleiermacher was wrong, Hegel-perhaps the last of the great systematic philosophersdecided to strike first. "It was a rather quick decision for him to give the lecture," notes Peter Hodgson, a Hegelian scholar and professor of theology at the Divinity School of Vanderbilt University. "But Hegel wanted to counter some of Schleiermacher's arguments."

As a result, Hegel initiated a series of lectures on religion that continued intermittently until shortly before his death from cholera in 1831. In the process, the German philosopher carved out an entirely new intellectual discipline. "It really was the start of the philosophy of religion," Hodgson notes. "The discipline was just a novelty at the time."

But Hodgson notes Hegelian scholars have struggled through the years to decipher the master's views on the philosophy of religion. Hegel delivered four separate lecture series on the subject—in 1821, 1824, 1827, and 1831—each arousing furious controversy in philosophical and religious circles.

However, "Hegel never published any of these lectures himself," says Hodgson. And so five generations of scholars looking for insight on this topic have been forced to consult Hegel's fragmentary lecture manuscripts and the often-confusing and contradictory accounts of the lectures in extant notebooks of Hegel's own students.

But with major support from NEH, Hodgson is trying to make clear this murky philosophical area. He is producing a new three-volume English translation of the lectures, derived from the student notebooks

HEGEL'S LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

and other materials, along with a detailed commentary pointing out central issues and untangling difficult passages. Perhaps most importantly, Hodgson is taking a radically different approach to organizing the materials than did editors of Hegel's own era.

Hegel's followers published portions of the lectures in German in 1832 and 1840. These became the basis for the only prior English translation, made in 1895, which Hodgson calls "rather stilted stylistically and not too accurate." Rather than organizing the textual materials into four discrete units—one for each lecture series—the early editors "conflated," or tried mixing the different texts together in a topical organization. The result was rather like the jumbled product of an editorial cuisinart.

Like Emerson, Hegel believed that a foolish consistency was the hobgoblin of little minds. "He often drastically changed his mind on particular subjects" between 1821 and 1831, notes Hodgson. "In later years, for example, he was much more interested in Eastern religions—he placed much more emphasis on Hinduism and Bud-

dhism." Hodgson says the early, conflated texts tend to obscure such "extremely dramatic" changes in Hegel's thought.

The conflated editions, adds Hodgson, also "conceal the distinctive structure and argument of the lecture series." Each lecture series "had a polemical setting," notes Hodgson, though each time Hegel took on a different target. For instance, in 1821 and 1824, the philosopher fired away at his rival Schleiermacher "and at the kind of philosophy that tended to reduce everything to subjectivity." But by 1827, "Hegel was being attacked by the religious right as some sort of atheist or pantheist, so he had to reemphasize the importance of historical subjectivity."

In an effort to capture the authenticity of the original lectures, Hodgson has worked with Hegelian scholars from Germany and Argentina to separate the four series of lectures and publish them as autonomous units based on a complete reediting of the sources. The first two English volumes of the new translation were published in 1984 and 1985. The final volume should appear by mid-1987.


"The obvious advantage of our separation of the sources," says Hodgson, "is that it will allow each lecture series to stand in its proper sequence, and it will enable readers for the first time to distinguish what Hegel said in 1821, 1824, 1827, and to some extent 1831, and thus to recognize changes in substance and form of the material."

"In the later part of the nineteenth century, Hegelianism went into eclipse," says Hodgson, as Hegel's systematic philosophy came under attack from critics ranging from Kierkegaard to Karl Marx. "But even then the terms of the debate were those laid down by Hegel."

In the past 30 years, he adds, "there's been a real rebirth of interest in Hegel—a real Hegel renaissance. But now we can approach his views from a distance, and not have to buy into his system as a whole."

-Francis J. O'Donnell

"Complete English Edition of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion"/Peter Hodgson/Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN/\$53,000 OR; \$17,000 FM/1984–87/Translations



Front elevation, Virginia state capitol, by Thomas Jefferson.

The Tradition of Religious Freedom

Two hundred years after enactment of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, questions continue to be raised about the separation of church and state in this country. Such questions have most recently dealt with issues relating to prayer in the schools, tax exemptions for parochial institutions, clerical advocacy of specific political policies, and secular humanism.

Because of the current intensity of interest in the relationship between church and state and in the continuation of the unbroken tradition of scholarship on the statute, the Virginia Foundation for the Humanities and Public Policy sponsored a symposium in September 1985 that brought together noted scholars in religion, political science, philosophy, and history—among them J.G.A. Pocock, Martin Marty, Walter Berns, and Richard Rorty-and members of the public in a discussion of the relationship between the American political tradition and the principles articulated in the Virginia statute. Symposium participants examined the origins of the statute, its historical influence and interpretation, and its relevance and implications for society today.

Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, which passed the Virginia legislature through the legislative skill of James Madison, became the basis for the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom in the First Amendment. Jefferson's words expressed the principle of freedom of thought that was to rest at the foundation of the American republic. The enactment of the Virginia statute marked the first time in thirteen centuries of Western history that a law ended religious persecution, exclusion, and compulsion. It also established the radical separation of church and state. Because the statute contributed to the spread of popular religions and helped to open the door of the new nation to the diverse religious groups of Europe, the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom is one of the essential documents defining not only the law but the culture of

this country.

Examining the history that influenced Jefferson's creation, J.G.A. Pocock of Johns Hopkins University traced the historical origins of contention between church and state from A.D. 324 when Constantine became emperor and established Christianity as the official religion of the Roman empire, through Augustine's civitas dei holding that the earthly city could never be the city of God, through the Protestant Reformation and the English civil war, and finally to the Enlightenment when, according to Pocock, there was a profound change in the definition of religion itself:

Hitherto religion has been about the operations of God in the world; the operations of the Word in becoming Flesh or in becoming the vehicle of the Spirit.... But the effect of many changes taking place at the end of the seventeenth century... was to redefine religion as the holding of opinions, and religious freedom as the freedom to form, hold, and profess opinions concerning the operations, the attributes, and even the existence of God—a great victory for the intellectualization of experience.

Without this intellectualization, Pocock said, religious experience might never have been defined in such a way as to present a radical claim to freedom. But there was a price to be paid, and that was the redefinition of religion itself as the formation and holding of opinions concerning personal religious experience.

In Pocock's view, the Virginia statute successfully legislated both the freedom of the religious sect from the established religion and the freedom of the liberal state from either. It should seem then that the statute goes a little way . . . towards establishing a kind of unitarian universalism—the religion of free enquiry—not as the official religion of American society, but as that most easily recognized by that society's magistracy and values; and at the same time towards regarding the pentecostal sects as a kind of loyal opposition.

Because the religious views of the "loyal opposition" do not permit a definition of religion as consisting of free enquiry and the formation of opinions, the view of religion stated in the Virginia statute and subsequent documents is not one the pentecostal sects support. For that reason, he said, they persist in efforts

to remake society in an image more consonant with their religious beliefs. But, says Pocock, "when they talk of remaking liberal society in Christ's image, the statute and its progeny are there to tell them that this is only bluster; their kingdom is not of this world. The secular magistrate retains his position as the best guarantor of a free society and has not ceased trying to remake religion according to his own specifications."

Martin Marty of the University of Chicago discussed the statute's importance, not for its legal standing because it has none today, but because people see it as a "hinge between ages"—a key moment in the end of the "Age of Constantine" and the beginning of a new one. It is also widely understood that the statute reappears in the First Amendment, which of course does have legal status.

As a background and tone-setting document, the statute is typical of founding texts that lie behind present-day debates over "who owns America," said Marty. If one part of society sees separation of church and state as necessary to securing liberty of conscience, another part sees it (especially the Supreme Court's "acceptance of belief-as-religion") as contributing to the elimination of theism from the public educational system and to the entrenchment of secular humanism in its place.

According to many of the symposium participants, the issue behind much of today's debate relates to the fundamental question of the role of religion—and morality—in society. In his paper, philosopher Richard Rorty of the University of Virginia said, "Ever since the Enlightenment, Americans have tended to agree with Kant that reason can substitute for religion as far as our public life, our relations with others, is concerned." The assumption is that the basis of morality lies somewhere in human nature, rather than in the will of God. Yet, he said, contemporary intellectuals are "less sure than were Jefferson and his friends that there is anything like a universal human nature or universal canons of rationality on which to fall back."

It is not that these people believe the Virginia statute itself was a mistake, he said, but that the statute's philosophical presuppositions were mistaken. Such people claim that society cannot hope to achieve social virtue without agreement among citizens as to what is intrinsically desirable, what practices are good in themselves.

Rorty argued that two hundred years of religious toleration, of letting "other people . . . try out their private visions of perfection in peace" have led to a "disenchantment with the religio-metaphysical picture of the universe of human nature as providing a constant and universal goal. . . . One cannot be both enchanted by one picture of the world and tolerant of all the others, and America has consistently opted for tolerance."

The spiritual liberation brought about by religious toleration, he said, has opened up inspiring political possibilities and forms of moral consciousness—"possibilities and forms which had not been and could not have been envisaged by those who thought that the world contained a *telos*."

If the principle embodied in the Virginia statute is that "liberty of conscience is every man's natural right," that can only mean that humans are not legally obliged to act with a view toward saving their own souls. Truly religious people—Jews, Christians, or Muslims—cannot accept this, said Walter Berns of the American Enterprise Institute. "To assert liberty of conscience is to deny revelation; it is to say that God did *not* reveal the commandments to Moses or did *not* reveal His word through Christ or did not reveal His will to Muhammad."

Yet in the course of time, most states followed Virginia in enacting similar legislation. "Were they following Locke and drawing a sharp distinction between body and soul, state and society, and therefore, the public and the private?" Berns asked. "Probably not."

Toleration of religious differences, for most Americans, has not meant indifference to religion, said Berns. "By separating church and state, Americans consigned religion to the private sphere or, more precisely, to the care of private institutions, but they have traditionally seen reason to provide public support—on a nondiscriminatory basis—for those institutions." And, he predicted, because they retain the

support of the people, such laws will continue to be passed by state legislatures, "the Supreme Court to the contrary notwithstanding."

The Virginia Foundation plans to publish papers from the symposium in a book to be released by the summer of 1987. In conjunction with the symposium, the foundation also conducted a speakers' bureau from June through December 1985. Each of the bureau's fifteen speakers, all of whom are on the faculty of Virginia colleges and universities, spoke at least twice to audiences in thirty towns and cities throughout the commonwealth. Topics ranged from "Freedom, Faith, and Bumper Stickers" to "Jefferson's Legacy: Radical Liberty, Rational Engagement."

Jefferson himself described the country he was trying to create as "an experiment." Rorty believes that if that experiment fails, our descendants will not necessarily learn either a philosophical or a religious truth from that failure. They will simply know what to look for while constructing the next experiment. "Even if nothing else survives from the age of the democratic revolutions," he said, "perhaps our descendants will still remember that social institutions can be viewed as experiments in cooperation rather than as attempts to embody a universal and a historical order. It is hard to believe that this memory would not be worth having."

—Caroline Taylor Henry Latrobe

Thomas Jefferson, by Benjamin Henry Latrobe



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Fundamentals: Issues and Texts

"I usually tell people I'm majoring in literature and philosophy," says Montgomery Brown, a junior at the University of Chicago. Actually, Brown's major is "Fundamentals: Issues and Texts," a unique NEHsupported program at the College of the University of Chicago. Fundamentals is an interesting blend of the kind of self-guided study that came into favor in the 1960s and a traditional, rigorous examination of some great books. Students entering the program choose a basic question about the human condition that interests them, questions such as those that absorbed Socrates-"What is man? What is knowledge? What is justice?"—and with the help of advisers, select for intensive study a few classic texts that illuminate this topic.

The program, which was first offered to undergraduates in October 1983, was devised by senior professors in the Committee on Social Thought, an interdisciplinary graduate department at the University of Chicago. Allan Bloom, one of the creators of Fundamentals, says he had become concerned that "students have lost the powerful sense of reading that affects one's whole life. The classic books are dying because nobody is reading them."

Bloom and his colleagues planned a program of these books specifically for undergraduates, taught by "teachers who are distinguished thinkers, teachers who are inspiring, and teachers who complement each other."

Another founder, and chairman of the program, Leon Kass, adds that there were a number of students at Chicago who would become engrossed in large questions from their readings in great books during their freshman year. It was difficult for such students to continue to pursue the questions that interested them. "Individual students could have engineered a program similar to Fundamentals on their own, but they would have no support, no company. Similarly, the professors who had been independently teaching in the Fundamentals spirit had no formal support."

The concept of Fundamentals: Issues and Texts comes naturally to the University of Chicago, which has a long tradition of incorporating great books into its education of undergraduates. Unlike other great books curricula, however, Fundamentals enables students and professors to concentrate on a small number of texts, to study them in great detail, and to consider the ideas presented in them in relation to a particular fundamental question chosen by the student. "The spirit is philosophic in the old-fashioned sense of seeking wisdom, the belief that one can become more thoughtful, wiser, with the help of great minds," explains Kass. The program's creators believe that when one has become intimately acquainted with even one great book and has learned how to read it perceptively and intelligently, one has learned how to read other books on a similar level.


Students usually enter the Fundamentals curriculum in their sophomore year, although juniors are also accepted. All undergraduates at the University of Chicago take a common core of courses in the social sciences, humanities, biological science, and physical science. In many of these courses, they read primary sources. By the end of the freshman year, therefore, the student who might be interested in majoring in Fundamentals has sufficient background to make an informed decision. Derek Jeffreys, a student in the program, says that a course in the history of Western civilization, in which he read Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Max Weber, focused his interest on the questions, "Can there be a just war? What is an appropriate response to violence?"

A graduate of the program, Bruce King, was powerfully affected by reading the Iliad his freshman year and was particularly interested in the heroic character of Achilles. Once he entered the Fundamentals program, however, and began reading books that portrayed other kinds of exemplary lives, King found that his original interest in tragic heroes and the epic seemed shallow. By the end of his senior year he was concentrating on different models of virtuous conduct—the democratic man in *Emile*, the friend, and the politically excellent man in Aristotle's Ethics.

There are few requirements in the program. Second- and third-year students must take three one-quarter courses (the university has a quarter calendar), each on a single text and taught by a different professor, showing how a text can be read to illuminate basic questions. This year the sequence is Genesis, Shakespeare's late plays, and Plato's *Symposium*.

In addition to the sequence of the three introductory courses, majors must have two years of formal language study, which enables them to read one of their texts in the original language. Brown studied French in order to read Rousseau, and Jeffreys is reading Machiavelli in Italian. Many Fundamentals students learn Latin or Greek.

A requirement for admission into the senior year of the program is the junior paper, which deals with some aspect of the topic of inquiry the student has chosen. King's paper was on the *Iliad* and *Moby Dick*, comparing Achilles and Ahab as heroic figures. Monica Powell, a junior in the program, is writing an analysis of Tolstoy's *War and Peace* from psychological, literary, and sociolog-



ical viewpoints. Brown's interest is the family and its relationship to the political order. This quarter he is writing his junior paper on the first book of *Emile*, and is enrolled in classes on Rousseau's second *Discourse*, a survey of Rousseau's works offered by the French department, and Aristotle's *Politics*.

The culminating activity of Fundamentals is the detailed study of six texts that articulate and illuminate the student's topic of inquiry. With the help of his adviser, Jeffreys has chosen to explore the question of society's response to violence through Machiavelli's *The Prince* and *Discourses*, which he will treat as one book; Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*; a text by St. Augustine or one by St. Thomas Aquinas; the *Iliad*; and the Sermon on the Mount.

At the end of the senior year, students take a three-day examination on the six books, in which they write two extensive papers on questions set by the faculty, in order to demonstrate how they have integrated their topic of inquiry with the texts and their other studies. King says he was given four questions on a Friday morning and asked to write about two of them. He went to the library and wrote all weekend. "Some students actually enjoyed the experience," he remarks.

This particular kind of program intellectually demanding and rigorous, yet relatively unstructured and self-directed— does not appeal to every student. In a way, this is fortunate, because a large enrollment would endanger the program's advising capacity. Kass and Fundamentals students agree that it takes a certain amount of courage to depart from a conventional major. "The students who have joined the program display a variety of abilities and tastes, but share a thoughtfulness and desire to think about basic questions. They all like to read, want a personally meaningful undergraduate life, and an interdisciplinary course of study that integrates life and thought," says Kass.

Students are selected for admission to Fundamentals. The applicants are asked what question is important to them; how at least one book they have read has helped them understand this question; and

why they want to concentrate on Fundamentals. There are also personal interviews and counseling. So far, most applicants have qualified for admission, but Kass expects that as word continues to spread, admissions may need to be restricted in order to preserve the benefits of a small program.

Once students enter the program, they have remarkably close contact with advisers and other faculty members. At this time, there are thirty students majoring in Fundamentals, who are taught by the fifteen faculty members in the program. Not all these professors devote full time to the program, but fourteen of them are advisers. Each student has four advisers: the Fundamentals chairman, the program coordinator, the college adviser who is assigned to the program, and his own faculty adviser, who is a member of the program and who will supervise the student's junior paper. Brown says he is very satisfied with the advising. "Not only can I talk to my assigned advisers, but any professor in the department is available for a conference."

Perhaps even more importantly, the faculty-student ratio and the small number of students allow and encourage a closeness between student and professor and a comradeship among the students that is one of the attractions of the program. This intimate environment offers an unparalleled opportunity for undergraduates not only to study under, but also to become closely acquainted with, prominent scholars, some of whom previously had taught only at the graduate level.

Collegiate lectures, to which the university community is invited, are part of the Fundamentals program. Distinguished scholars from the University of Chicago and elsewhere speak to issues and ideas discussed in Fundamentals classes. Leszek Kolakowski has lectured on several occasions. Other speakers have been Aaron Wildavsky, who spoke on the Torah; David Grene, who lectured on *Hamlet*; and Keith Baker on Rousseau. Approximately six of these lectures are held each year.

The initial three-year period of the program will end this spring. In the fall of 1986 there will be a national conference to which representatives of approximately one hundred

colleges and universities will be invited to share the results of the program. Model classes will be held for conference participants, and Fundamentals graduate Bruce King will describe his question and studies, followed by commentaries by two of his teachers about the books he read. A panel and discussion group will evaluate the concept of the program in general and Fundamentals methodology in particular.

Faculty and students are equally enthusiastic about Fundamentals. Bloom says that two expectations have been "more than fulfilled." "The program has attracted good students whose lives have been changed by the program, and a certain kind of collegiality has been achieved. Professors from various departments—history, classics, psychology, theology, social thought, literature—speak to each other, teach and talk to the same students, and collaborate in a very fruitful way." Faculty members outside the program regard it as a model, he continues. Some have begun teaching single texts, or plan to do so, and some are willing to do small tutorials.

Bloom's first expectation, about students' lives being changed, is certainly true. The students themselves confirm this. Bruce King says he would become so enmeshed in Aristotle's *Ethics*, which he studied for two quarters under Kass, that he couldn't stop thinking about it. "I would walk to the supermarket, mentally rehashing class discussions or finding new ways of looking at the material—and this was a book that initially I felt pretty lukewarm about."

Probably because Fundamentals students have a chance to get to know their professors well and can experience what an academic life is like, the program has changed a few career goals, too. Monica Powell represents many of her fellow students when she says she wants to go to graduate school, to be a college teacher. "Almost everyone in Fundamentals wants to teach."

-Ellen Marsh

[&]quot;Fundamentals: Issues and Texts: A New Undergraduate Concentration Program"/Leon Kass/University of Chicago, IL/\$283,973/1983–86/ Promoting Excellence in a Field

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Advice for Younger Scholars

Sixty-three high school students and more than one hundred college undergraduates have landed summer jobs that will compensate them with knowledge as well as money. The students are winners of an annual competition for Younger Scholars, an NEH program awarding grants of \$1,400 to \$1,800 to students for nine weeks of research and writing about topics in the humanities with guidance from humanities scholars.

Among this year's winners, who come from thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia and who are listed with the other 1986 NEH Fellows on pages 35 to 44, are sixty-six students receiving awards in a special competition celebrating the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution. These students will undertake research projects in areas of constitutional study: the origins of the Constitution; the meaning and intent of its provisions; the relation of

the Constitution to American History, and to American political, social, and intellectual culture.

The 166 winners from both com-

The 166 winners from both competitions were selected from 983 applications in all disciplines of the humanities. Their proposals were evaluated by independent panels of experts in areas of the humanities relevant to the proposed research topics. What were the specific qualities in the 166 winning proposals that convinced the panelists that these were studies worthy of funding?

First, a successful application proposes a project that is both challenging and doable. A Younger Scholars grant involves nine weeks of full-time work. A significant characteristic of the program is that the study takes place during the summer, when a student can concentrate on a single subject without the distraction of other academic responsibilities. The resulting product, therefore, is expected to be much more thorough and more sophisticated than a term paper completed during the school year.


On the other hand, panelists must be convinced that the project can be completed. A project that will take the full nine weeks for reading and research with no time left for writing is not likely to be recommended, nor is a project based on a subject too vast for nine weeks of study, such as the social impact of nineteenth-century technological advances or the search for the sublime in lyric poetry. The single most frequent shortcoming in proposals that were not recommended for funding was over-ambitiousness.

"A rigorous and carefully delineated plan of work which strikes me as feasible and realistic," wrote a re-

viewer of Wallace P. Mullin's proposal to study leifmotifs in The Brothers Karamazov. A junior at Boston College, Mullin will write a commentary this summer that will explain the role of four leitmotifs in Dostoevsky's novel and that will trace their significance in Slavic thought and Russian Orthodoxy. Panelists found Mullin's plan demanding in its requirements of a close reading of a Russian text, of a comparison with two English translations, and of a study of Russian intellectual history. But they also believed that the project could be accomplished because Mullin had limited the number of leitmotifs to be examined and had focused on only one major work. Had the study not been so well defined or had the project involved several novels, reviewers may not have been as enthusiastic about the project, even though the student is well qualified to undertake such a study.

Applicants should keep in mind, however, that a proposal is a piece of persuasive writing. The task is to persuade reviewers that an idea is sound and worthy of the effort involved and that the researcher knows what he or she is getting into.

Daniel L. Alexander, a senior at Lexington High School in Massachusetts who won a bicentennial grant, conveyed through his essay both personal enthusiasm for his study on the historical origins of the accountability provisions in Article I of the Constitution and confidence about the significance of his research. "Here is a topic to challenge a bright student," a reviewer wrote, "my only worry is that it might be too much. But from the excellent references as well as the revealing essay, I think we ought to



let this young man have a go at it."

Alexander's experience as an intern for a U.S. Representative made him aware "of the strong effect that certain provisions of Article I have in making the lawmaking branch of the federal government accountable to the public," he wrote in his proposal.

He continued:

The topic I would like to research is unusual in its character, but it is compelling.... Several American history scholars have argued that the correspondence that young American law students in pre-Revolutionary England sent home convinced colonists that the English lawmaking body was corrupted.... What is exciting about this is not just that many in the American Revolution probably had clear, constitutional objectives, but that such objectives were realized in the American Constitution. The seeds of some of these objectives, then, might well have been the correspondence of the young American law students [in London] such as [John] Dickinson. In particular, the observations of Dickinson and others on the lawmaking body of England and its members' lack a commitment to office or sense of duty to constituents might well have influenced the construction of Article I and its accountability provisions. Therefore, I would like to study the correspondence of these American law students ... and the anti-British pamphlets from [the same period] and compare them with similar polemics that appeared in the years after such men as Dickinson returned home.

Reviewers' comments make it clear that it was Alexander's discussion of the intellectual content of his project that convinced them of its value. One reviewer wrote, "Mr. Alexander is dead right in his belief that by the Revolution, Americans believed they were fighting for a pure and untarnished constitutionalism, which had been perverted back in the Mother Country. He ought to be able to flesh out the story by his research."

Once panelists have determined that the project is rigorous and that its objectives are attainable, they will examine the plan of work to make sure that it is logical. Applicants should divide their projects into stages of work and should describe the specific tasks involved in each stage.

Morgen Fleisig, a junior at Columbia University, won an award to analyze Frank Lloyd Wright's architecture as an expression of contemporary social philosophy. He provided panelists with the following detailed plan of work:

Week 1: Examine in detail the democratic and organic philosophies and personal life of Wright in the period between 1914 and 1932, focusing on the 1920's.

Week 2: Examine in detail the thinking of the social pragmatists, and analyze the way in which this affected Wright's thinking.

Week 3: Examine Wright's architectural projects from the years 1914–32 after a full understanding of the motivating philosophies has been achieved.

Week 4/1st Half: Examine the main thrusts of the European architectural movements and the ideas behind them that existed at this time. Week 4/2nd half thru Week 6:

Outline argument in detail.

Week 7–9: Rough draft through final paper, with an estimated length of

50–75 pages.

Even the best designed projects cannot be recommended for funding unless the applicants are qualified to carry them out. The statement of qualifications in the proposal is brief; therefore, it must include educational experience that is related specifically to the project. Panelists also base their evaluation of the applicant on the quality of thinking and writing evident in the proposal and on the required let-

ters of reference.

Two other elements of the proposal that should not be overlooked are the bibliography and the project adviser. Panelists read bibliographies. Comments about the proposals in the recent competition for Younger Scholars grants show that panelists base their evaluations in part on the applicants' knowledge of the literature relevant to their topics.

Panelists are also asked to assess the appropriateness of the adviser to the project. The adviser should have training and knowledge in the applicant's general field of inquiry, and the proposal should explain the role of the adviser in the project. Here it should be emphasized that the Younger Scholars Program provides grants for *supervised* research in the humanities. The student should describe the nature of that supervision in the proposal.

Philip Clark, a junior from Louisiana State University who won an award from the bicentennial competition, described in detail how he would work with his adviser in the early stages of his project:

Because I will be spending full-time on the project, Dr. Jillson and I have agreed that 750 to 1000 pages per week is a reasonable reading target. I will read and take notes (with the final research paper in mind) during the week. Dr. Jillson will be available to me throughout the week to answer questions or direct me to additional materials. On Friday afternoons I will meet with Dr. Jillson for an intensive discussion on the past week's readings and for direction concerning the readings for the coming week.

The final word of advice is probably the most important. READ THE **GUIDELINES.** Guidelines not only provide information about applicant eligibility and restrictions, they also explain the three possible areas of study for proposed projects—the interpretation of cultural works; the study of historical ideas, figures, and events; and the understanding of a discipline in the humanitiesand give examples of the kinds of projects that could be undertaken in each area. In the case of bicentennial projects, they explain and illustrate the areas of constitutional study.

They also give careful, explicit directions for providing the information that must be included in a proposal and list the criteria by which a proposal will be judged. Guidelines and application forms for the Younger Scholars Program will be available in July from the NEH Public Affairs Office, Room 409, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20506. Telephone: 202/786-0438.

The next application deadline for Younger Scholars is November 1, 1986. Proposals for studies of the U.S. Constitution are again encouraged; the winners of this competition will be at work on constitutional projects during the summer of 1987, the bicentennial year.

THE 1986 NEH FELLOWS

Some of the items in this list are offers, not final awards.

Archaeology & **Anthropology**

FELLOWSHIPS FOR INDEPENDENT STUDY YOUNGER SCHOLARS AND RESEARCH

Michael F. Herzfeld, Indiana U., Bloomington, Local, Regional, and National Identity in a Cretan Town

Jerome R. Mintz, Indiana U., Bloomington, Social Change in the Hasidic Community,

John G. Pedley, U. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Architecture and Sculpture from the Sanctuary of Santa Venera at Paestum

Carol T. Silverman, U. of Oregon, Eugene, Tradition, Cultural Ideology, and Contemporary Folklore in Bulgaria

Michael T. Taussig, U. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, The Magic of History and Its Healing

FELLOWSHIPS FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS

Lila R. Abu-Lughod, Williams College, Williamstown, MA, A Bedouin Family: Ethnography, "In a Different Voice"

Rebecca L. Ammerman, Colgate U., Hamilton, NY, The Mould-Made Goddess: A Study of Votive Terracottas in Magna Graecia

Daniel A. Bradburd, Clarkson U., Potsdam, NY, Western Economic Expansion and the Historical Basis of Tribal Structure in 19thand 20th-Century Iran

Judith N. Friedlander, SUNY Research Foundation/College at Purchase, NY, The Rise of Jewish National Movements in Eastern Europe and the Jewish Question in France Roger Joseph, California State U.-Fullerton Foundation, The Anthropological Image of the World: European Representations of Culture in the 16th and 17th Centuries

Lawrence I. Taylor, Lafavette College, Easton, PA. The Social Construction of Historical Consciousness in Donegal, Ireland

SUMMER STIPENDS

Lawrence A. Babb. Amherst College, Amherst, MA, Image Worship in Jainism Jane B. Carter, Tulane U., New Orleans, The

Origins of Early Greek Lustral Basins (Perirrhanteria)

Arthur A. Demarest, Vanderbilt U., Nashville, The Beginnings of Civilization on the South Coast of Guatemala: The Archaeological Evidence

John A. Grim, Elizabeth Seton College, Yonkers, The Sun Dance among the Crow Peoples of Montana

Emelie A. Olson, Whittier College, Whittier, CA, Women's Symbol Systems and Rituals in Muslim Saints' Shrines in Turkey

Susan Rodgers, Ohio University, Athens, Sumatran Culture in Transition

Daniel C. Snell, U. of Oklahoma, Norman, The Cuneiform Tablets in the Emory U.

Randall K. White, New York U., New York, Ice Age Art and Ornamentation in the Beloit College Collections

Laura N. Albert, Oberlin College, OH, Melville: Civilization and Savagery

Michael F. Bazinet, U. of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Two North African Cloaks: A Comparison

Sarah L. Caldwell, U. of California, Berkeley, A Study of Gesture in Classic Maya Art Craig Stephen DeLancey, U. of Rochester, NY, The Golden Dawn: A Study of Modern Magic Practice

Gery W. Ryan, Carleton College, Northfield. MN, What It Means to Understand the "Other" through a Review of Works on Native American Cultures

Arts—History & Criticism

FELLOWSHIPS FOR INDEPENDENT STUDY AND RESEARCH

Carolyn Abbate, Princeton U., Princeton, NJ, Stories Told in Music: The Narratives in Wagner's Operas

John Belton, Columbia U., New York, CinemaScope: Technique and Technology Vincent J. Bruno, U. of Texas, Arlington, Delos and Pompeii: A Comparative Study of

Greek and Roman Painting Techniques

Wanda M. Corn, Stanford U., CA, Cultural
Nationalism in Post World War I American Art Keith F. Davis, Kansas City, MO, George Bernard Shaw: Photographer of Sherman's

Alfred K. Frazer, Columbia U., New York, The Roman Villa Urbana; 2nd Century B.C.-2nd Century A.D.

Jane F. Fulcher, Indiana U., Bloomington, Politics, Culture, and Wagnerian Opera in Fin-de-Siècle France

Spencer J. Golub, U. of Virginia, Charlottesville, Nikolai Evreinov: A Critical Biography

Richard D. Leppert, U. of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Social-Iconographical History of Upper-Class Amateur Musicians in 18th-Century England

W.J.T. Mitchell, U. of Chicago, IL, Word and Image in the Arts

Maria Teresa M. Moevs, Rutgers U., New Brunswick, NJ, A Study of Greek Figurative and Decorative Arts in the 3rd Century B.C. Jonathan B. Riess, U. of Cincinnati, OH, Luca Signorelli's Orvieto Frescoes and the Culture of Apocalypticism in Late 15th-Century Italy Anne W. Robertson, U. of Chicago, IL, Music and Ritual at the Royal Abbey of St. Denis,

Judith C. Rohrer, Hartford, CT, Architecture and Politics in Barcelona, 1880-1920

Damie Stillman, U. of Delaware, Newark, American Neoclassical Architecture: The Federal Period

R. A. Sutton, U. of Wisconsin, Madison, Musical Pluralism and Regional Identity in Contemporary Java

William E. Wallace, Washington U., St. Louis, MO, The Workshops and Assistants of Michelangelo Buonarroti

Dora L. Wiebenson, U. of Virginia, Charlottesville, Interpretations of Vitruvius' Treatise on Architecture from 1450 to the Present

FELLOWSHIPS FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS

Adrienne F. Block, CUNY Research Foundation/Hunter College, New York, Biography of Amy M.C. Beach, 1867-1944

Michael T. Davis, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA, Paris, Jean des Champs, and the Development of Rayonnant Architecture in Southern France

Mark B. DeVoto, Tufts U., Medford, MA, Pre-Twelve-Tone Composition in the Sketches of Alban Berg

Thomas A. Denny, Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, NY, The Emergence of Schubert's Mature Instrumental Style

Michael Ann Holly, Hobart-William Smith Colleges, Geneva, NY, The Origins of Art

Edward F. Houghton, U. of California, Santa Cruz, A Critical Edition of the Chigi Codex Nathalie B. Kampen, U. of Rhode Island, Kingston, Historical Reliefs of the Roman Provinces

Barbara A. Kellum, Smith College, Northampton, MA, The City Adorned: Programmatic Decoration in Augustan Rome John Platoff, Trinity College, Hartford, CT,

Mozart and the Opera Buffa in Vienna Paul E. Sprague, U. of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, A Documented Catalogue of the Early Work of Frank Lloyd Wright

Paul J. Staiti, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA, The Life and Work of Samuel F.B. Morse

Brucia Witthoft, Framingham State College, MA, The Artist-Family Smillie in 19th-Century

Joanna E. Ziegler, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA, The Brabantine Gothic

SUMMER SEMINARS FOR COLLEGE **TEACHERS**

Allen Forte, Yale Summer and Special Programs, New Haven, CT, Three Masterworks of Early 20th-Century Music

Eleanor Winsor Leach, Indiana U., Bloomington, Roman Art in a Social Context Harold S. Powers, Princeton U., NJ, Verdi

and the Playwrights Eileen J. Southern, Harvard U., Cambridge, MA, Afro-American Musicians in the 19th Century

Janis C. Bell, Kenyon College, Gambier, OH, Focus and Finish in Painting from Leonardo to Poussin

Bonnie A. Bennett, U. of Rochester, NY, 19th-Century Perceptions of Medieval and Renaissance Art as Reflected in the Final Facade for the Florence Cathedral

Charles E. Brewer, U. of Alabama, University, Popular Music from Late Medieval Central and East Central Europe: An Anthology

and East Central Europe: An Anthology
Marcia J. Citron, Rice U., Houston, Cecile
Chaminade in the Context of Fin-de-Siecle
France

Frances G. Couvares, Amherst College, Amherst, MA, Movies and American Audiences in the Early Years

Patricia B. Erens, Rosary College, River Forest, IL, The Film Work of British Directors Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger

Burt H. Feintuch, Western Kentucky U., Bowling Green, The Music of Northumberland

Alicia B. Finkel, U. of Connecticut, Storrs, The Theatrical Sets of Charles Kean and His Designers

Stephen C. Fisher, Widener U., Chester, PA, Series I, Volume 9, of the Haydn Collected Edition

Patricia J. Fister, U. of Kansas, Lawrence, Japanese Women Artists, 1600–1900

Rena Fraden, Pomona College, Claremont, CA, The W.P.A. Federal Theater Project: A Political, Aesthetic, and Cultural Study of the Negro Units

Kathe B. Geist, Illinois State U., Normal, The Films of Yasujiro Ozu

Rona Goffen, Duke U., Durham, NC, Giovanni Bellini and the Renaissance in Venice Ethan T. Haimo, U. of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, The Formation and Maturation of Schoenberg's Twelve-Tone Idea, 1920–30

A. John Hay, New York U., New York, The Chinese Dragon: An Icon of Cultural Structure

Sumiko Higashi, SUNY Research Foundation/ College at Brockport, NY, Cecil B. DeMille: Fabricating Spectacle for a Consumer Culture Joann W. Kealiinohomoku, Northern Arizona U., Flagstaff, Jennie Wilson at the Court of David Kalakaua, King of Hawaii (1875–91): A Study in the Ethnology of Dance

Meredith Lillich, Syracuse U., NY, The Stained Glass of Eastern France: Chalons-sur-Marne and Related Sites in Champagne, 1250–1325

Laura L. Meixner, Cornell U., Ithaca, NY, American Responses to French Avant-Garde Art, 1850–1910

Roger L. Parker, Cornell U., Ithaca, NY, The Milanese Musical Milieu (1800–50) and Its Influence on the Early Operas of Giuseppe Verdi

William A. Pastille, U. of Wisconsin, Madison, Heinrich Schenker: An Intellectual History, 1890–1910

Linda A. Pellecchia, U. of Delaware, Newark, The Misunderstood Vitruvius: The Classical Domus and the 15th-Century Suburban Villa Nancy J. Rosenbloom, Canisius College, Buffalo, NY, The American Silent Film in the Progressive Era

Joseph P. Swain, Colgate U., Hamilton, NY, The Broadway Musical: A Critical Survey

Joseph G. Turow, Purdue U., West Lafayette, IN, Storytelling and Institutional Power as Exemplified by American Television

David T. Van Zanten, Northwestern U., Evanston, IL, The Designs of Louis Sullivan, 1890–95: Classical or Revolutionary?

Maida I. Watson, Florida International U.,

Miami, The Theater of Manuel Ascension Segura and Felipe Pardo y Aliaga

Susan F. Weiss, Garrison Forest School, Lutherville, MD, Musical Patronage of the Bentivoglio Signoria, 1475–1505

YOUNGER SCHOLARS

Susan L. Boynton, Yale U., New Haven, CT, The Marian Motets of Ockeghem and the Cult of the Virgin in the 15th Century: A Liturgico-Musical Study

Sharon Clarke, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, *Sir Nikolaus Pevsner: Did He Mislead Us?*

Connie A. Darby, Edward Little High School, Auburn, ME, Religious Ceremony and Form in Egyptian Architecture

Amy J. Dunlop, Ames Senior High School, Ames, IA, Ed Kienholz and Red Grooms: The Art of Social Suggestion

Morgen L. Fleisig, Columbia U., NYC, The Philosophies and Architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright: 1914–32

Sarah A. Fremerman, Shawnee Mission East High School, Prairie Village, KS, *Dramatic* Criticism and Contemporary Theater

Sarah J. Gillies, U. of Maryland, College Park, The Role of Food in 17th Century Dutch Art Brian W. Hollahan, Druid Hills High School, Atlanta, GA, Interpretation of Cultural Works: Music in the Poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins

Charles S. Kronengold, Yale U., New Haven, CT, Issues of Musical Text Setting as Revealed in Alfonso Ferrabosco's 1609 Setting of Donne's The Expiration

Ann Marie Leavy, New York U., New York, The Life and Photography of Andre Kertesz Alice F. Mauskopf, C.E. Jordan Senior High School, Durham, NC, The Horrors of War: Four Artists' Response to Modern Warfare

Phillip Lynn Nichols II, Halls High School, Knoxville, TN, Monumentality in Three Great Democratic Capitals: Rome, Paris, and Washington

Russell J. Platt, Oberlin College, OH, Romanticism in Modern American Music

Katherine E. Ramsey, Yale U., New Haven, CT, The Significance of Isadora Duncan and Ruth St. Denis for the Development of American Modern Dance

Pedro A. Sanchez, Greenhill School, Rowlett, TX, Visions of Hell: Changes in the Christian Idea of Salvation in Relief Sculpture and Painting

Lauren E. Shohet, Oberlin College, OH, *Text Setting in Six Cantatas of Elisabeth Jacquet De La Guerre*

Classics

FELLOWSHIPS FOR INDEPENDENT STUDY AND RESEARCH

Mark W. Edwards, Stanford U., CA, Introduction to and Commentary on Homer, Iliad Books 17-20

Leonardo Taran, Columbia U., New York, *A Critical Edition of Simplicius'* Commentary on Aristotle's Physics

John J. Winkler, Stanford U., CA, Origin and Development of Tragoidoi in Athens

FELLOWSHIPS FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS

Elizabeth Block, Haverford College, PA, *The Relation of Audience to Narrator in Oral and Literary Epic*

Barbara W. Boyd, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME, The Style and Humor of Ovid's Amores

Judith P. Hallett, U. of Maryland, College Park, Edition and Translation of the Latin Priapea with Literary Commentary

Gary B. Miles, U. of California, Santa Cruz, Foundation and Refoundation: The Historiography of Titus Livius

SUMMER SEMINARS FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS

Charles Hamilton, San Diego State U., CA, *Greek Values in Crisis: Thucydides, Sophocles, Plato*

John R. Maier, SUNY, College at Brockport, NY, Gilgamesh: Myth and the Heroic Quest Marsh H. McCall, Jr., Stanford U., CA, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides: Performance and Interpretation of Greek Tragedy Gregory Nagy, Harvard U., Cambridge, MA, Principles of Classical Lyric: A Comparative

SUMMER STIPENDS

Approach

Darrell D. Dobbs, U. of Houston, TX, Commentary on Plato's Laches

William A. Grimaldi, Fordham U., Bronx, NY, A Commentary on Book II of Aristotle's Rhetoric

Maurice (Rush) P. Rehm, Emory U., Atlanta, GA, Women's Roles in 5th-Century Wedding and Burial Ceremonies as Presented in Greek Tragedy

Stephen G. Salkever, Bryn Mawr College, PA, *Aristotelian Political Philosophy*

Julie A. Williams, Lehigh U., Bethlehem, PA, Formula and Formularity in the Homeric Poems

YOUNGER SCHOLARS

Jorge J. Bravo III, Jesuit High School, Thibodaux, LA, The Peace Plays of Aristophanes

Thomas J. Diaz, U. of Missouri, Columbia, The Sophistic Movement and Sophocles' Oedipus the King Christopher M. Hawke, Swampscott High

Christopher M. Hawke, Swampscott High School, Swampscott, MA, The Satire of Petronius and Juvenal

Rebecca L. Novelli, U. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, *A Comparison of the Sequence Hymns of Notker to Classical Lyric*

History—Non U.S.

FELLOWSHIPS FOR INDEPENDENT STUDY AND RESEARCH

Norman G. Barrier, U. of Missouri, Columbia, *Tradition and Change in Sikhism*, 1880–1920

Linda S. Bell, U. of Chicago, IL, Economic Development in Modern China

Edward G. Berenson, U. of California, Los Angeles, *The Affaire Caillaux: A Study in the New Narrative History*

Iris B. Berger, SUNÝ Research Foundation, Albany, NY, Women in South African Industry, 1925–80

Robert L. Bireley, Loyola U., Chicago, Antimachiavellianism, Counter-Reformation, and the Baroque

Thomas H. Connolly, U. of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, *The Cult of St. Cecilia from Antiquity to the Renaissance*

Peter Duus, Stanford U., CA, Backward Imperialism: The Japanese in Korea, 1890–1937
Paul H. Freedman, Vanderbilt U., Nashville, TN, The Origins of Peasant Enserfment in Medieval Catalonia

Stephen E. Gersh, U. of Notre Dame, IN, European Philosophy from the Late 8th to Late 9th Century

Jeffrey L. Gossman, Princeton U., NJ, Society

Paula E. Hyman, Jewish Theological Seminary of America, New York, Emancipation and Social Change: Alsatian Jewry in the 19th

Enno E. Kraehe, U. of Virginia, Charlottesville, Metternich's German Policy and the Contest with Russia, 1815-20: A Study in the Relationship of Ideology and Power

Elias C. Mandala, U. of Rochester, NY, Peasant Cotton Agriculture in the Lower Tchiri Valley of Malawi, 1907–60

Phyllis M. Martin, Indiana U., Bloomington, Aspects of European Colonialism in Brazzaville, 1885-1960

Susan Naquin, U. of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, The Temples of Peking

Randall M. Packard, Tufts U., Medford, MA, Industrialization and the History of Tuberculosis in Southern Africa

Donald G. Quataert, U. of Houston, TX, A Reinterpretation of the History of Manufacturing in the Ottoman Middle East, 1800-1914 Jehuda Reinharz, Brandeis U., Waltham, MA, Chaim Weizmann: A Biographical Study

Barbara H. Rosenwein, Loyola U., Chicago, Cluniac Notions of Property

Francisco A. Scarano, U. of Connecticut, Storrs, Agrarian Puerto Rico, 1765–1934: An Economic History

Wolfgang Schivelbusch, New York, The Destruction and Restoration of the Louvain Library: European-American Cultural History between the Wars

Michael M. Seidman, Rutgers U., New Brunswick, NJ, Capitalist Elites and Working Classes in Paris and in Barcelona (1936–38) Richard A. Soloway, U. of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Demography and Degeneration: The Declining Birth Rate in 20th-Century Britain

William W. Stueck, Jr., U. of Georgia, Athens, The Korean War: An International History

Warren T. Treadgold, Hillsdale College, MI, One-volume Analytic History of the Byzantine Empire (284–1453)

Martin J. Wiener, Rice U., Houston, TX, Conceptions of Man and Criminal Policy in Britain, 1820-1914

Madeleine H. Zelin, Columbia U., NY, The Redevelopment of Sichuan, 1650–1900

FELLOWSHIPS FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS

Selma Botman, Simmons College, Boston, Political Opposition in Egypt: The Communist Movement, 1952-65

Kendall W. Brown, Hillsdale College, MI, The Huancavelica Mercury Mines and the Spanish Empirial Economy, 1700–1824

Linda L. Clark, Millersville State College, PA, Crossing Administrative Barriers: French Professional Women and Careers in the Governmental Bureaucracy, 1870-1940

Paul A. Cohen, Wellesley College, MA, An Exploration in Historical Epistemology: The Boxers as Experience, Event, and Symbol

Emily Honig, Lafayette College, Easton, PA, The Making of an Underclass: Subei People in Shanghai, 1840-1980

Mary C. Karasch, Oakland U., Rochester, MI, Before Brasilia: Settlement Patterns and Population Change in Goias, 1780–1890

Margaret L. King, CUNY Research Foundation/Brooklyn College, NY, Grief and Consolation in Quattrocento Venice: The Marcello Episode

David C. Large, Montana State U., Bozeman, Cultural History of Munich, 1886–1918 Johanna M. Meskill, CUNY Research Foundation/Lehman College, Bronx, NY, Civic Leadership and Urban Reform in Frankfurt am Main, 1890-1914

R. Keith Schoppa, Valparaiso U., Indiana, The Destruction of Lake Xiang: Themes of Chinese Society and Culture since the 12th Century

SUMMER SEMINARS FOR COLLEGE

Thomas N. Bisson, U. of California, Berkeley, Medieval European Feudalism

Charles T. Davis, Tulane U., New Orleans, Dante's Florence

Walter Pintner, Cornell U., Ithaca, NY, Russian and European Social History: New In-

Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., Tulane U., New Orleans, Central American Crises in Historical Perspective

SUMMER SEMINARS FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS

John Lukacs, Chestnut Hill College, Philadelphia, PA, Churchill's History: The Second World War

SUMMER STIPENDS

Dauril Alden, U. of Washington, Seattle, The Economic Role of the Jesuits in Portugal and Her Empire, 1540–1808

William H. Beik, Northern Illinois U., De-Kalb, The Culture of Urban Revolt in 17th-Century France

Hugh R. Clark, Ursinus College, Collegeville, PA, South China in the T'ang-Sung Interregnum, 878-978

Robert E. Entenmann, Saint Olaf College, Northfield, MN, Heterodoxy in 18th-Century China: The White Lotus Sect and Roman Catholicism in Szechwan

Theodore Evergates, Western Maryland College, Westminster, *Crusaders from Cham*pagne in the Frankish Morea

Joanne M. Ferraro, San Diego State U., San Diego, CA, Brescia during the Ancien Regime Andrew C. Fix, Lafayette College, Easton, PA, The Quaker-Collegiant Controversy of 1660 and the Coming of the Enlightenment World

Maureen M. Flynn, U. of Georgia, Athens, The Changing Perceptions of Pain and Sorrow in Medieval and Early Modern Spain

Rachel G. Fuchs, Arizona State U., Tempe, Charity and Welfare for Impoverished Mothers in 19th-Century Paris

Gay L. Gullickson, U. of Maryland, College Park, Women and the Paris Commune of

Sarah Hanley, U. of Iowa, Iowa City, The Crucible of Royal Justice: Private Interests and Public Passions in Early Modern France (1550-1750)

Mack P. Holt, West Texas State U., Canyon, War, Economy, and Society in 16th-Century Burgundy

Kenneth W. Jones, Kansas State U., Manhattan, The Defense of Orthodoxy by Punjabi Hindus during the 19th and 20th Centuries Robert L. King, College of Our Lady of the Elms, Chicopee, MA, Political Rhetoric and the Execution of Charles I

Maryanne Kowaleski, Fordham U., Bronx, NY, The Role of Domestic Trade in the Pre-Industrial Economy: Local Markets and Regional Trade in Late Medieval Exeter

Norma B. Landau, U. of California, Davis, The Relation of Magistrate to Neighbourhood in 18th-Century London

Erick D. Langer, Carnegie-Mellon U., Pittsburgh, Liberalism and the Debate for Indian Integration in Bolivia

James Z. Lee, California Institute of Technol-

ogy, Pasadena, Agrarian Population and Economy in Qing China: Peasants in Liaoning Province, 1750-1850

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
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